TERRITORIAL GAINS AND LOSSES:

THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ISSUE INDIVISIBILITY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School

of the University of Notre Dame

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Sean P. Braniff

_____

Sebastian Rosato, Director

Graduate Program in Political Science

Notre Dame, Indiana

July 2018

ProQuest Number: 13836113

ProQuest 13836113

www.manaraa.com

TERRITORIAL GAINS AND LOSSES:

THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ISSUE INDIVISIBILITY

Abstract

By

Sean P. Braniff

Why do states develop intransigent maximalist preferences in territorial disputes? I argue that shifting relative power dynamics between states with territorial disputes causes dissatisfaction with the status quo. Rising powers feel they are entitled to more than the status quo and set new aspirational references points. Declining powers fail to accept the new status quo and retain the previous status quo as their reference point. When reference points shift such that states view compromise as a loss they develop a preference for territory that is averse to loss, resulting in intransigent maximalist preferences. This argument explicitly draws on the insights of prospect theory. I test my argument using a mixed-methods approach. I first present evidence from a survey experiment in which participants demonstrated a decreased willingness to compromise when primed in the domain of losses. I then present three case studies of territorial indivisibility, namely Israel/Palestine, Taiwan, and Ireland. I test these cases against prominent theories of indivisibility and find that issue indivisibility is an important factor in international relations and that the source of intransigent maximalist preferences lies in the psychology of loss aversion driven by shifting power dynamics.

To my family,

who have taught me more about indivisibility than a dissertation ever could.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To come to the end of writing this dissertation brings with it the humbling reminder that much of what is good in the pages that follow is due to the influence of others. I gladly take a few lines to offer thanks.

My greatest intellectual debt is owed to the chair of my committee, Sebastian Rosato. Sebastian's keen eye for sound theory helped shape an amorphous idea into a focused project. I have appreciated his candor, mentorship, and friendship. Michael Desch has been an example to me in research and teaching since my admission to Notre Dame and his work steering the Notre Dame International Security Center has provided me opportunities that shaped this project and will remain with me. Gary Goertz has fundamentally shaped my views on methodology and qualitative research. Any student hopes to rise to the level of their teacher, but with this committee the bar is high indeed. I hope my scholarship and service in this profession may someday honor them.

My associations at the University of Notre Dame have been a constant source of support and thought-provoking discussions throughout the course of this project. The faculty in the political science department have been inspirational and encouraging. I owe the project's inception to Guillermo Trejo who introduced me to ways in which prospect theory can be used to understand problems in political contexts. Sarah Daly, Tanisha Fazal, and Dan Lindley all saw aspects of the project at various stages and all gave feedback that was pointed and insightful. Additionally, my comrades among the department's graduate students have been supportive, encouraging, and good not only for valuable intellectual suggestions but also – and at many times more importantly – for

iv

good company. Jesse James and Nate Huston workshopped the first version of this project with me and, in credit to their quality, continued to be good friends despite the crudeness of my early thinking. Omar Coronel, Ben Denison, Tahir Kilavuz, Steven McDowell, Lucia Tiscornia, Sarah Peters, and Luis Schenoni have all provided great insights into this project, wonderful friendship, and often both.

I have presented aspects of this project at conferences including the annual meetings for the American Political Science Association, the International Studies Association, and the International Society of Political Psychology. I owe thanks to the discussants and participants in those panels for their comments and ideas.

A special word of thanks is in order for the Pandora app on my phone and the thousands of hours of music I listened to while writing this dissertation. Eric Clapton, Dave Matthews and Tim Reynolds, and Howard Shore were all constant companions. I'd send them Notre Dame coffee cups if they weren't millionaires.

I thank my family to whom this work is dedicated. None of this would have been possible without the constant support of my parents, Sandy and Tim Harper. I know of no better way to thank them than to pass their example of devotion to my own children. My brother, Chris, is the smartest person I know and a truer friend than I could ever express. My children have been a source of joy and laughter. Liam and Gwyn were with me before this journey began and Ellie was born along the way. During the writing of this dissertation I became just as familiar with Olivia the Pig and Knuffle Bunny as I did with

the literature on indivisibility, and I wouldn't have had it any other way. Despite the tens

of thousands of words that follow, I find myself without the words to express

appreciation to my wife, Stephanie. If I could have her name printed on my diploma

along with mine, I would, because I could not have done this without her. I suppose I'll

just say what I should have said the first day we met: "Want to go out tomorrow?"

CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVISIBLE TERRITORY

Introduction

Politics is fundamentally about the distribution of resources, but hard-line and inflexible claims can obstruct negotiation and spoil compromised outcomes. As Harold Lasswell argued, the questions "who gets what, when, and how" are central in any political situation (Lasswell 1936). As such, the process of politics entails actors with competing preferences wrangling in continually recurring interactions. Actors – individuals, groups, or states – have policy preferences, exist within an environment of structural constraints, have varying degrees of power, and attempt to achieve their desired objectives while interacting with others holding competing goals. They are constantly engaged in theoretical bargains over the distribution of resources. Political outcomes are the result of the "pulling and hauling" of these bargaining games (Allison 1999, 255) and often represent a negotiated compromise (Reiter 2003, 28). However, at times actors hold intransigent maximalist preferences that inhibit any negotiated agreement; they refuse to bargain because they hold a preference such that any compromise is unacceptable. For them the issue at hand is zero-sum; they consider nothing short of the whole because anything gained by the other side is a loss for them. This dissertation explores why such maximalist preferences develop and demonstrates that process is not only important in strategic interaction, but also critically matters in the formation of actors' preferences.

1

Specifically, I trace how shifting power dynamics drive perceptions of loss which in turn produce preferences that are averse to compromise. I examine one specific domain in which intransigent maximalist claims occur, namely territorial disputes, but argue in the dissertation's conclusion that my theory's implications extend to other issue areas.

In this chapter I will first introduce the topic of territorial indivisibility and discuss its empirical and theoretical importance. I then define key terms, assess the literature on indivisibility, and introduce my study's innovations. I conclude with an outline of the chapters to follow, including my theory and empirical chapters.

Why the topic matters

Territorial disputes and accompanying maximalist claims are ubiquitous in international politics and often costly. Despite critiques that studies focusing on territory better explain the politics of Napoleon's time than our own (Schweller 2011, 460–62), over 80% of wars in recent centuries have centered on territorial disputes and territory leads to more war than any other single issue (Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016, chap. 4; Hensel and Mitchell 2005). An even greater number of territorial disputes exist without ever leading to violent conflict (Hensel 1996, 2001, 2012). Perhaps most importantly, territorial disputes will be central to possible future great power conflicts (Glaser 2011b, 489). Moreover, the number of new territorial claims per year grew in the 20th century, from 2.4 new claims a year between 1815 and 1899 to 7.1 a year between 1900 and 1945 and 5.7 between 1946 and 1989. Even initial rates following the end of the Cold War

2

exceeded those of the 19th century at 3.8 new claims a year (Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017, 102).[1]

Territorial disputes are paramount to some of the most important questions in international relations. While scholars and policymakers consider the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China as the latter rises to the status of a great power (Mearsheimer 2014; Rosato 2015; Johnston 2003; Steinberg and O'Hanlon 2014), there is little question that should conflict occur key contested territories will be the flashpoint. Taiwan, for example, is a waypoint on the road to either war or peace between the United States and China; Taiwan will play a role no matter which path we are on. The Strait of Malacca is another important area. The strait is a key shipping lane for oil imports to China and a contributing factor to China's interest in developing its naval power to counter the American ability to deny access to the strait.

Territorial disputes are central to other important questions in international relations including the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons and the prospect for regional conflict. India and Pakistan, both nuclear states, have fought four wars and had numerous military standoffs since the partition of British India in 1947 and the region of Kashmir remains a central point of dispute. Open conflict between North and South Korea would quickly be complicated by U.S. and Chinese commitments. China's potential conflict with its neighbors likewise begins with territorial flashpoints, whether its dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, both of which have led to crises in recent years. These and other

---

[1] At the time of this writing the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset ends at 2001. An update, extending to 2010 is under development but not yet publicly accessible.

3

disputes, from Western Sahara to Crimea, continue today while others, such as Alsace-Lorraine and the Sinai Peninsula, have been key factors in explaining the onset of intense interstate wars. Reports that we live in a post-territory world, it appears, have been greatly exaggerated and "[t]he control and division of territory" as Gilpin notes, continue to "constitute the basic mechanism governing the distribution of scare resources among the states in an international system" (Gilpin 1981, 37).

In examining the rhetoric of enduring territorial disputes an oft-cited reason for their intractability is claims of indivisibility. Discourse of indivisibility is present among some of the most persistent territorial disputes in international politics. "Jerusalem," a senior State Department official came to learn after failed peace talks, "wasn't for sharing."(Miller 2008, 305) Likewise, the Irish republican refrain that "twenty-six plus six equals one," referring to a united Ireland combining Ireland's twenty-six counties with the six British counties of Northern Ireland, demonstrates the proposition that, to some republicans, Ireland is indivisible. Irredentist parties and political groups – those committed to the restoration of lost territory – have existed in many countries including Albania, Greece, Italy, India, Russia, and Venezuela. Survey results in Kashmir find that 79% of respondents prefer the region to be independent or to join either India or Pakistan, thereby retaining the region's territorial integrity, while only 16% would prefer joint sovereignty or for the current Line of Control to be permanent (Bradnock 2010). Chinese President Hu Jintao summarized his country's One China policy after a meeting with George W. Bush in saying, "Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory… We will by no means allow Taiwan independence."(Kan 2013, 78) Such statements lead us to

question whether indivisibility is more than rhetoric and if so how such preferences develop.

In addition to the ubiquity of recalcitrant territorial disputes and accompanying rhetoric of indivisibility, indivisibility matters theoretically because the concept has been the forgotten step-child of the bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995). Most international relations literature, outside of a small subset discussed in the next section, discounts the idea that a bargain may fail to develop because actors hold intransigent maximalist preferences that do not allow bargain. Given the amount of scholarship devoted to other explanations for failed bargains in the last twenty years[2], it is likely that recognition of the implications of indivisibilities on the bargaining model would yield fruitful scholarship.

Finally, further examination of the concept of indivisibility matters because it presents a puzzle in international politics. That indivisibility should affect territorial disputes is especially perplexing because territory, as much as any other issue, is *prima facie* divisible. Conceptually territory is easily divisible and in practice it often is. Any map can be redrawn and any fence can be shifted. Winston Churchill boasted having "created Jordan with a stroke of the pen one Sunday afternoon" while British colonial secretary (Gelvin 2008, 183).[3] Near the conclusion of World War II, Stalin and Churchill famously divided southeastern Europe into spheres of influence in what is known as the

---

[2] According to Google Scholar, Fearon's "Rationalist Explanations for War" has been cited nearly 3,000 times since its publication in 1995.

[3] An apocryphal story – but one that is common in the Middle East – of Churchill's creation of Trans-Jordan at the 1921 Cairo Conference holds that a sharp angle in Jordan's eastern border with Saudi Arabia traces its origin to a particularly heavy meal (likely accompanied by some imbibing) and a resultant hefty hiccup as Churchill drew the border. The portion of the border thus became known as "Churchill's Hiccup."

"percentages agreement." (Trachtenberg 1999, 5–6) Yet despite the theoretical ease of dividing territory, territorial disputes often endure with neither side willing to compromise on the final outcome. Such enduring disputes are a major contributor to the empirical finding that "a small fraction of dyads accounts for a large number of dyadic conflicts." (Maoz and Mor 2002, 4) It is the repeat offenders who are responsible for the majority of conflict in the international system and it is territory, more than any other single issue, that drives their conflict. The most recent release of the Issue Correlates of War dataset noted 843 disputed territories over the last two centuries with ongoing disputes over 107 territories.[4] We are thus left with an intriguing puzzle. Territory, if anything, should be divisible, yet preferences for territorial indivisibility endure. Territory is the hard case for the concept of indivisibility and it is for this reason that an investigation of territorial indivisibility will add the most to international relations theory. If indivisibility is found in territorial cases, the concept is meaningful and important.

Issue indivisibility – Defining terms and assessing the literature

This dissertation explores the formation and change of a particular preference – that of territorial indivisibility or in other words an intransigent maximalist territorial claim. The preferences are maximalist because they claim the whole of the disputed territory and they are intransigent because an actor's obstinate unwillingness to compromise is their defining feature.[5] Although a well-established adage asserts that

---

[4] The ICOW Territorial Claims provisional data includes all regions of the world, 1816-2001.

[5] Maximalist claims may also be evidence of political posturing in which actors attempt to gain an advantage at the bargaining table rather than evidence of an actual unwavering extremist preference. I discuss this distinction in the theory chapter's methodology section.

"there's no accounting for taste,"[6] this dissertation argues that territorial indivisibility has a traceable source in the interaction between politics and psychology. Before exploring the origin of such preferences in the next chapter, I first define preferences, issues, and indivisibility.

What is a preference and who holds one?

A preference is an affinity for one option over alternatives. We hold any number of preferences on matters of great and small importance and everything in between. A person may prefer red apples to green and living in the city to the country. A preference may be an immediate reaction to a prospect based on a lifetime of experience, such as many years suggesting green apples are more tart than red apples, or it may represent an unrealized goal, for example an idealized policy position such as territorial sovereignty or resource ownership. In this latter sense preferences represent possible worlds; actors prefer certain policy outcomes and work toward them despite the fact that they may not be reached in their entirety. To return to Lasswell's dictum from the introduction, preferences represent the "what" of politics.

Preferences are separate from the strategies. Strategies are plans made in pursuit of preferences. Strategies are the "how" of Lasswell's adage. Strategies are means and preferences are ends and it is important not to conflate the two either rhetorically or in research practice. The challenge for studying the two is that strategies, as demonstrated through behavior, are observable while preferences lie in peoples' heads (Frieden 1999,

---

[6] The maxim precedes modern economists who often cite it and has its origin in Latin: "de gustibus non est disputandum."

50–51).[7] It is therefore incumbent upon a researcher to be deliberate in theorizing about preferences. When doing so a scholar may simply assume preferences, attempt to observe them, or deduce them from prior theoretical principles (Frieden 1999). This project explicitly embraces the latter approach. As I discuss below and develop further in chapter 2, I ground my analysis of preference formation on prior theoretical principles found in political psychology.

Preferences are also separate from beliefs, which are attitudes that are more deeply developed and less likely to change, but the two are closely linked. Beliefs are a worldview. Our beliefs suggest how the world operates while our preferences delineate favored outcomes within that world. For example, a national leader may have a belief that other states consider relative power dynamics in their handling of bilateral agreements and so will pursue a strategy of military build-up to gain diplomatic leverage for a preferred policy outcome.

Preferences are important in the study of human behavior because decision-makers have goals and act to reach those goals. In international relations we can observe preferences at several levels of analysis: individuals, groups, and states.

Studying individual preferences in international relations can lead us to elites or to laymen. Studies focusing on elites are especially common in the security realm because key decision-makers, especially at times of crisis, are important to outcomes. In this vein, for example, elites are the central subject of inquiry in influential studies including: the origins of credibility of an adversary's threats (Daryl Grayson Press 2005), why presidents support specific intervention policies (Saunders 2011), why some dictators are

---

[7] I return to this point in the methodology section of chapter 2.

more war-prone than others (Weeks 2014), the social learning of diplomats within institutions (Johnston 2008), and many studies explicitly exploring the role of psychology in state-leader decision making (Jervis 1976; Farnham 1997; McDermott 1998). While elites are common targets in IR scholarship, they are not the only individuals that matter. Individual citizen preferences are also important especially as they aggregate and inform policy. This aggregation occurs in several modes including the normal politics of elections – in which individuals vote for parties or representatives that are likely to enact policies in line with their own preferences – and participation in a social movement in which individuals join with others with similar preferences, at least on the issue of concern, in hopes of achieving their policy goals.

Once individual preferences aggregate we are in the domain of group preferences. Groups can include social movement organizations, firms, lobbies, government ministries, parties, non-profit organizations, religious organizations, and many others. Indeed these are not mutually exclusive categories. The relationship between individual and group preferences is captured well in the literature on the politics of international trade (Alt et al. 1996). Specific policies (in this case with respect to trade restrictions) benefit some and hurt others. Domestic political cleavages form around the winners and losers of policy proposals (Hiscox 2002) and are translated into policies based on the power of those coalitions and the specific political institutional environment in which they operate (Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997; Kono 2006).

Government policies brings us to states. Just as we can discuss individuals and groups as having preferences, so can we discuss states as having preferences. On the surface this appears as if we are 'black-boxing' the state – essentially

9

anthropomorphizing the state by treating it as a unitary actor with properties, such as preferences, like an individual. Indeed explicit examples of such an approach may be found in all major paradigms of the IR discipline (Walt 1987; Glaser 2010; Keohane 1984; Wallander 1999; Wendt 1999; Finnemore 1996) and the assumption is ubiquitous in the bargaining model of war (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1973; Fearon 1995). Although the unitary actor approach is not without criticism, to say that states have preferences is far less controversial than to say they have other person-like attributes, such as beliefs, motives, or intentions. As Wendt argues, the purposive nature of the state is the least controversial aspect of its personhood (Wendt 2004). The reason for this lies in the preceding paragraphs. Individual and group preferences become aggregated and refined through the political process until governments set policies. Research programs such as liberalism, neoclassical realism, and much of the international political economy literature are grounded in the view that state policies cannot be considered absent state-level factors including formal and informal institutions, state-society relations, winners and losers from trade, and other factors that explain the "bottom-up" formation of state preferences (Moravcsik 1997; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016; Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997). In this view some state preferences are fleeting and subject to change dependent on factors such as the party in charge or the capabilities of leaders to influence policy. Other state preferences, such as national security posture, are likely to be cut across multiple sectors of society and thus be more stable despite changes in governing regime.

Issues

An issue is any disputed point over which actors may choose to fight (Diehl 1992, 333). Issues may be tangible or intangible and actors attach varying degrees of importance to issues (Hensel and Mitchell 2005). Favorable economic policies, increased access to political channels, and concerns over status are all issue areas that may lead actors toward dispute. When actors hold a maximalist position on an issue they seek an outcome that is wholly in line with their policy preferences without any degree of compromise. When actors are intransigent in their maximalist positions they will continue the policy fight until the entirety of their objectives are met. This all-or-nothing mentality reflects a preference that the issue in question is subjectively indivisible. As this chapter will explain, examining the origin of such preferences requires an approach that incorporates politics and psychology.

Indivisibility

Indivisibility is a belief that any degree of forfeiture on an issue will fundamentally change the issue such that it loses its original meaning or value. This definition emphasizes that issue indivisibility is fundamentally subjective and has at its core an element of loss aversion (sensitivity to forfeiture). An indivisible issue does not permit subdivision because it has the economic characteristic of rivalry. According to public goods theory, rivalry denotes that consumption by one party precludes the consumption of that good by another party (Samuelson 1954, 1958; Holcombe 2000). This rivalry creates a zero-sum perception in which one's gains occur only at the loss of another. Indivisible issues become defined by this zero-sum deadlock. Negotiated

11

outcomes, by definition, require compromise but such compromise is spoiled by perceptions of another's gain coming only at one's own loss. The issue itself, therefore, comes to develop an "all or nothing" connotation.

Because this definition is my own, I will briefly note its relation to other definitions of the concept in the literature. My definition draws on economic treatments of indivisibility while emphasizing the subjective nature of the concept.[8] My definition is similar to Hassner's discussion of the concept, though Hassner notes an emphasis on *cohesion* – meaning any subdivision changes the issue's subjective value – is problematic on its own in politics where issues are not goods and therefore can have ambiguous lines of demarcation or be inherently non-substitutable. As such, Hassner's definition adds two additional elements: *boundaries* – the issue means the same thing to those in dispute; and *uniqueness* – the issue is nonfungible, meaning it cannot be substituted or exchanged (Hassner 2009, 41–42). These two additions are less important definitionally than they are operationally. As such, I return to Hassner's tripartite definition in the methods section of the next chapter. My definition departs from Goddard who defines indivisibility as a social fact rather than as a subjective belief or preference (Goddard 2010, 6–7). I treat this difference as an empirical question and demonstrate in my cases the development of indivisible preferences, rather than indivisibility as a social construct. Goddard is also critical of economic definitions because they only emphasize physical division. She notes that "[w]e do not need to literally slice an object in half to divide it; we can also divide that issue by sharing ownership or trading possession." (Goddard

---

[8] As I will discuss later, by focusing on loss aversion I move away from classical economic models and embrace insights from behavioral economics.

2010, 6). By emphasizing forfeiture my definition accounts for physical divisions as well as ownership sharing or tradeoffs.

Explaining the process by which actors develop preferences for indivisibility is the central task of this dissertation. To rephrase the research question posed in this chapter's introduction, I ask: Why do intransigent maximalist preferences develop? Before presenting my theory in answer to that question in the next chapter, I review the literature on indivisibility and note its shortcomings and the added value of my approach.

Indivisibility in the literature

Issue indivisibility has received little attention in the literature because of two broad trends. The first is a general tendency to dismiss the importance of issues in understanding international outcomes, especially war. Neorealism's focus on the constraining influence of the international system and its explanatory privileging of the distribution of capabilities among states operating in an anarchic environment leaves little room for issue-specific explanations (Waltz 1979). Any theory incorporating non-systemic factors, according to Waltz, is reductionist. Blainey likewise disregarded issues in his argument that war occurs when states disagree about their relative power (Blainey 1973). As Diehl notes, "[t]he traditional approach in international relations has been to explain state behavior, including decisions to use military force, by reference to national, dyadic, and systemic attributes... Little consideration is given to the issues or their salience in a dispute between states."(Diehl 1992, 333) If issues explain little, then it matters not whether they are divisible or indivisible.

The second broad trend skirts whether issues matter and argues that their indivisibility is of little concern. This approach is rooted in Fearon's influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995). Although Fearon includes issue indivisibility in his initial list of rationalist explanations for war, he subsequently dismisses it; while it is logically tenable he argues it is also empirically implausible. For Fearon and others, issue indivisibility has little analytical leverage because of issue complexity, the possibility of side payments, and the availability of intermediate bargains (Gartzke 1999; Powell 2006). Each point, however, is problematic. Fearon notes that the issues over which states bargain are typically multidimensional and that issues get rolled into larger concerns. Yet issue linkages can cut both ways; as Fearon suggests they can tie potential indivisible issues to other points thereby mitigating indivisibility concerns, but they may also tie threats together and create a fear of precedent setting. Interdependence of issues, Schelling notes, causes states to react on one issue for fear of losing credibility for other issues or for fear of piecemeal "salami slicing" losses (Schelling 1966, 55, 67).[9] With respect to the possibility of side payments Fearon does no more than to give three examples of 19th century territorial purchases along with noting that territorial purchases were common "[b]efore the age of nationalism." (Fearon 1995, 389) Yet a claim that individuals or states may have preferences for territory that are indivisible does not assert that all territorial claims must have an indivisible connotation. Lastly, Fearon includes a dissatisfying example for his claim that indivisibility matters little because of possible intermediate bargains such as random allocation or alternation. He cites Mafia dons

---

[9] That Schelling has a role for indivisibility is no small point considering Walt's critique that there is little new in the formal bargaining model of war (Walt 1999). While much of Fearon's model mirrors Schelling's logic, there is considerable divergence between the two on issue indivisibility.

avoiding conflict by randomly allotting construction contracts. The fact that he does not include an example from international politics is telling. Moreover, as the emphasis on forfeiture in my definition of indivisibility implies and as I demonstrate in my theory in chapter 2, division need not be only physical but can include random allocation or alternation. The prospect of forfeiture thus gets to the heart of indivisibility and diminishes any hope that the promise of intermediate bargains might bring.

Fearon's final dismissal of the concept of issue indivisibility lies in his argument that if indivisibilities exist they likely occur because of domestic dynamics, but it is only issues that are objectively indivisible that should matter and international politics holds few, if any, such issues. This project will show how preferences for territorial indivisibility develop, originating in systemic pressure and working through domestic perceptions, and will argue those preferences matter for behavior regardless of whether the issue is objectively divisible. I argue that Fearon is correct in noting the consequences of indivisibilities should they exist, namely that they will render bargaining moot and push states toward war.[10] I also agree that in the international arena there are essentially no issues that are objectively indivisible.[11] Where my study diverges from his is in recognizing the implications of subjective beliefs of indivisibility. Although Fearon acknowledges that "[w]ar-prone international issues may often be *effectively* indivisible," he dismisses indivisibilities that may develop as a result of process and in so doing he

---

[10] Favorable structural conditions for war are an unstated scope condition in Fearon's theory. Without them commitment and information problems are moot. Likewise, issue indivisibility cannot explain conflict without power considerations.

[11] Issues of hierarchical status, such as who is the regional hegemon, are one possible exception. Privileges that attend hegemonic status, for example the command of the global commons, are binary; a state either has command or it does not.

treats the preferences of actors as stable and exogenous to the political interaction (Fearon 1995, 382, emphasis in original). As I argue below, endogenizing preferences is key to understanding indivisibilities. In this project I aim to pull the theoretical lens a step back from most studies and look at preference formation and the process by which maximalist preferences develop.

Not all scholars have been content dismissing the concept of issue indivisibility. Their work falls in three broad trends. The first examines the role of indivisibility in ethnic civil conflicts. The settlement patterns of ethnic groups determine their capability and legitimacy which in turn determines feelings of indivisibility of the homeland. In this sense territory is fundamentally tied to identity (Toft 2002, 2003). The state, alternatively, views territory in terms of resources and fears that acquiescing to the demands of an ethnic group, even in the case of resource-poor areas, will set a precedent of secession for other groups (Toft 2002, 2003; Walter 2009). This logic is explicitly subnational; Toft notes the applicability of indivisibility as an explanation for intrastate war while claiming it "may not play as strong a role in violence between states."(Toft 2006, 42, 2002, 88) When sticking strictly to the scope conditions of these analyses it is difficult to extend the concept of issue indivisibility beyond a multinational state worried about its reputation and the precedent of capitulating to a subnational ethnic group.

The second application of indivisibility puts the concept in the context of religion and specifically the indivisibility of sacred space (Hassner 2003, 2009). Sacred space, like homeland, carries with it intangible value that may have nothing to do with resources. Territory may be imbued, because of religious tradition, with meaning beyond its resource value or strategic location. Not all religious space, however, carries with it

16

feelings of indivisibility or is important in understanding conflict. Hassner argues that issue indivisibility in sacred spaces occurs along one of two paths, each path requiring contestation between at least two groups. The first path concerns differing religious groups splitting or merging. The religious space thus becomes the central claim of competing religious groups. The second path involves religious actors on one side and secular actors on the other. Beliefs of indivisibility develop when sacred space carries material or political value and is thus of interest to both groups for different reasons.

The third branch of literature views indivisibility as a social construct. Goddard argues that "whether or not territory appears to be indivisible depends on how actors legitimate their claims to territory during the bargaining process." (Goddard 2006, 36, 2010) The logic of her narrative is that actors seek bargaining advantages but their strategies for legitimation may have unintended consequences. Actors must negotiate at the domestic level before ever approaching the international bargaining table (Putnam 1988) and the process of legitimation at the domestic level resonates with some actors but not others. This can result in "switching effects" in which coalitions either build ties and "recognize the legitimacy of each other's claims," or conversely become hardened in their positions and unable to "recognize any other demand to an issue as legitimate." Henripin adds a strategic element to this line of thinking, arguing that leaders employ indivisible rhetoric through propaganda to their own people in an effort to arrive at the bargaining table with the leverage of tied hands (Henripin 2014).

My study's innovation

My study highlights two themes that are common, yet under-explored, in the current literature. The first theme is that antecedent dispute is an important driving factor in producing indivisibilities. Hassner, Toft, Goddard, and Henripin all have a preceding story of dispute that drives their narratives. For Hassner, sacred space only becomes indivisible when religious sects split or when religious and secular groups develop a dispute over the territory. Toft's preceding dispute is with respect to ethnic groups demanding greater autonomy within a multiethnic state. Goddard's narrative assumes a dispute that brings parties together into a bargaining dynamic and Henripin's study likewise presupposes a dispute for which a national leader will strategically employ indivisibility propaganda for greater bargaining leverage at the negotiating table. All studies of indivisibility note the need of an antecedent dispute in developing beliefs of indivisibility. I make this observation explicit in my study and in the process embrace the effects of time more plainly than previous studies. Temporality, as I discuss in the theory chapter, plays an important role in perceptions of loss or gain and accompanying territorial preferences.

The second theme highlights the importance of political psychology in understanding the development of maximalist preferences. Hassner and Toft note the role of perception in discussions of indivisibility, but they do not center their analysis through a perceptual lens. Goddard discusses indivisibilities as social fact without considering insights from political psychology. Hensel and Mitchell's study points to the need for such an approach, noting that we cannot understand intangible territorial salience without

18

insights of perception and political psychology (Hensel and Mitchell 2005, 277). None of the current literature takes such an approach to issue indivisibility.

Privileging political psychology is a double-edged sword. While it focuses the area of inquiry on the underlying roots of indivisibility, it also opens the door to a broad and meandering literature. Perception, as one line of inquiry in political psychology literature, relates to many themes in international relations theory - signaling, intentions, and resolve to name a few - yet strictly perceptual approaches to these topics must overcome challenges including operationalizing and observing perceptions, identifying predictable outcomes, and demonstrating the importance of perception above other possible causal factors. Jervis's seminal study on the topic highlights some of the ways perception plays a role in international politics, but also demonstrates that perceptual approaches to international politics often fail to produce substantive hypotheses or well-defined theories. In his own words his approach is "broad" and "eclectic," and aims not to produce testable propositions but rather to gain a wide "variety of insights"(Jervis 1976, 6). Wading into the waters of perception, therefore, introduces the risk of drowning in a literature that is not only diverse but often conceptually muddied.

My response to the pitfalls of perception is to ground my study within one specific approach from political psychology, namely prospect theory. Although prospect theory pushes against expected utility approaches, it still provides a set of core insights that may be operationalized and tested. Indeed Rose McDermott alluded to the applicability of prospect theory in explaining intractable territorial conflicts in her assessment of the promises of the theory for political science (McDermott 2004).

McDermott, however, did not draw out why prospect theory is a good fit for investigating issue indivisibility nor did she theorize on the subject.

In evaluating the indivisibility literature, I have highlighted the importance of perception and evidence of preceding dispute and have noted that authors have thus far paid too little attention to both. It is exactly because of the importance of preceding dispute and the role of perception that prospect theory offers considerable leverage in analyzing issue indivisibility. An antecedent dispute introduces a situation of uncertainty and risk and prospect theory deals explicitly with decision making at times of risk. Prospect theory also has perception at its core.

Prospect theory offers an alternative model of decision making to that of expected utility theory.[12] The latter offers a set of normative axioms – including transitivity of preferred outcomes and fixed preferences –to explain how individuals should make decisions so that they are optimizing outcomes based upon cost / benefit analyses and probabilistic determinations of outcome likelihood. Dan Ariely summarizes the assumption of standard economic rationality as the implication "that, in everyday life, we compute the value of all the options we face and then follow the best possible plan of action." (Ariely 2008, xx) Actual decision-making processes, however, do not fit this model because they rely on a fictional assumption that people, in the words of Thaler and Sunstein, "can think like Albert Einstein, store as much memory as IBM's Big Blue, and

---

[12] For a review of decision-making models in foreign policy analysis see (Redd and Mintz 2013). Examples of international relations scholarship utilizing prospect theory include studies about risk taking in American foreign policy (McDermott 1998), FDR and the Munich Crisis (Farnham 1997), the Cuban Missile Crisis (Haas 2001), the Japanese / American Structural Impediments Initiative (Mastanduno 1992), the relative gains debate (Berejekian 1997), great power intervention in the periphery (Taliaferro 2004), START (Fuhrmann and Early 2008), U.S. trade policy (Berejikian and Early 2013), trade disputes (Elms 2004), and deterrence (Schaub 2004).

exercise the willpower of Mahatma Ghandi" (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 6). Most importantly, some behavior systematically violates expectations under standard economic theory. Prospect theory, in contrast, offers a positive rather than normative account for human behavior under conditions of risk by accounting for the cognitive factors absent in classical economic theory. As I discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, its central findings are that individuals evaluate outcomes not in terms of final value but in relation to some reference point and that we feel the pain of losses more than we feel the joy of gains and are more willing to take risk to avoid loss than we are to get gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). It is both descriptive of how people actually think and predictive of their behavior under certain conditions.

Dissertation contributions and outline

This dissertation offers several contributions to the international relations literature. First, it argues for wider application of the concept of issue indivisibility and shows that indivisibility is fundamentally driven by loss aversion. Such insights open the door to a wide variety of areas of future inquiry in bargaining dynamics. Second, this study utilizes prospect theory as a means to understand how preferences are formed and changed rather than in analyzing an actor's risk propensity, the usual home for prospect theory in IR. This innovation has implications far beyond the topic of issue indivisibility and can help us understand how actors form the goals they set. Finally, this project suggests areas of both optimism and pessimism with regard to enduring territorial conflicts. Policy makers may find hope in the knowing that maximalist preferences are

21

largely frame dependent, however history and structural power dynamics loom large in these frames and they are not easily changed.

The remainder of the dissertation will proceed as follows: Chapter two develops my theory of territorial indivisibility by discussing how shifting relative power dynamics affect states' perception of disputed territory and ultimately their preferences for that territory. Chapter 3 explicitly explores the political psychology of issue indivisibility by testing the connection between perceptions of loss and bargaining intransigence. I design a survey experiment in which participants are primed either in a loss frame or a gain frame and I then measure their willingness to bargain. In so doing I review the literature on survey experiments. This chapter offers evidence for the connection between my theory's intervening variable, loss frame, and my dependent variable, an intransigent maximalist preference. Chapters 4 through 6 present three case studies of maximalist territorial preferences. I examine the development of indivisible preferences in Israel and Palestine, China and Taiwan, and Ireland. These cases offer in-depth analysis of the connection between my independent variable, relative power shifts, and the resultant loss or gain frames. I present evidence that power shifts change how foreign policy elites view the prospect of potential compromise. I also offer evidence of true maximalist preferences that are not simply rhetoric to gain a better bargaining position. Chapter 7 offers a conclusion with a brief discussion of theoretical implications of my study, areas of future research, and policy implications.

CHAPTER 2

THEORY OF TERRITORIAL INDIVISIBILITY

Why do states develop intransigent maximalist preferences? This chapter presents my theory of territorial indivisibility and argues that in order to answer this question we must account for both the politics and the psychology of the process. In the following sections I preview my argument, discuss preference formation and change, and then turn to the theory itself first through a discussion of the impact of shifting power dynamics on state perceptions and then the role of perceptions of loss and gain on preference formation. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the research methods I employ to test my theory.

The argument

I argue that shifting relative power dynamics between states with territorial disputes causes dissatisfaction with the status quo. Rising powers feel they are entitled to more than the status quo and set new aspirational reference points. Declining powers fail to accept the new status quo and retain the previous status quo as their reference point. When reference points shift such that states now view compromise as a loss they develop preferences for territory that are averse to loss, resulting in intransigent maximalist preferences. I thus present a two-level theory containing independent and intervening

variables (Goertz and Mahoney 2006).[13] Shifting relative power dynamics, the theory's independent variable, move the reference point against which states consider the possible outcomes of territorial disputes. The intervening variable is perceptual: a loss frame in which actors perceive the possible outcome as a loss relative to some reference point.[14] Figure 1 presents a causal model of this argument.


Figure 2.1: Basic argument

In making this argument I rely on the insights of prospect theory. Most international relations studies that utilize prospect theory use risk propensity as the dependent variable (taking values of risk-averse or risk-acceptant). This study pulls the analytical lens back a step to explain the development of specific preferences, a task well at home in prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) yet one that has been underexplored in IR. Surely the process by which actors develop maximalist territorial

---

[13] Goertz and Mahoney use the term "basic level" and "secondary level" independent variables, the latter causing the former and the former being the primary explanation for the dependent variable.

[14] In this respect, I follow major prospect theory works in IR (McDermott 1998; Taliaferro 2004) in explaining outcomes dependent on whether actors were in a loss or gain frame. This approach also follows Jervis in using perception as a variable of interest (Jervis 1976, 29–30).

24

claims would imbue them with risk-acceptant propensity, but it is the preference itself, and not the accompanying behavior that is of interest here.

Accounting for taste – Preference origin and change

As this dissertation is about the development of a particular preference, an examination of preference formation is in order before turning to the specific pieces of the theory. Actors – individuals, groups, and states – have preferences, but what is the origin of those preferences? Questioning the origin of preferences is not common in social science literature. Most political science research assumes that actors have fixed preferences (that the nature and rank ordering of their interests does not change) and they introduce these preferences to the study exogenously (without explaining the source of those preferences). Having made these assumptions, scholars then theorize about how actors will maximize their utility – how they will achieve the goal that will bring them the most satisfaction – given various environmental constraints and the probability of attaining the options before them. This is the bedrock not only for formal rational choice theory but also "lies at the heart of social choice theory and microeconomic theory in general" (Bossert and Suzumura 2010, ix). Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* offers an influential and well-known example of an assumed preference. Waltz notes that states have myriad goals that range from world domination to complete isolationism, but he assumes that survival is the primary interest for all states (Waltz 1979, 91).

25

Economists recognize that preferences vary among individuals.[15] Economists explain diverging preferences by arguing that individuals have their own utility functions, a theoretical construct that measures satisfaction from a range of preferences. Estimating this function for an individual, however, is extremely problematic because preferences exist fundamentally between an individual's ears. As a result, scholars rely on individuals to reveal their preferences through their behavior.

Although assumed preferences are useful in many contexts, individuals do not actually hold unchanging preferences that are isolated from the setting of the decision as social scientists often assume (Jacobs 2016). When we examine the preference itself these core assumptions begin to fall apart. Actors can derive preferences from their strategic setting and those preferences can change over time (Gerber and Jackson 1993). In some cases the origins of a preference may result from a simple cost-benefit analysis. For example, those that stand to gain from trade liberalization have preferences for such policies while the losers of free trade have preferences for protectionist policies. Yet preference updating need not be, and likely is usually not, simply a result of a Bayesian process of information updating. Our decisions are not simply the result of super-computer thinking calculation. Non-informational preference change, driven by our experiences, environment, and psychological factors must also be considered (Dietrich and List 2011). This is especially true because we face choices with multiple dimensions and derive satisfaction on any number of properties of a specific option. We may prefer the sweetness a red apple but the crispness of a green. We may prefer the quiet of the

---

[15] For a debate about whether preferences are instrumentally useful constructs versus representations of real mental phenomena see (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008; Dietrich and List 2016a).

country but the arts and culture of the city. How are we to choose? Developing a preference is thus more than a determination of the costs and benefits of a particular option or a simple Bayesian update from new information, but rather a determination of which dimension of an option is the most important to us (Dietrich and List 2013).

Some dimensions or properties of an alternative motivate us more than others. Sweetness and crispness may be important in choosing an apple, but size might not; perhaps a small sweet apple is preferred to a large tart one. The origin of preferences thus lies in the fact that certain properties of an option are more motivationally salient than others. Some aspects or properties of an option matter to us more than others and we act on those properties that matter. For example, voters may consider a variety of factors in party vote choice, but be primarily motivated by the left-right socioeconomic dimension of the decision (Dietrich and List 2011, 146). Therefore, individuals form preferences "by focusing – consciously or not – on certain properties of the alternatives as the motivationally salient properties" (Dietrich and List 2013, 622). It is these aspects of available alternatives that drive decisions. But what is motivationally salient at one point in time need not remain so indefinitely. Our voter previously motivated by left-right socioeconomic decisions may come to value the religious-secular dimension of a party vote choice as the key motivational property (Dietrich and List 2011, 146). Therefore, individuals change preferences when previous properties lose their motivational salience and new properties gain salience (Dietrich and List 2013, 622). Preference formation and change are therefore tightly linked (Druckman and Lupia 2000).

Preferences result from the motivational salience of various properties of a choice option – what aspects of an alternative speak the most to an individual – but that salience

may rely heavily on the context of the decision. If especially hungry (the context), apple size may become the most motivationally salient property rather than sweetness and or crispness, changing the earlier preference for a small, sweet apple over a large, tart apple. Motivational salience, therefore, may occur because of some intrinsic affinity for one dimension over another, such as a distaste for tart apples, or it may occur because of a specific context, such as hunger driving size to become more salient than any other apple property (Tversky and Simonson 1993; Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky 1993; Dietrich and List 2016b). The environment under which a decision is made is important; preferences cannot be considered in isolation of the strategic setting in which actors operate. Indeed, as Frieden notes, a theory of preferences relies on either variation in actor properties or variation in their environment (Frieden 1999, 63).

Motivational factors are key to understanding preference formation and change, but what is the source of such factors? As Dietrich and List note, motivational salience is fundamentally a psychological issue (Dietrich and List 2013, 217) Druckman and Lupia, make a similar claim. They note that a preference serves as a "cognitive marker that reminds people how to interact with various aspects of their environment" and that we must look to cognitive science to understand preference origins (Druckman and Lupia 2000, 2). While cognitive science points to many possible motivating factors, one that is relevant for this study and has been shown to be particularly important in driving motivational salience is the effect of framing (Dietrich and List 2016b; Jacobs 2016; Gimpel 2007). Whether an alternative is framed as a loss or a gain matters. Loss and gain frames, I argue below, are centrally important to the development of maximalist preferences.

28

Several points from this discussion warrant emphasis. First, an individual's preferences are not always fixed and exogenous to the decision. Second, preferences do not suddenly appear; they are the product of interaction between individuals and their environment (Druckman and Lupia 2000). They are comparative in nature and require both experience – in determining the intrinsic salience of specific properties – and situation – in determining the contextual salience of specific properties. Preferences, therefore, do not exist prior to politics but are formed by it. Third, preferences form and change according to the motivational salience of various properties of an option. In order to understand this motivational salience we must accept a role for cognitive explanations. The final point, though implicit to this point, is that benefits can be gained when a theory of human behavior reflects actual decision-making processes as they occur in the real world, not processes that are founded on assumptions that operate *as if* they were real. A good theory of choice rests on the fact that it is "psychologically plausible" (Dietrich and List 2011, 159).

The Theory

Shifting relative power dynamics between political actors redefine their satisfaction with the status quo of territorial disputes. When reference points shift such that states now view compromise as a loss they develop preferences for territory that are averse to loss, resulting in intransigent maximalist preferences. I address each piece of this theory below.

Shifting power dynamics: Accounting for moving reference points

Power returns again and again like a leitmotif in international relations literature and for good reason.[16] If politics is fundamentally about the distribution of resources, then power dynamics matter in answering Lasswell's question of "who gets what, when, and how." In its most general form, power is the ability to influence others (Dahl 1957). Power is therefore an inherently relational concept (Baldwin 2016, 50). It is meaningless in isolation because there is no other actor to influence and it is defined only in its association with another. The autistic power-obsessed state, which is to say a state concerned with its own power but unconcerned with others, is thus an oxymoron. States define their power in terms of others and therefore acutely feel the effects of changing power dynamics.

Because this dissertation adds several notes to the opus of power politics in international relations, it is important to be clear about what exactly power is. Power is primarily material. The key markers of a state's power are its military, it's latent economic and population resources, and its ability to use these resources effectively. The chief instrument of material power by which states gain the ability to influence others is the military. A strong military allows a state the means to defend itself, stands as a deterrent against possible attack, and gives a state a range of options in choosing expeditionary endeavors. Through its military capabilities a state influences adversaries

---

[16] Power is the central concept in seminal works with questions such as how the United States should project its influence across the world (Posen and Ross 1996; Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky 1997; Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 2012) or whether the United States and China are doomed to conflict as China's power increases (Mearsheimer 2014; Glaser 2011a). Scholars use power to explain outcomes such as why states balance against others (Waltz 1979; Walt 1987), why states go to war (Blainey 1973; Van Evera 1999), and how states view the actions of others (Daryl Grayson Press 2005; Glaser 2010). Researchers have debated to great lengths the ways in which power could be conceptually refined (Van Evera 1999; Glaser and Kaufmann 1998) or broadened (Nye 2004).

away from doing something they would otherwise prefer or compelling them into action they otherwise would not pursue (Schelling 1966). To gain this influence states may develop naval and air power for both independent and support operations, but militaries are fundamentally measured by their armies (Mearsheimer 2014, Chapter 4). Beyond its military, a state's power is further defined by its economic and population resources that could be marshalled for the military (Walt 1987, 22; Mearsheimer 2014, 55–56). A strong economic engine is required to drive a successful military to meet the costs of weapons development and procurement, personnel costs, maintenance, and operational costs. Even given unlimited economic resources, a military requires feet in boots and therefore a large population is key for a powerful military. In order for power to be effective a state's organizational quality matters, to include topics such as a military's training, its command structure, and its recruitment policies (Rosato 2011, 21). The sword is a signal of power, but all the more so if the blade is sharp and lies in the hand of a proficient warrior.

While much of international relations is unpredictable, a constant in the world is the presence of change. Some change mirrors the shadow of a large tree, only revealing its movement to the patient eye, while other transformations are more like the shadow of a bird in flight, quick and fleeting. Gibbon's reflections on the fall of the Roman Empire, for example, were only possible with centuries of trends in front of his eyes (Gibbon 1897) while analysis of a single short war provides snapshots for analyses of a different sort, such as explaining the role of air power at a particular point in time (Biddle 1996; Daryl G. Press 2001). But just as all shadows move, all states' power ebbs and flows. Critically, these changes occur at different rates for different states and some ebb while

others flow. It is this differential rate of change that is the driving force behind major disjunctures in the international system (Gilpin 1981, 48; Copeland 2000). States' power rise and fall just as predictably as the sun rises and sets, it is only the length of the day that is in question.

Shifting relative power between two states changes their perceptions of disputed territory such that they may come to view any compromise as a loss. The primary theoretical lever here is a shift to an actor's reference point away from the status quo.[17] States that have gained power feel the status quo no longer represents current power dynamics and set a new, aspirational reference point for the territory. States that have declined in power remember the halcyon days of yore and continue to hold the previous reality (status quo ante) as their reference point. In other words, it is both expectations and experience that drive dissatisfaction with the status quo. Actors view the status quo as a loss because they desire an alternative reality; their reference point is no longer the status quo but rather an alternative point. Gurr's work on grievances and rebellion is informative in this regard. He explains this shifting reference point and the development of dissatisfaction through an increase in value expectations and a decrease in value capabilities (Gurr 1970). Gurr defines value expectations as "the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled." Value capabilities are those goods and conditions "they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining" (Gurr 1970, 13). Although other processes may also contribute to rising value expectations or

---

[17] In this respect I am building on Maoz and Mor's argument that dissatisfaction with the status quo is the primary factor in explaining enduring rivalries, however I investigate the psychological underpinning of this dissatisfaction and explain the process by which an actor's preferences can change (Maoz and Mor 2002, 10).

decreasing value capabilities, the fundamental mechanism by which states come to shift their reference point is a change in relative power dynamics.

To this point I have discussed state perceptions and state preferences as if the abstract concept of the state were able to have such person-like qualities. A state preference, as I noted in the introductory chapter, is the least controversial aspect of its personhood because it represents a state policy that resulted from some form of aggregation and refinement through the political process. Claiming a state has perceptions, however, is more provocative. It is for this reason that this study focuses on the foreign policy elites, those key decision makers at the very top of the foreign policy establishment. It is their perceptions that proxy for the state because it is their decisions that determine state behavior in the international arena (foreign policy). Changes in relative power, I argue, have an effect on foreign policy elites such that they redefine their reference points with respect to disputed territory and develop preferences best explained by these shifting power dynamics.

That pressure from the international system can have effects at the domestic level should come as no surprise. Gourevitch noted 40 years ago that, although foreign policy cannot be considered absent domestic politics, we cannot ignore the fact that much in domestic sphere "derives from exigencies of the international system." (Gourevitch 1978, 882) Moravcsik extended this logic to preference formation, arguing that preferences "may result from international political interaction." (Moravcsik 1997, 519) Zakaria argues even more forcefully that a theory of state behavior should "first examine the effect of the international system on foreign policy, for the most important general characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative standing in the

international system." (Zakaria 1999, 16) Wendt likewise examines relationships between structure and ideas in his seminal book (Wendt 1999), although I examine individual perceptions and preferences as an outcome.[18] In this theory I suggest shifts in power and underlying structure do much to explain maximalist territorial claims because they shift the reference point against which losses and gains are perceived.[19]

The role of gains and losses in preference formation

Having discussed what preferences are and why they form and change in addition to the effect of power shifts on states' reference points, I turn now to explaining how certain perceptions, specifically perceptions of loss or gain, are especially motivationally salient and thus play an important role in explaining maximalist preferences. The logic is as follows: a change in how an actor perceives a territorial dispute prompts a change in preference for the outcome of that dispute. Actors may perceive a compromised outcome as a loss or a gain. These perceptions, known as loss frames and gain frames, are key to understanding maximalist territorial preferences. A change in the way an actor frames a potential outcome may change an actor's preference (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Levy 1997). In the paragraphs that follow I draw out this logic by first defining perceptual frames and then noting the role loss and gain frames play in human behavior and the accompanying predictable behavioral outcomes associated with loss and gain frames. By

---

[18] Wendt explores the difference that structure makes along a continuum from high (holism) to low (individualism) and the difference ideas make from high (idealism) to low (materialism). I would place this project in the upper-left quadrant of Wendt's 2x2 (figure 1) on page 29 of *Social Theory,* implying an orientation toward structure and materialism as causal factors rather than individualism and idealism.

[19] This is a decidedly different approach than studies that privilege discourse as an explanatory factor, such as Kaufman's theory linking emotionally potent symbols with the onset of ethnic war (Kaufman 2001).

34

examining preference formation and emphasizing a role for perception and framing I embrace insights from psychology and behavioral economics and build upon the path-breaking work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, the fathers of prospect theory.

A frame is an analytical lens that enables actors to locate or interpret occurrences in their life (Goffman 1974; Snow et al. 1986). Frames may emphasize certain properties of an alternative as an individual deliberates between choices and thereby emphasize one alternative over another. Frames help organize information and guide behavior.[20] Within political science the study of framing effects has been especially robust among scholars studying social mobilization. They have shown that frames are important in understanding topics including participation in a social movement, the role of the media in contributing to or obstructing collective action, and the interpretation of history (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson 1995; Zald 1996). Political actors use many types of frames to identify problems and propose appropriate strategies of redress (McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996).

Although an issue may be framed in any number of ways, it is the framing of an outcome as either a gain or a loss that has especially high motivational salience (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Moreover, it is a framing that produces consistent and observable behavior. Critical to Kahneman and Tversky's findings was the fact that individuals evaluate outcomes relatively; it is not just the final outcome that matters but where that outcome stands in relation to expectation and experience. We evaluate final outcomes not in terms of some atomized or intrinsic value,

---

[20] Schelling, a founding father of rationalist international relations theory, demonstrates this point in his discussion of an "identified life" versus a "statistical life" (Schelling 1984).

but rather in relation to a standard by which we may evaluate the outcome. As Kahneman notes,

> "This reference dependence is ubiquitous in sensation and perception. The same sound will be experienced as very loud or quite faint, depending on whether it was preceded by a whisper or by a roar… Similarly, you need to know about the background before you can predict whether a gray patch on a page will appear dark or light. And you need to know the reference before you can predict the utility of an amount of wealth." (Kahneman 2011, 275)

That the level of an individual's wealth is less important to an individual's happiness than changes to one's wealth provides a critical departure from expected utility theory and insights that have permeated the study of human behavior tracing to Daniel Bernoulli in the 18th century. A loss or a gain frame signifies that an actor views an outcome not in terms of a final value but rather in comparison (as a loss or a gain) to a reference point (Boettcher 2004, 333). Gains are outcomes that are better than a reference point and losses are outcomes that are worse than a reference point; a gain frame highlights the positive while a loss frame emphasizes the negative.

Several consistent and predictable behaviors derive from Kahneman and Tversky's work. First, we feel differently about losses than we do gains. We hate losses more than we love gains and, as a result, we are more acceptant of risk to avoid loss than to get gain.[21] In other words, we are risk-acceptant in the domain of losses and risk averse

---

[21] It pays, evolutionarily speaking, to think differently about losses and gains. Acting more promptly to threats than opportunities and taking bigger risks to avoid threats than to get gain is likely to lead to better survival odds (Kahneman 2011, 282; McDermott, Fowler, and Smirnov 2008)

36

in the domain of gains.[22] This is loss aversion. Second, we are more sensitive to changes closer to our reference point than we are further away from it. We feel losses and gains acutely even in initial steps away from our reference point and then have a diminishing sensitivity to continuing changes. This is the reflection effect. Third, we adjust to gains faster than we do to losses (Jervis 1992, 199; Ledgerwood and Boydstun 2014). Having improved upon our reference point we shift our reference point to the new status quo such that adjustment back to the previous reference point would be felt as a loss. Losses, on the other hand, produce a different attitude. Having suffered loss we remember the previous reference point and are far slower to renormalize our reference point. Previous reference points are stickier in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains. Fourth, having adjusted our reference point we overvalue the new status quo because of the pain of losing relative to our new reference point. This is the endowment effect (Thaler 1980; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). Finally, prospect theory helps explain why actors continue to invest resources in a strategy that is not working. The sunk cost effect occurs because readjusting a reference point to account for the losses of the sunk costs is difficult. Instead, actors continue with risky strategies in hopes that they may recoup their losses (Thaler 1980; Kahneman 2011, 343–44).

---

[22] This insight is the major empirical finding from Kahneman and Tversky's influential 1979 article. It accounts for prospect theory's unique S-curve utility function in which the slope of the curve is steeper for losses than it is for gains. This insight also provides the foundation for the most influential works in political science utilizing prospect theory. Scholars analyze whether actors are in the domain of losses or gains and then note the accompanying risk-acceptant or risk-averse behavior (Weyland 1996; Berejekian 1997; McDermott 1998; Taliaferro 2004; Berejikian and Early 2013). This dissertation breaks with this standard use of prospect theory by not seeking to explain risk attitude but rather in explaining the development of preferences and the sources of loss aversion. This dissertation focuses primarily on the first phase of prospect theory – the editing phase in which an actor identifies a reference point and frames an outcome as a gain or a loss – while most work in political science using prospect theory focuses on the evaluation phase in which risk-acceptant or risk-averse behavior is observed.

Changes to perceptual frames – whether possible outcomes are seen as a gain or a loss – may change policy preferences. Recent research has shown that preferences may be reference-dependent (Gimpel 2007; Jacobs 2016). We make and change preferences based on the motivational salience of certain properties of an outcome and viewing an outcome as a gain or a loss is especially motivationally salient. Loss frames – viewing a territorial negotiation as a loss – decreases the willingness to bargain and drive maximalist preferences.

Putting the pieces together

Relative power shifts produce loss frames which in turn cause maximalist territorial preferences. Aspirations for an improvement to the status quo or memory of the status quo ante are both sufficient to produce a loss frame. Once states have shifted to a loss frame they are unlikely to give up their aspirations easily. Individuals adjust to gains faster than they do to losses; in other words loss frames are stickier than gain frames (Ledgerwood and Boydstun 2014). History, as the cases will show, therefore becomes an important part in explaining maximalist territorial claims (Abramson and Carter 2016). When states lose territory they remember those losses. Their reference point is in the past, specifically when they held the territory previously. When states gain territory they renormalize their reference point to the new status quo and are unwilling to make compromises on territory currently held because of the endowment effect. For these reasons, territorial accommodation, such as Glaser's grand proposed bargain between China and the United States (Glaser 2015), is not simply a question of cost-benefit calculation.

There are three clear paths for a state to be in a loss frame with respect to disputed territory. First, when states' power rise, states feel they are entitled to more than they currently have, thus aspiring to a status not currently held. The state no longer has the status quo as a reference point, but rather holds an aspirational reference point. Second, when states' power fall, states find they are no longer capable of maintaining the previous status quo. The state's reference point does not change to the new status quo but rather remains the status quo ante. While either party in a conflict may be subject to either of these two paths to loss frame, a third path relates only to the party currently in control of territory whom I refer to as the incumbent. Loss aversion for those in control of territory is explained by prospect theory's endowment effect which demonstrates an overvaluing of that which is already in possession. Thus a loss frame can occur when the status quo is the reference point and is being threatened just as it occurs with an aspirational reference point or the status quo ante as a reference point.

Figure 2 presents the full theory including the independent variables of increases/decreases in state power or challenges to the status quo, the intervening variable of a loss frame, and the dependent variable of intransigent maximalist preferences. I also include the causal mechanisms connecting these variables which are derived primarily from the insights of prospect theory. In this project I view causal mechanisms in a similar vein to Waldner's explanation of causal mechanisms as invariant causal principles (Waldner 2015).[23] As I discuss in the methods section, I test this causal arrow both in my survey experiment and in my case studies.

---

[23] Waldner argues that causal inference is best achieved when causal mechanisms are invariant processes rather than intervening events or variables (Waldner 2015, 241–43). Waldner's approach is especially useful in my study because my mechanisms are fundamentally psychological.

Figure 2.2: Full theory

Research Methods

Several questions stand paramount in designing an empirical test of my theory. First, what methodological approach is best suited to a theory of loss aversion and issue indivisibility? Second, how can concepts of the theory, such as reference points and loss frame, be operationalized with observable implications? Finally, what competing theories should be considered for alternative testing? This section discusses these issues.

To test my theory of maximalist territorial claims and issue indivisibility I offer a multi-method research design that includes a survey experiment and qualitative case studies. The purpose of this multimethod design is to fully explore my theorized causal mechanisms (Goertz 2017) and to test the two stages of my theory in the manner that provides consistency between my theorized causal mechanisms and my empirical strategy (Hall 2003). The link between my explanatory variable, relative power shifts, and the resultant loss frame, as well as the presence or absence of my dependent variable

are best demonstrated through in-depth case analysis. To be effective I must not only demonstrate relative power shifts but also operationalize the observation of loss frames and indivisibility. These are decidedly qualitative efforts. The connection between my intervening variable, loss frame, and my dependent variable, a maximalist preference, is primarily psychological. As such, a survey experiment drawing on the insights of psychology and behavioral economics allows me confidence in my theorized mechanism. A multimethod approach, therefore, presents the greatest confidence in making causal claims given the setup of my theory.

Case study methodology

Case studies form the backbone of empirical work for this study. The nature of a study driven by the insights of prospect theory requires evidence that is context specific. Studying loss aversion and processes involved in framing, as Mercer has noted, requires that "analysts must study details of a decision maker's situation, goals, and motivation." (Mercer 2005, 4) As such, qualitative case work is the tool best suited for this study as it is the most likely to account for perceptions and preferences left obscured by large-N analyses (E. J. Wood 2007).

Operationalizing the dependent variable

My dependent variable takes one of two values: a maximalist preference in which an individual is unwilling to bargain and a compromising preference in which an actor is willing to negotiate a bargained outcome. The former represents bargaining intransigence and issue indivisibility. It is necessary to establish a rubric by which we can have

confidence in coding observations of the dependent variable. Here Hassner's tripartite definition of indivisibility, cited in chapter 1, is particularly useful in operationalizing a maximalist preference (Hassner 2003, 2009). Hassner argues that an issue is indivisible when it has cohesion, boundaries, and uniqueness. Cohesion refers to the point that the issue cannot be subdivided without a change in the subjective value of that issue. An issue has boundaries if it means the same thing to competing parties without ambiguity over the issue in question. Finally, an issue is indivisible if it is unique, meaning that it is nonfungible or without possibility of substitution. These three points allow us to operationalize discourse of indivisibility, or in other words maximalist preferences. These are three independently necessary and jointly sufficient aspects of a maximalist claim. When any of these three factors fails to hold, for example individuals discuss land swaps or other side payments for the disputed territory and therefore violate the standard of nonfungibility, we may confidently code the preference as a compromising preference rather than a maximalist preference.

To effectively code discourse of indivisibility as a true preference we must take care to not rely on statements that may be intended for political posturing even if those statements are explicit in declaring a maximalist preference. In such a study as this a scholar faces the challenge that discourse might not reveal actual preferences. Actors might employ rhetoric of indivisibility – a hard-line position – simply to gain an advantage at the bargaining table rather than because of an actual belief of the territory's inseparable integrity. Frieden noted such a scenario in discussing the difficulty in separating preferences from the behavior they would predict. "A country that prefers compromise over a territorial dispute could adopt an intransigent tone if it judged this

most likely to induce movement toward a settlement."(Frieden 1999, 60) We cannot, therefore, infer preferences from bargaining behavior and must keep both separate. My case studies disregard maximalist rhetoric if there is a possibility the actor intended such discourse as a signal to gain bargaining leverage. The key to confident coding therefore becomes the audience of maximalist rhetoric. If foreign policy elites discuss maximalist claims in private domestic audiences then we may have confidence the discourse is not simply political posturing.

Operationalizing loss and gain frames

Operationalizing loss and gain frames may be accomplished by determining an actor's reference point and putting issues at hand in relation to that reference point. For example, Palestinian frustration to peace is typically framed around a return to 1967 borders, representing a reference point of the status quo ante and implying Palestinians are in a loss frame because of it. Changes in the reference point over time must be considered to demonstrate the effect of rising expectations or falling capabilities. Where direct evidence makes determination of the reference point unclear, Mercer suggests several complementary techniques to further refine the operationalization of a loss or gain frame (Mercer 2005). Heuristics and analogies are especially helpful here. Heuristics provide cognitive shortcuts to sort information and may include determining the representativeness of an issue and the availability of alternative framings (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Baron 2014). Analogies are insightful in that they signal what are perceived to be similar circumstances (Khong 1992; Mercer 2005). McDermott, for example, examines the analogies top foreign policy advisors used when discussing the

Iranian hostage crisis with President Carter to determine whether they were in the domain of losses or gains (McDermott 1998).

Crafting the cases through process tracing

Confidently coding this study's dependent and independent variables requires me to clear a high empirical hurdle. I need evidence of foreign policy elites' perceptions of contested territory, how they frame possible negotiation, and their true policy preferences. To clear this empirical hurdle I look to primary documents to ascertain the preferences of foreign policy elites. I use secondary sources and historiographic triangulation to supplement the primary documents or in instances where primary documents are unavailable (Lustick 1996, 615–16; George and Bennett 2005, 95–98). This study therefore fits firmly in the tradition of comparative historical analysis, an approach that remains relevant because of "its focus on large-scale and often complex outcomes of enduring importance; its emphasis on empirically grounded, deep case-based research; and its attention to process and the temporal dimensions of politics" (Thelen and Mahoney 2015, 3).

Beyond using the historical record to code my variables of interest, I also use it to process trace, an empirical procedure that connects the theoretical dots through the historical record to make a causal claim. Process tracing offers within-case, rather than across-case, causal leverage (Thelen and Mahoney 2015; Goertz 2017). As Collier notes, process tracing "requires finding diagnostic evidence that provides the basis for descriptive causal inference" (Collier 2011, 824). In order to do this effectively a scholar must pay particular attention to the development of events over time and the sequences of

44

variables of interest (Mahoney and Falleti 2015). Scholars may gain confidence in their causal inference by laying out a clear theoretical premise against which to measure the case evidence with tests such as hoop tests that affirm a hypothesis's relevance if passed and eliminate a hypothesis if failed and smoking-gun tests that confirm a hypothesis if passed (Van Evera 1997, 31–32; Collier 2011). In going through this pattern it is important process trace rival theories (Fairfield 2013, 55).

<center>Case selection</center>

Since I am limited to only a few cases I follow Goertz's recommendation to draw cases from among those that best demonstrate the causal mechanism (Goertz 2017, chap. 3). Although I am not testing the link between territorial indivisibility and conflict – I recognize that maximalist claims can exist without violent encounters or war – I review cases that did lead to war because these cases are likely to give the greatest insights into the implications of maximalist territorial preferences. I begin with cases in which the dependent variable is likely and then look to explain how the concept developed. This approach explicitly violates King, Keohane, and Verba's mandate to not choose cases based on the dependent variable (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), however I agree with a growing body of literature that views the logic of qualitative research as fundamentally different from that of quantitative approaches (Brady, Collier, and EBSCO Publishing 2010; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). A qualitative design can be justified selecting on the dependent variable when explicitly questioning the processes by which the outcome developed (Goertz 2017).

45

I test my argument against three cases: the Israel/Palestine, Taiwan, and Ireland. The logic behind this case selection is as follows: First, these cases represent the most important cases of territorial indivisibility because of their strategic importance. Even if my theory had no external generalizability an understanding of these three cases alone would be of value. Additionally, absent a dataset of all cases of territorial indivisibility – such a project being impossible because of the qualitative empirical burden in coding just one case – a useful place to begin is the usual suspects of territorial intransigence. Second, these cases allow me to demonstrate the widest applicability of my theory by testing it against previous theories of indivisibility. Each case has an indivisibility explanation that is extant in the literature: Hassner's sacred space thesis in Israel/Palestine, Henripin's strategic social construction thesis in Taiwan, and Goddard's legitimation thesis in Ireland. Taken as a whole, intransigent maximalist claims in these cases combined cannot be explained by the indivisibility theses of the current literature. I aim to show that shifting power dynamics in these cases drive actual preferences and that intransigent bargaining positions are not the result of sacred space, strategic social construction or the legitimation dynamics of bargaining. So as to ensure my findings are not biased in my favor I also process trace alternative hypotheses of indivisibility.

Experimental methodology

Case studies may present the presence of my variables of interest, but in order to demonstrate that the correlation between my perceptual variable and my dependent variable is not spurious I develop a survey experiment. In so doing I may truly test the causal mechanism of loss aversion. I present here a brief review of the logic of

experimental designs and in the next chapter offer an in-depth review of the methodology of survey experiments along with my survey and results. Experimental methodology has been a growth industry in the social sciences since the 1980s, having roots in psychology and being transplanted to economics and later to other disciplines (Druckman et al. 2006; Bardsley et al. 2010; Dunning 2016).[24] Experiments can provide both a test of a theory and an investigation of empirical regularities (Bardsley et al. 2010, 23). My experiment aims to do both; it tests the link between a loss frame and an intransigent maximalist preference, but it also explores the link between how individuals frame negotiation and their willingness to bargain. Specifically, I present survey respondents with a brief vignette discussing a contested issue and ask them to report their willingness to negotiate a compromised outcome. I randomly assign respondents to vignettes that are framed either as a positive (a gain frame) or a negative (a loss frame) and I compare the differences. Such a design offers insight into the connection between the perception of an issue and our willingness to bargain over it. It adds important psychological evidence for the link between my intervening variable (loss frames) and my dependent variable (intransigent maximalist claims).

Utilizing experiments offers benefits and drawbacks. In terms of benefits, the experimental model is the gold standard for causal inference because it produces a high level of internal validity (Green and Gerber 2002). Scholars can have a high degree of confidence in making causal claims by controlling factors of interest and manipulating the variable of concern among a treatment population. They compare the effect of that

---

[24] Daniel Kahneman shared the 2004 Nobel memorial prize in economics with Vernon Smith, not a psychologist like Kahneman and Tversky but another pioneer of experimental methods.

independent variable with the population of cases that did not receive treatment and effectively isolate the influence of treatment on the outcome. The challenge in political science, however, is that it is often difficult or impossible to replicate the experimental standards of random allocation of treatment and control among like populations (Sartori 1991, 245). Ethical concerns aside, we may not, for example, randomly assign military coups among a large population of similar countries that vary only on our variable of interest. Despite these challenges, scholars continue to find ways to incorporate insights from the experimental method into social science research including through field experiments and natural experiments (Bardsley et al. 2010, 8). Survey experiments, common in psychology and behavioral economics, are especially useful in a study such as this that makes an argument about actual decision-making processes.

While internal validity and accompanying confidence in causal inference are the chief benefits of an experimental method, questions of external validity represent the methodology's chief drawback. Controlled experiments in the social sciences are open to questions of generalization beyond the experimental design. How, we might ask, can we be confident that the experimental results will travel outside the exact parameters of the experiment? Indeed this criticism was a central point in Jack Levy's early review of the use of prospect theory in international relations literature (Levy 1992). Such a question is especially relevant in political science where "context is the defining element" (Druckman et al. 2006, 633).

I offer two brief responses to the critique of generalizability in experimental designs. The first holds that science, as a cumulative effort, allows for replication and extensions. Although Kahneman and Tversky's 1979 *Econometrica* article introducing

prospect theory utilized lab experiments with convenient sample populations ranging from just 66 to 95 participants, their work has been so influential because the insights they uncovered have been replicated in so many different conditions including the lab and field (Salovey and Williams-Piehota 2004). In that sense I argue that an experiment that applies the insights of prospect theory to the domain of bargaining is a valuable effort in and of itself, despite the tight constraints of the experimental design. My second response, even more important than the first, is that my multimethod approach that combines experimental and case study methodology adds confidence that the mechanism proposed in the tightly-controlled survey extends to real-world conditions. I can be confident that my survey findings are not spurious by carefully analyzing the historical record and finding evidence that individuals hold preferences for territory in a manner that is consistent with the experimental findings.

My study's theoretical epistemology

I close this methodology section with a brief discussion of my dissertation's theoretical approach to understanding international relations. As is likely evident, I find value in building theories of human behavior on models of decision making that reflect actual cognitive processes. Correct assumptions, I argue, drive more accurate analyses than "useful fictions" (MacDonald 2003). My theory is explicitly positivist rather than normative. I am interested in how state leaders and states behave, not how they should behave should they conform to a set of deductive axioms. Although deduction has been an important tool in the crafting of my theory, it is deduction based on theories of how

49

individuals act, not deduction from theories of behavior that work "as if" people conformed to their precepts.

Conclusion

Intransigent maximalist preferences for territory are ubiquitous in international politics. They result from power shifts that in turn drive perceptions of loss and an accompanying aversion to any compromise. The resultant territorial indivisibility ensures that disputes endure without resolution and may pave the path for violent conflict. Some of the world's great powder kegs – including Israel/Palestine, Taiwan, and Ireland – center on indivisible territory. To understand these and other conflicts we must account for both the politics and the psychology of the process. Wars, as Gilpin notes, are often fought to "minimize potential losses rather than to maximize any particular set of gains" and are "preceded by an important psychological change" (Gilpin 1981, 239). It is one such psychological change, and the attending political dynamics, that the following chapters seek to explain.

CHAPTER 3

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF LOSS AVERSION ON BARGAINING

INTRANSIGENCE

Introduction

This chapter presents the dissertation's first empirical evidence that begins to explain why intransigent maximalist preferences develop. In so doing this chapter asks: Do perceptions of loss affect an individual's willingness to compromise? To answer this question, I present results of a survey experiment in which participants note their inclination to reach a bargained settlement after having been primed in either a loss frame or a gain frame. The experiment demonstrates that there is an important link between loss aversion and willingness to bargain. Those survey respondents who were primed in a loss frame on a particular question – which is to say participants who had hypothetical situations or possible outcomes framing the situation as a loss rather than a gain – were less likely to consider compromise than were those primed in a gain frame. The survey questions, when taken together, demonstrate that perceptions of loss negatively affect an individual's willingness to compromise. These results identify the psychology of loss aversion as an important aspect of bargaining intransigence and lend credence to the theory presented in the previous chapter and the historical cases in chapters four through six.

51

This chapter proceeds as follows: I first discuss the portion of my theory's causal chain that is explored in this chapter and note the connection between bargaining theory and loss aversion as it currently exists in the literature. I then discuss my survey's methodology including the logic and challenges of experiments in studying the social world. The subsequent section presents my survey and its results. The complete survey, including exact wording for all questions and treatments, may be found in the dissertation's appendix. The chapter concludes with a discussion of these results and their wider implications for my theory of territorial indivisibility.

Loss aversion and bargaining intransigence

This study joins a small body of literature that examines the connection between loss aversion and bargaining dynamics, though none are solely concerned with bargaining intransigence as this study is. Other studies have examined various aspects of bargaining theory and the insights that framing and prospect theory may provide. Such studies note how positive framing leads individuals to concessionary behavior (Neale and Bazerman 1985), how actors might influence a bargaining dynamic to their favor through the manipulation of the other side's frame of reference (Kanner 2004), the influence of risk aversion on bargaining outcomes (Murnighan, Roth, and Schoumaker 1988), and the ways that different reference points may influence bargaining behavior (Butler 2007). The latter study is indicative of the challenges scholars face in building a theoretical model incorporating bargaining dynamics and insights from prospect theory. Butler's study has a role for "I-want-it-all" dynamics – what this dissertation calls intransigent maximalist preferences or indivisibility – but the logic is tautological. He conflates

bargaining preferences with their underlying reference points, so it is an "I-want-it-all" reference point that leads to an "I-want-it-all" preference. In contrast, I explicitly theorize how reference points are the subject of political dynamics and produce loss or gain frames that then affect bargaining preferences (Druckman 2004). In this manner points of reference and preferences are considered in a causal sequence rather than as a tautology (Druckman 2001).

A central contention within this dissertation is that perceptions of loss or gain do have a connection with a willingness to bargain. The previous chapter presented my theory of territorial indivisibility by arguing that relative power shifts between actors in a territorial dispute can drive perceptions of loss such that those actors become unwilling to compromise in the dispute. They come to desire the entirety of the territory and are unwilling to accept anything less than the whole. This causal chain suggests that shifting power dynamics may affect the way individuals view compromise which in turn affects their willingness to bargain. The three chapters that follow present case studies that trace evidence of the theory through the historical record. Despite the evidence in those chapters that add confidence to the theory, they are incomplete by themselves because the theory makes an argument about what is happening with individuals at a psychological level. Although we can find behavioral evidence consistent with the theory through case studies, as I do in chapters four through six, case studies alone cannot give great confidence to the psychological process suggested in the theory. In order to isolate what happens between an individual's ears with respect to perceptions of loss and an accompanying bargaining intransigence, I use a survey experiment designed to test this particular causal mechanism.

The theory presented in chapter two contained independent and intervening variables that ultimately resulted in the study's dependent variable of an intransigent maximalist preference, or in other words territorial indivisibility. The complete theory figure is presented below.

Independent Variable	causal mechanisms	**Intervening Variable**	causal mechanism	**Dependent Variable**

incumbent: challenge to status quo — endowment effect

either party: ↑ state power — Δ reference point (aspirational)

↓ state power — Δ reference point (status quo ante)

loss frame — loss aversion — intransigent maximalist preference (territorial indivisibility)

Figure 3.1: Full theory

The survey experiment in this chapter explicitly explores the causal mechanism between the theory's intervening variable of a loss frame and the dependent variable of indivisibility. This causal mechanism of loss aversion is psychological and therefore not observable in a historical case study. Certainly behavior may suggest that a particular psychological process is occurring, and indeed I present such suppositions in this dissertation's case studies, but the actual psychological process at work remains only a deduction without an analysis that can sufficiently insulate the psychological process at play. Doing so requires testing that can isolate and manipulate the variables of interest. It

is for this reason that I developed a survey experiment with treatments at the level of the theory's intervening variable, either a loss frame or gain frame, and I then measure the effect of those treatments on survey respondents' willingness to compromise.

This study is certainly not the first to use experiments to investigate bargaining dynamics, but it is unique in its focus. I take a decidedly monadic approach; because I am investigating the formation of individual preferences, I am concerned with what preferences individuals bring to the bargaining table – or more accurately, the preferences to sit at the bargaining table or not – rather than the dynamics of the bargain itself. Although my theory centers on the importance of relational power dynamics and history, I am explaining how loss aversion develops and its subsequent influence on an individual's willingness to bargain. As such, my experiment focuses on individuals rather than the strategic dynamic at the bargaining table.

Many lab experiments and game theoretic models have eschewed a monadic approach because their focus is precisely in the strategic dynamic; how the moves of one player affect those of another. Studies investigate this dynamic through situations such as sequential bargaining in which one player makes an offer and the other chooses to accept or counter (Roth 1995, 256). Other games have a different area of focus, such as ultimatum games in which players make only one decision (Güth and Tietz 1990). Dictator and trust games ask players to determine how much of an endowment to split among themselves (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). Variables in strategic dynamic studies include degrees of private information (Kennan and Wilson 1993), communication between parties (Crawford 1990), anonymous vs face-to-face interactions, (Bolton and Zwick 1995), the role of an arbitrator (Ashenfelter and Bloom

1984), gender differences in bargaining outcomes (Eckel and Grossman 1998), and how ideas of fairness affect bargaining dynamics (Rabin 1993). There are a litany of such studies producing views on bargaining experiments that "defy easy summary" because bargaining itself is "subtle and complex" (Roth 1995, 327).

This study is interested in the preference an actor brings to a strategic interaction, rather than the strategic interaction itself. As such, I examine individual preferences under loss or gain frames rather than loss aversion in an iterative strategic environment. Others have argued that "in order to correctly incorporate the concept of loss aversion into non-cooperative game theory, it is necessary to let the reference points of the players depend on the strategies the players play" (Driesen, Perea, and Peters 2010, 385). Although I do not develop a game theoretic model to explore the relationship between loss aversion and bargaining intransigence, the sentiment in such a view nevertheless remains myopic. By only considering loss aversion through reference points developed within a specific strategic interaction we are not only neglecting important prior attitudes and preferences the players bring into the interaction, but more importantly failing to ask why actors may never enter into a strategic interaction in the first place. It is a central contention of this dissertation that loss aversion helps explain exactly such a phenomenon.

Methodology

To analyze the role loss aversion plays in bargaining intransigence I developed a survey experiment that isolates the intervening variable of my project's theory – namely whether an actor is in a loss or gain frame – and tests that variable's effect on the

56

individual's willingness to bargain. It is therefore worthwhile to discuss the logic of experiments in social science research, survey design, and the specifics of how I administered my experiment.

Experiments provide a greater degree of confidence in causal inference than observational studies. The fundamental problem of causal inference notes that we cannot observe the outcome of both treatment and non-treatment on a single subject of inquiry (Druckman et al. 2011, 16). A doctor, for example, is unable to determine the efficacy of a medication through its treatment to a single individual; she cannot prescribe treatment, measure the change in the patient's welfare, and then rerun history without treatment on the same patient to compare the two outcomes. As such, researchers provide treatment to groups of subjects and compare results to those who have not received treatment. The standards for such experiments provide confidence in the effect of the treatment when the populations of groups receiving treatment and those in the control group do not differ in any meaningful way and when treatment and control are randomly assigned among those two population groups.

The fundamental problem of causal inference is especially vexing in the social world where researchers face myriad confounding variables that violate the strict conditions that experiments require. The logic of experiments in the study of international politics, therefore, is not immediately intuitive. We cannot randomly allocate high GDP growth among a group of like non-democracies to measure the effect of wealth on democratic growth nor can we rerun the years since World War II absent the advent of nuclear weapons to measure if nukes are a stabilizing factor in great power politics.

Despite these challenges, researchers have found ways to incorporate the logic of experiments into the study of politics (Druckman and Lupia 2012).

Lab experiments tend to analyze decision-making processes under specific conditions of interest. These experiments offer highly structured conditions that precisely isolate variables of interest. Kahneman and Tversky's studies that developed prospect theory were centered in the lab, presenting university students with different treatments of questions and discovering the effects of framing on risk propensity (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Although the strict conditions of the lab yield high confidence in such studies' internal validity, lab experiments are open to criticism given the small population tested and the non-representative samples involved. How are we to have confidence, for example, that the findings from a group of Hebrew University students used in Kahneman and Tversky's early studies will hold with a more diverse population? Field experiments aim to address these concerns through a random assignment of treatment to a larger population and have been especially popular in the area of voter mobilization. Natural experiments aim to apply the logic of experiments, namely the random allocation of treatment and control on like populations, to conditions that are naturally occurring in the social world, asking, for example, why ethnic conflict persists among two ethnic groups in one state but not among the ethnic groups in a neighboring state (Posner 2004). Natural experiments explain a real-world issue and, as with lab experiments, create a high degree of internal validity. Their external validity, however, remains suspect.

Survey experiments are a unique class of experiments in that they retain the internal validity of other experiments, but they offer a higher degree of external validity

owing to their larger sample population and higher degree of sample representativeness. Survey experiments blend the high degree of confidence in causal inference that experiments afford with the generalizability of samples representative of larger populations (Mullinix et al. 2015). This is not to say that the survey experiment has singlehandedly solved the external validity limitation of experiments, but it has improved it. When combined with other types of analyses, such as I do in the case studies in the following chapters, survey experiments may give us a high degree of confidence in explaining social phenomena. While surveys may incorporate any number of experiment types, such as endorsement experiments used to measure civilian attitudes toward combatants during wartime (Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013) or list experiments that examine non-disclosed racial attitudes (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997), a common form of survey experiment is to measure how perceptions of political phenomena shift dependent on a descriptive aspect in survey vignettes. Split-sample survey experiments present treatment and control variations among samples of like populations and analyze the differences in participant responses. Although some argue that experiments should reveal what individuals are predisposed to do rather than to push them to a place that they are not (Sniderman 2011, 111–12), such an approach does not allow for the evolution of preferences through changing settings (Dietrich and List 2013).

To test the role of loss aversion in bargaining intransigence I deployed a split-sample survey experiment through Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is a crowdsourcing platform in which individuals complete tasks, such as surveys, for compensation. Although this process raises some questions regarding the generalizability of findings, recent scholarship provides a high degree of confidence in MTurk results.

59

The biggest difference between MTurk and surveys through research firms such as Qualtrics or YouGov is that samples from MTurk are not entirely representative of the population as a whole whereas research firms take great care to ensure that survey populations embody a cross-section of the population as a whole on all relevant demographic and socio-economic factors. The MTurk sample, alternatively, is a convenient sample drawn from individuals who opt in to taking the survey in exchange for payment. This process produces sample populations in MTurk that tend to be younger, better educated, more liberal, less ethnically diverse, and less wealthy than the population as a whole (Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016, 3).

Despite these differences, MTurk survey results do not differ from representative samples (Mullinix et al. 2015), especially when controlling for the factors that are unique to MTurk samples and creating sample weights for key features such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, income, and education (Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016, 9). As a result, studies that rely on MTurk in whole or in part appear in major journals including the *American Political Science Review* (Tomz and Weeks 2013)*, International Studies Quarterly* (Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Peterson 2017; Huff and Schub 2018; Hurst, Tidwell, and Hawkins 2017), *Political Psychology* (M. J. Wood 2015; Conway et al. 2017; Friedman and Zeckhauser 2017) and the *Journal of Politics* (Ryan 2014).

I have additional confidence in my MTurk results because I am not gaining causal leverage from factors that are likely to be affected by my convenient sample. I am testing a broad psychological connection between loss aversion and bargaining intransigence, a factor unlikely to be influenced by a population that is slightly younger, more liberal, and more female than the population as a whole. As Levay et al note, "[w]hile the

representativeness of MTurk does not threaten experimental inferences in most cases, one might nevertheless misestimate treatment effects if groups who are expected to respond to an experimental treatment differently than others are underrepresented and/or differ in unmeasurable ways from others like them who are not included in the sample" (Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016, 9–11).

I deployed my survey to 512 individuals, each individual receiving one of two treatments for each question. The treatments were randomized for each individual question so that participants received a mix of questions with loss frames and questions with gain frames. Each treatment, therefore, received an average of 256 responses. My population only contained Americans 18 years of age or older. I had near gender parity in my sample with 49% of the population female, 50.6% of the population male, and 0.4% preferring not to disclose. The age distribution tracked with typical MTurk samples in skewing younger than a representative American sample. My population was 4.9% between 18 and 25, 43.2% between 26 and 35, 29.1% between 36 and 45, 13.3% between 46 and 55, and 9.2% 56 or older. More than three quarters of my study's participants had completed either some college (37.3%) or had a four-year degree (39.8%) as their highest level of education. Another 10.1% had a graduate or professional degree while 12.5% had a high school diploma or equivalent as their highest level of education. Income trended toward the middle class with 18.6% having a household income less than $25,000, 32% between $25,000 and $49,999, and 26% between $50,000 and $74,999. A fifth of the population had a household income above $75,000 (9.2% between $75,000 and $99,000 and 11.3% above $100,000). My sample skewed from a representative sample the most in the area of ethnicity. Asians or Pacific Islanders accounted for 7.8% of my population,

61

not far from the 6.2% national rate. African Americans, however, were underrepresented in my sample at 8.2% as opposed to the national rate of 14%. The disparity between my sample and the national population was even worse for Hispanics/Latinos who constituted 3.7% of my sample compared to 17.6% of the national population. Non-Hispanic whites were overrepresented in my sample at 77.7% compared to the national rate of 62%.[25]

Survey Experiment and Results

The questions in the surveys all had two versions, one which framed the compromise as a gain and another which framed the compromise as a loss. Participants were randomly assigned gain questions and loss questions and the questions themselves were assigned independently of other questions. Survey respondents could therefore receive any question in either its loss or gain framing.

The null hypothesis for each question is that there are no significant differences between the responses from those primed in a gain frame vis-à-vis those primed in a loss frame. Some questions measured willingness to compromise along a seven-point scale. For these questions, the means of the two sample populations should not vary meaningfully.

$$H_0: \mu_1 - \mu_2 = 0$$

---

[25] All comparative statistics of U.S. ethnicity are taken from the Pew Research Center's 2015 analysis.

Other questions presented a consistent statement across treatments but then asked for treatment and control responses of mathematically equivalent statements that are framed as either a loss or a gain. For this subset of questions, the null hypothesis is that the ratio of responses in favor of compromise versus those opposed to compromise will not differ among treatment groups.

To determine if differences between treatments are significant I calculate confidence intervals for differences in the means of treatment populations responding to thermometer "willingness" scales according the following formula in which the standard deviation and population size are the required variables:

$$\sigma_{\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2} = \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_1^2}{n_1} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{n_2}}$$

For those questions in which I compare total responses rather than population means, I calculate the confidence interval according to the following formula

Difference Between the Sample Proportions $\pm$ z*(Standard Error for Difference)

in which the difference between the sample proportions is added/subtracted to the relevant z score multiplied by standard error for the difference between the samples.

Some questions had a consistent prompt but randomly assigned from two different pairs of options for answering. For example, the following vignette was given to all survey participants:

You are a member of the local school board and the board is considering how to spend a sum of money. You would like the money to be spent on improving the district's music and arts programs while another member of the board would like to spend the money on school facilities. The amount of money is such that it will make a large improvement if applied in whole to either option but will only make minor improvements if split among the options. If the board does not come to an agreement the superintendent will decide to give all of the money to one of the two options. Which of the following do you prefer?

Participants were then randomly assigned a pair of options from which to choose. One pair framed the compromise as a gain, noting that a compromise allowed the participant in the hypothetical situation to keep half of the funds for the district's music and arts programs. Specifically, respondents for this question that received the gain frame option chose from among the following:

[Treatment A]

Option 1 - You compromise by keeping half of the money for music and arts programs

Option 2 - You pass the decision to the superintendent with 50% chance that all the funds go to music and arts and 50% chance that none of the funds go to music and arts

The other pair of options framed the compromise in terms of loss, noting that the participant lost half of the funds to the policy preference of the other board member. These respondents chose from among the following:

[Treatment B]

Option 1 - You compromise by losing half of the money to school facilities

Option 2 - You pass the decision to the superintendent with 50% chance that all the funds go to facilities and 50% chance that none of the funds go to facilities

The actual meaning of the two sets of options are identical. Option 1 in both treatments splits the funds in half, giving half to the respondent's (hypothetical) preferred cause, music and arts, and giving half to the other board member's cause, school facilities. Likewise Option 2 in both treatments passes the decision to the superintendent who is equally likely to give all finds to music and arts as she is to school facilities. The only difference lies in how the decision is framed.

Despite the fact that the two sets of options are substantively equivalent, survey participants displayed an asymmetry in their responses. In the first set of options, the set that emphasized the gain to be had, respondents chose to compromise 53% of the time. However, when presented with the loss frame, respondents chose compromise 43% of the time. The difference between these two numbers is significant at the 95% level.

Several questions followed the above format. Like above, in these questions survey participants were given hypothetical situations then randomly assigned a pair of options from which to choose their preferred alternative, one pair that framed the potential compromise as a loss and the other pair that framed the compromise as a gain. The results of these questions were consistent with the first; respondents were less willing to compromise when options were framed as a

loss rather than when framed as a gain. Importantly, there was no mathematical

difference between the loss and gain options, it was only the framing that

changed.

Question 2 gave all participants the following prompt:

You and a neighbor both claim 100% of a disputed area between your two
properties. You have the opportunity to settle or to go through legal arbitration.
Which of the following do you prefer?

Respondents were than randomly assigned one of the following treatments:

[Treatment A]
You settle and gain half of the contested land; or
You arbitrate with 50% probability you are awarded the whole of the territory and
50% probability you are awarded none of the property

[Treatment B]
You settle and lose half of the contested land; or
You arbitrate with 50% probability you lose all of the territory and 50%
probability you lose none of it

As in question 1, respondents presented with a gain frame were more likely to

compromise than those presented with a loss frame. The former, those who received

treatment A, preferred to settle and gain half the contested land 77% of the time. The

latter, however, preferred to settle and lose half the contested land 57% of the time. The

difference in responses between these two treatments is significant at the 99% level.

Question 3 followed the same format, asking:

> Your business is in a legal dispute with another company over the proceeds of an idea which both companies claim as their own. Which of the following do you prefer?

Once again Treatment A presented options through a gain frame, while Treatment B presented options through a loss frame.

> [Treatment A]
> A settlement which gives you half of the proceeds; or
> A judge's ruling with 50% chance you receive all the proceeds and 50% chance you receive none of the proceeds
>
> [Treatment B]
> A settlement which takes half of the proceeds from you; or
> A judge's ruling with 50% chance you lose all the proceeds and 50% chance you lose none of the proceeds

Consistent with questions 1 and 2, the results of this question again point to the effect of framing on willingness to bargain. Those presented with a gain frame chose to settle 66% of the time. Those presented with a gain from chose to settle 47% of the time. This is likewise significant at the 99% level.

A final question in this category, question 4, asked:

> You are developing a product design for a client who will pay you a significant sum of money if your design is chosen. A colleague of yours is the only competing design developer and suggests you work together and split the profits. Which of the following do you prefer?

67

Treatment A was presented as a gain frame and Treatment B as a loss frame:

[Treatment A]
You receive half of the project payout by co-developing a design with your colleague; or
You develop your own design with 50% chance you receive all of the project payout yourself and 50% chance you receive none of the payout

[Treatment B]
You lose half of the project payout by co-developing a design with your colleague; or
You develop your own design with 50% chance you lose all of the project payout yourself and 50% chance you lose none of the payout

The results for this question are the consistent with the above. Those presented with a gain frame chose to compromise 74% of the time while those in a loss frame chose compromise 61% of the time, a significant difference at the 99% level.

Another set of questions had differences in the prompts, embedding a loss or gain in the vignette itself, and then asking participants their willingness to compromise on a scale of one to seven, one being not likely at all to compromise and a seven being very likely to compromise. The value of four, which lies equidistant from the two extremes, was labeled as having no opinion. Some of these questions add an additional aspect of the loss aversion, namely the endowment effect, that is present in the theory in the last chapter and is evident in the cases that follow in the subsequent chapters. The endowment effect suggests that we overvalue things in our possession and that the possibility of losing them is sufficient to produce outcomes consistent with the loss aversion findings of prospect theory.

Consider, for example, the following scenario which was included in the survey and is labeled here as question 5. Respondents were asked to consider that both they and a sibling claimed a family heirloom and that recent family events reminded them both of the heirloom and that both desired possession of it. Another family member who is known to be impartial suggests a compromise in which the siblings alternate possession of the heirloom, however the physical distance between them suggests that alternating possession is not without cost or risk that the heirloom may be damaged or lost if shipped again and again. Although all respondents received theses details, the vignettes randomly varied a detail about who was in currently in possession of the heirloom. Some respondents were told the heirloom had been in their possession for a number of years while the others were told the heirloom had been in their sibling's possession for years. All were then asked their willingness to accept the compromise rather than keeping things as they currently are.

This question differs from those discussed above in that it is not only value neutral options that are framed differently, such as suggesting a 50/50 compromise as losing half versus gaining half, but rather the conditions of the vignette itself that produces the loss or gain frame. In one, the respondent considers the heirloom as having been in their possession for some time as opposed to the heirloom having been in the possession of the sibling. My theory would suggest that those considering the heirloom in their possession would see any change to the status quo as a loss while those not currently in possession would see the compromise as a gain and an improvement to the status quo. The data support this claim with those currently in possession of the heirloom

expressing a willingness to alternate possession with a mean of 2.97 and those not in possession desiring alternation with a mean of 5.23.

Several other questions followed a similar format, altering an aspect within the vignette to produce the loss or gain frame. One question told the survey participant that their house lies on a piece of land recently discovered to have property lines different from the fence that separating their land from their neighbor's. One vignette informed the participant that the true property line was 20 feet further from their house than originally thought, extending their own land, while the other vignette informed the participant that the true property line was 20 feet closer to their house than originally thought, reducing their own land. They were then told that the neighbor suggests splitting the difference and each paying 50% to move the fence 10 feet further from their house in the first case and 10 feet closer to their house in the second case. The respondent is then asked how willing they are to accept this compromise.

Respondents that received the first treatment, the treatment in which the property line was further from their house than originally thought, were equally as likely to accept the compromise as to not, with a mean response on a scale of 1 to 7 at 4.01 with a 95% confidence interval between 3.77 and 4.29. Those in receiving the other treatment which placed the property line closer than originally thought were more willing to compromise with a mean response of 5.58 and 95% confidence interval between 5.39 and 5.76. The first group had 44% of responses under a 4, the neutral value in the response scale, whereas the second group had only 11% of responses under a 4. Similarly the first group had far fewer

70

respondents very willing to compromise, as marked by a 6 or 7, at 25.1% of all responses compared to 62.3% of responses in the second group at 6 or 7.

This question demonstrates that the logic of the endowment effect looms large but also that it need not contradict individuals acting in their self-interest. It is not entirely surprising that knowing that a neighbor has a legal right to move a fence 20 feet closer to an individual's property gives that individual an incentive to compromise to help pay to move the fence only 10 feet closer. It may appear on its surface that simple cost-benefit evaluations provide all that is needed in appraising such behavior. Doing so, however, fails to account for the differences between the two treatment groups. Those in the first group who had every incentive not to accept the compromise because they had a legal right to extend the property line a full 20 feet were just as willing to compromise as not. This behavior suggests that the initial condition of the fence looms large in an individual's mind and in determining their subsequent behavior. Gains and losses are measured against the initial point of reference, in this question that reference point being the original location of the fence dividing the two properties.

Another question asks the respondent to suppose they enter a retail store and while completing their purchase they are informed that they were the store's millionth customer and as such were to be awarded a prize of $1,000. After receiving the check, the respondent is informed that the manager made a mistake and that the customer behind them was the actual winner. The manager informs the respondent that they are not required to return the winnings but suggests that they split the prize between the respondent and the customer behind them and

each take half. The respondent is asked how willing they are to accept this compromise.

The alternate version of this vignette swaps the roles of the respondent and the other customer, placing the other customer ahead of the respondent and giving that customer the initial prize. The respondent is then informed that there was a mistake and that they were the rightful winner. The manager suggests the respondent and the other customer split the winnings but notes to the respondent that the respondent is not required to do so. The respondent is then asked how willing they are to accept this compromise.

In both of these vignettes the respondent has a claim to the entirety of the prize and must decide to split the winnings or not. In the first case the respondent is first presented with the prize and in the second the respondent first observes someone else winning the prize. The difference lies in the initial perception in the first case that the money all belongs to the respondent while in the second case the respondent first considers the money in the hands of another. That initial condition has implications in the actions of the two groups of respondents.

Those who received the first vignette were less likely to compromise than those who received the second vignette. The first vignette had a mean of 4.03 with 95% confidence interval between 3.77 and 4.29 while the second vignette had a mean of 4.84 with 95% confidence interval between 4.57 and 5.12. More than a third of the respondents in the second group were very willing to compromise while only 14.5% of respondents in the first group were similarly willing. Although respondents had a claim to the entirety of the money in either case, the

initial point of reference signaling the winner of the money loomed large in their decision to split the money or not.

A final question further explored the relationship between the endowment effect and loss frames and their influence on subsequent behavior. In this final question respondents were presented with the following vignette:

[Treatment A]
You and a partner established a business some years ago in which you each handle separate halves of the company and each take equal salary. In recent years your half of the company brings in considerably more revenue. How willing are you to suggest that revenue sharing between you and your partner should reflect this shift, giving you a higher salary than your partner?

The alternate treatment presented the business partner's half of the company as the more profitable as follows:

[Treatment B]
You and a partner established a business some years ago in which you each handle separate halves of the company and each take equal salary. In recent years your partner's half of the company brings in considerably more revenue. Your partner has suggested that revenue sharing between you and your partner should reflect this shift, giving your partner a higher salary than you. How willing are you to accept such a change from your original agreement in which you had equal salary?

The results of this question are consistent with other questions in the survey. Those in the first treatment expressed a greater willingness to alter the status quo than those in the second group. The mean of the Treatment A was 5.35 with a 95% confidence interval between 5.11 and 5.60 while the mean of Treatment B

was 3.86 with a 95% confidence interval between 3.61 and 4.10. This question also had a qualitative element to it. Respondents were asked to explain in a short sentence why they gave the response that they did. Among those in Treatment A responses reflected a consistent renormalization of fair revenue sharing to reflect the changed reality of the company's income. Responses consistently cited the fairness of revenue sharing based off of the new reference point of current income. Those in Treatment B, alternatively, continued to hold the original agreement as their reference point and cited the fairness of original agreement.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented consistent results showing that perceptions of loss negatively influence an individual's willingness to compromise. The purpose of this survey experiment was to isolate the causal chain between my theory's intervening variable of loss frame and the dependent variable of an intransigent maximalist preference. The causal mechanism linking these two variables, that of loss aversion, is psychological and warranted a focus of its own before exploring its role in the case studies that follow. Before turning to those case studies, several points warrant brief discussion including the relationship between my findings and typical prospect theory studies as well as the meaning of the significance of differences between two treatment populations versus the magnitude of those differences.

Although the purpose of this survey, and the dissertation more broadly, is to trace the origin of a specific preference, the results of this survey are consistent with the typical findings of prospect theory studies which focus on risk propensity driven by loss or gain

frames. According to the prospect theory literature, individuals accept more risk to avoid loss and are therefore more risk-acceptant in the domain of losses than they are in the domain of gains. Individuals are more willing to take risk to avoid loss because they hate losses more than they love gains. While my survey questions were interested specifically in an individual's willingness to compromise in light of loss or gain frames, several questions demonstrated an increased willingness to accept uncertainty in the face of losses rather than gains. Recall, for example, that question 3 asked survey participants to note their willingness to settle in a legal dispute for half the proceeds of a contested idea versus a 50% chance a judge rules in their favor. Participants in a loss frame chose to settle 47% of the time to the 66% in the gain frame. This represents a difference not only in the formation of a preference to compromise, but also in a greater willingness to accept uncertainty in the face of losses. There appears to be a connection, therefore, between bargaining intransigence and risk acceptance.

Interpreting the results of this chapter in the context of the dissertation requires a discussion of the difference between the significance of results and their magnitude. The results of my survey questions consistently show that individuals are less willing to compromise when in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains. Whether in mathematically equivalent alternatives or through qualitatively different vignettes, participants demonstrated a regular tendency to discount the possibility of compromise when facing losses as opposed to gains. As the above results have shown, these findings were not only consistent but also highly significant. The magnitude of the differences, however, were not extreme. While the needle moved, it did not swing wildly. One might ask if these findings are meaningful in light of this fact. I argue that they are. The study

itself has internal validity based on the logic presented earlier in this chapter and because my study avoids the most common concerns for internal validity in experiments including attrition and the possibility of noncompliance (McDermott 2011, 30–33). We may therefore have a high degree of confidence that the reasoning of the argument of this chapter, namely that perceptions of loss lead to a decrease in willingness to compromise. The question therefore becomes one of degree. The cases in the chapters that follow demonstrate that this logic holds and is taken to its extreme in situations that are contingent on history and context rather than in short survey vignette's devoid of real-world implications. While this chapter has shown that loss aversion influences compromise aversion, the following chapters show the conditions in which that aversion to compromise may be taken to its extreme.

CHAPTER 4

INDIVISIBLE ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

There is no more quintessential example of indivisibility in international politics than the case of Israel and Palestine. For 70 years the unresolved dispute between the Israeli state and the Palestinian territories has shaped regional politics and the efficacy of American policies in the region. Vast portions of the populations on both sides have lived for generations discontent with the status quo of the political boundaries. The intransigent and maximalist nature of national preferences are neatly summarized in Aaron David Miller's assessment of peace talks in the 1990s. Miller was a key member of the U.S. State Department's peace delegation and a senior advisor to Secretary of State James Baker. Miller noted that of all the thorny issues surrounding Israeli-Palestinian peace, including Palestinian reparations and Israeli settlement building, it was the final status of Jerusalem that was destined to be the spoiler for peace. "Jerusalem", Miller stated, "wasn't for sharing."(Miller 2008, 305) This statement is indicative of the reality of intransigent maximalist preferences in the dispute, but the sources of such preferences remain unclear.

This chapter is organized around three central questions: Why did Palestinian and Zionist interactions become increasingly hostile through the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century? Why were Israeli and Palestinian responses to the 1947 United Nations territorial partition plan so divergent? And why have intransigent maximalist preferences endured among both parties?

My argument is that these events are best understood as a result of shifting power dynamics and the ensuing sense of loss that accompanies changing reference points. The changing power dynamics between the Palestinians and Zionist settlers between 1870 and 1947 altered the reference points by which both populations evaluated their standing with the other and their claim to the shared territory. Through successive waves of Zionist immigration, Palestinians saw their relative strength in the territory decline significantly, especially in the 1920s and 1930s. This had the result of Palestinians failing to renormalize their reference point to reflect of realities of the new status quo but rather continuing to hold their position in the past – the status quo ante – as their reference point. Palestinians remembered what they had in the past and used that as their baseline to evaluate territorial concessions. Any concession, when viewed against this historical baseline, was seen as a loss and led to intransigent maximalist preferences.

Zionist settlers, conversely, saw a massive population swing in their favor through the latter end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. As Zionist relative power grew vis-à-vis the Palestinians, Zionist preferences became increasingly maximalist. This resulted from Zionist views that the status quo no longer represented the true power dynamic and so Zionists held a new reference point, an aspirational reference point, against which concessions were measured and seen as a loss. The 1947 proposed United Nations partition of the territory disproportionately favored the Israelis, reinforcing the Palestinian loss frame which was only further cemented by Israeli military victories in 1948 and 1967.

An alternative argument for the indivisibility of Israel and Palestine is found in Ron Hassner's theory of sacred space (Hassner 2003, 2009). Sacred space - a place to

communicate with the divine, a place of permanent divine presence, and a place to provide meaning to the faithful - drives indivisibilities when religious traditions splinter into competing branches, when competing religions have traditions in shared space, or when religious and secular groups dispute territory for different reasons, for access to the divine in the case of the religious and for access to resources in the case of the secular. In this chapter I argue that Hassner is not incorrect in his discussion of sacred space, but that his thesis is too limited and fails to recognize the role of loss perception and preceding shifts in power dynamics. As I show below, intransigent maximalist preferences extend far beyond the Temple Mount or Jerusalem and are best explained through the lens of power shifts and accompanying aversion to loss.

Shifting power

Relative power shifts between the Zionists, later Israelis, and the Palestinians provide the foundation for understanding perceptions of loss and resultant intransigent maximalist preferences for the Palestinian territory.

19th Century

The driving force behind Jewish immigration to Palestine and the resultant power shifts in subsequent decades was Zionism. The nationalist ideology of a Jewish return to Palestine and establishment of a Jewish state grew out of the political particulars of the late 19th century, though proponents trace Zionism's roots through two millennia of displacement from their ancestral home. At the heart of Zionism is the notion that the Jewish people are not a religious body but a nation and that Palestine (at the time) was

their homeland. Such a belief was a natural result of Europe's growing nationalism in the 19th century for two reasons. First, the discourse of nationalism was one of the chief developments in 19th century Europe. French nationalism in the Napoleonic Wars proved an especially powerful motivating factor and discourse of complementary "imagined communities" soon spread. Second, as nationalism spread through Europe groups defined who they were often by who they were not. States were not formed along ethnic lines and as such minority groups were often marginalized. Jews, with a unique blend of religious and ethnic identity and lacking a home state of their own, were often on the receiving end of such marginalization.

Growing nationalism through Europe saw a concurrent rise of anti-Semitism in which long-held discrimination against Jews took a new flavor of ethnically-based hatred. The 19th century witnessed several examples of organized violence against Jewish communities, but it was the Russian pogroms of the early 1880s that were especially odious. In March 1881 socialist agitators assassinated Tsar Alexander II, an act that many came to blame on Russia's small Jewish population. Over the next three years more than 200 anti-Jewish incidents occurred throughout the empire, but especially in the southwest in cities including Odessa, Kiev, and Warsaw. Rioters destroyed thousands of homes and assaulted those who did not flee. The Russian government's tacit support of the discrimination became explicit in the May Laws of 1882, which established a number of restrictions on Jewish settlement, property ownership, and business autonomy.

Although Jewish nationalism preceded the anti-Semitic pogroms of the 1880s, the pogroms were instrumental in convincing many to put the aspirations of Zionism into reality by migrating to Palestine (Halpern and Reinharz 1998, 11). The first large wave of

Jewish immigration to Palestine, known as the First Aliyah, was a direct result of these pogroms. Those immigrating to Palestine joined a population of Jews already in the region numbering roughly 20,000, most living in Jerusalem.

Despite a common Zionist refrain that Palestine was a "land without a people for a people without a land," the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea was not unoccupied.[26] By the middle of the 19th century the population of Palestine numbered roughly 500,000 most of whom were Muslim. Approximately 60,000 Arabic-speaking Christians and the aforementioned 20,000 Jews constituted the region's most significant minorities. Although David Ben-Gurion would later argue "The First Aliyah arrived in a country of empty spaces and slums. Jerusalem was a crumbling village where hovels alternated with monuments gone to seed," the reality on the ground was markedly different. (Ben-Gurion 1970, 112) Arab life was family-centered and located primarily within ancestral villages lying on mountain slopes or in small valleys where inhabitants farmed olive trees or grain (Pappé 2006, 14). Most villages were made up of several extended families and only 20% of the population lived in urban settings (Sammy 2015). Although the region fell under Ottoman auspices, there was little political centralization and identity was primarily a matter of village membership. Several villages formed an Ottoman administrative unit and at the head of each polity stood the leader of the villages' most powerful clan. Bedouins, especially in the region's south and west, connected the villages and towns through a nomadic trading infrastructure (Pappé 2006, 18). By the 1880s the economy of the region began to shift as Palestine became the

---

[26] For a discussion of commonalities and shared shortcomings within Palestinian, Israeli, and Western historiography of Ottoman Palestine see (Doumani 1999).

crossroads for European trade in Egypt and Syria. Palestinian subsistence crops fell to cash crops and rising property ownership put limits on peasants' access to land they had long used (Halpern and Reinharz 1998, Ch. 2).

Jewish philosophers and rabbis began calling in earnest for the Jewish return to Palestine as early as the mid-18th century, but the most influential interlocutor of Zionism was the Budapest-born Theodor Herzl. Herzl's 1896 *The Jews' State – Der Judenstaat* in the original German – argued the answer to the "Jewish Question" of deep-rooted and continued anti-Semitism in Europe was a national polity explicitly reserved for Jews (Herzl 1997). A distinction from the common translation of Herzl's work, *The Jewish State,* is important here. Herzl's solution was a political center for the Jewish people, it was not a call for a state founded on Jewish religious principles.

Herzl was not only a gifted polemicist, but also a skillful political organizer. Herzl organized the First Zionist Congress in Switzerland in 1897 and successfully wrangled differing constituencies into accepting a public program calling for the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine. He also emerged as the president of a movement that gained traction with additional Congress meetings in subsequent years. These meetings and the organization of the Zionist Congress served as a type of proto-state laying the foundation for an Israeli infrastructure before the creation of an Israeli state (Halpern and Reinharz 1998, 271).

The close of the 19th century did not yet provide a sea change in the demographics of Palestine but it did lay the foundation for such a change over the next several decades. By the turn of the century the Zionist vision had become more than rhetoric. Jews had begun immigrating to Palestine and the Zionist Congress provided an institutional

foundation for continued work toward a Jewish state. Although Jewish numbers remained small relative to Palestinian inhabitants the stage was set for monumental shifts in the coming decades.

1900 – 1947

The years between the turn of the century and the end of World War II witnessed additional waves of Jewish immigration into Palestine, each wave resulting from distinct political circumstances at its origin though following a familiar story of rising anti-Semitism. These waves formed the foundation for to the shifting power dynamics between the Palestinians and the growing population of Jews and ultimately the intransigent maximalist preferences each group later developed.

The 20th century's first wave of Jewish immigrants came primarily from Russia between 1904 and 1914. This Second Aliyah brought with it a socialist spirit and was responsible for the founding of the first kibbutz, agricultural collectives that became a central aspect of Israeli society. Other features of future Israeli culture were grounded in these years, including an emphasis on Hebrew and the founding of Tel Aviv. During this decade approximately 40,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine. These years also saw increasing hostility between Arabs and Jews. Although the native Palestinian population had few conflicts with settlers of the First Aliyah, the growing numbers of the Second Aliyah prompted occasional clashes.

Immigration halted during the first World War, but the war had profound effects on the region. British promises for the disputed territory during the war were frequent and varied. In hopes of frustrating Ottoman war efforts, the British offered support to Arabs

revolting against Ottoman rule in exchange for promises of political autonomy after the war. The British worked with the Hashemite family of Mecca primarily through T.E. Lawrence as a military advisor. Lawrence's guerrilla warfare allowed the British to push the Ottomans out of Jerusalem and eventually Damascus. Despite earlier promises for Arab political autonomy, following the war the British acted on the prescripts of another wartime promise, that of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, in splitting the region into spheres of influence with France. The Hashemites were therefore left to rule under British patronage in a mandate system with continued uncertainty over the final status of Palestine. To complicate the matter further, in November 1917 Arthur Balfour, the British foreign minister, noted Britain's support for the Zionist cause in a letter to Zionist leaders. Although the Balfour Declaration did not specify British endorsement of a Jewish state, the letter clearly noted the crown's support that the Jewish people "establish in Palestine a national home."

Upon conclusion of the war Jewish immigration to Palestine continued at rates that dwarfed those of previous waves. Although Jewish immigration prior to World War I caused changes in the region, it was the post-war immigration that caused a sea change in Palestine. The Third Aliyah, from 1919-1923, provided another 40,000 Jewish immigrants, this time primarily from Eastern Europe. It was during this period that institutions such as the national council, elected assembly, and Haganah developed. Immediately following the Third Aliyah another wave of Jewish immigrants arrived from Eastern Europe, primarily from Poland and Hungary. This Fourth Aliyah, 1924-1929, brought 82,000 Jews to Palestine, though approximately one quarter of that number did not remain.

84

The Fifth Aliyah (1929-1939) was the largest wave of immigration prior to the founding of Israel. Once again resulting from anti-Semitism, this time in the form of rising Nazism, the 250,000 immigrants of the Fifth Aliyah arrived primarily from Europe, including Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. This group was largely educated and filled the professional ranks of pre-Israeli society. By the end of this period the total Jewish population in Palestine was 450,000, approximately equivalent to the Palestinian population when Jewish immigration began 70 years prior. According to the UN's 1947 recommendation for partition, there were 84,000 Jews in Palestine in 1922 but that number more than doubled to 175,000 by 1931 and continued through the next decade to 474,000 in 1941. By 1946 the Jewish population was 608,000, a growth of 620% in 24 years.

Growth of the Jewish population spurred violent responses from Arab residents. In April 1920 riots broke out in protest of the Balfour Declaration and British support of the establishment of a Zionist state. In the summer of 1929 disputes over access to the Western Wall of the Temple Mount spurred riots that killed more than 250 people over the course of a week and injured hundreds more. The most serious conflict prior to the establishment of Israel took place during the Arab revolt between 1936 and 1939 in which Palestinians fought against the local British authorities resulting in the deaths of hundreds of British soldiers and Jewish civilians and thousands of Palestinians.

Following the Arab revolt of 1936-1939 and facing war with Germany, Great Britain lost interest in its mandate responsibilities. The White Paper of 1939 supported the establishment of a Jewish state in the next 10 years. By the end of the World War II, Britain was happy to extricate itself completely from an increasingly difficult situation in

Palestine. The trouble was how it could do so cleanly. Fortunately for Britain, the newly establish United Nations appeared keenly able to handle such difficult situations.

Partition and Aftermath

One of the first questions before the nascent United Nations was the future of Palestine. The UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), created in May 1947, recommended to the General Assembly in September of that year that the British Mandate be terminated and that Palestine be partitioned among Zionists and Palestinians. In November 1947 the General Assembly accepted Resolution 181, the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine. The plan laid out by the UN called for partition between Arabs and Jews with economic union between the two. The conditions of partition, however, were not equitable or reflective of the power between the Palestinians and Arabs. Despite the fact that Arabs outnumbered Jews by a roughly 2:1 margin and land ownership favored Arabs as well, the UN partition plan called for 43% of the disputed territory to go to the Arabs with 57% for the Jews. Additionally, the land distribution was not only proportionately inequitable but also unequal in terms of land quality.

The partition plan acted as a catalyst not only for Arab dissent but for Zionist action. In May 1948 David Ben-Gurion announced Israel's Declaration of Independence. Ben-Gurion noted that the "State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles" and concluded with an "appeal to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream – the redemption of Israel." This declaration, made the day before

the British Mandate was set to expire, prompted swift action from Israel's Arab neighbors with Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi forces all invading territory of the former British Palestine. Despite an advantage in numbers, the Arabs were poorly organized (Morris 2008, 398–99). The war that followed would claim the lives of roughly 6,500 Israelis, one third of whom were civilians, between 4,000 and 7,000 Arab soldiers, and as many as 10,000 Palestinians. The Israeli victory and resulting armistice agreements left Israel with more territory than it had under the UN partition plan and left Palestinians without political autonomy, the West Bank being occupied by Jordan and the Gaza Strip being occupied by Egypt.

For Israel, the war was one in which David slew Goliath against all odds. For many it was final proof that a state for the Jews could no longer be denied in the international arena. Aided by Jewish expulsion from Muslim countries and increased immigration from Europe including from Holocaust survivors, Israeli population doubled in size in its first four years of statehood (Shapira 2014, 175). The years following Israel's statehood were witness to recurrent Palestinian violence and rising tensions with its neighbors led by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser. Israel proved its military strength again in the Six-Day War of 1967 and the intense 1973 war. Following the defeat of its Arab neighbors in 1973 Israel stood in a place of greater security than it ever had, aided by its peace with Egypt in 1978. The final status of relations between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, however, remains unresolved owing in large part to the history and power shifts described above.

Shifting reference points

The shifting power dynamics between Palestinians and Zionists in the decades prior to the foundation of Israel brought with them changes in perception of the territory itself. As the Jewish population grew relative to the Palestinian population, Zionists grew increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo and evaluated the territory in terms of an aspirational state that encompassed the entirety of the Palestinian territory. Historical events, specifically the Balfour Declaration and the atrocities of the Holocaust, served as powerful standards against which Zionists measured their expectations for the territory. Following the 1948 independence war Israel saw any territory gained as its rightful possession and looked forward to reclaiming further land. Palestinians likewise grew dissatisfied with the status quo as power dynamics between the two groups shifted, but for the Palestinians the points of reference lay behind, not ahead. Palestinians retained in memory their possession of the territory prior to the Jewish immigration and measured any possible territorial outcome in terms of loss from the status quo ante. The 1948 war became a particularly potent symbol for Palestinian loss, only to be replaced in historical memory by the losses of the 1967 war.

These reference points may be seen through the principal statesmen of the time. On the Zionist/Israeli side, three important figures demonstrate the growth of Jewish perspective with regard to the Palestinian territory: Theodor Herzl, the voice of early Zionism and founder of the World Zionist Organization; Chaim Weizmann, the first president of Israel whose political work prior to and during World War I secured the monumental Balfour Declaration; and David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel whose political activities from the 1930s through the 1950s earned him the moniker

of Israel's founding father. On the Palestinian side, a key figure in analyzing shifting preferences is Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and primary leader of the Palestinian nationalist movement during the British mandate period. Husseini's views may also be contextualized within the wider Palestinian nationalist movement. While these are simply a few voices from among many during the decades of interest for this chapter, I argue that they are indicative of popular opinion at the time and emblematic of their respective polities.

The biggest signal for early Zionist perceptions with respect to territorial division in Palestine comes from Herzl's influential *Der Judenstaat.* Herzl's book enunciated the need for a polity for the Jewish people but did not reflect an intransigent maximalist preference with respect to its location. Jewish civil and political rights, Herzl argued, could only be protected and nurtured if removed from the anti-Semitism endemic in the states of the late 19th century, and indeed in host-nations throughout the centuries. The "Promised Land," however, was not any specific tract of land. Herzl wrote in his personal journal that "No one ever thought of looking for the Promised Land where it actually is – and yet it lies so near. This is where it is: within ourselves!... The Promised Land is where we carry it!" For Herzl the Promised Land was as much a psychological state as it was a territory. As one observer noted,

> "One aspect of Zionism, hardly assimilated by any assimilated Jew, but seen very clearly by Herzl, was that Zionism was not just a nationalist movement like any other. It did hold out to the Jewish millions the hope of a free life in their own country, but over and above it also held the promise of the rise of a new and different type of Jew, different from the insecure assimilants and different from the ghetto-created perversions of Jewry… The return of a whole people to its true nature, that was the ultimate aim of Herzl's Zionism…" (Clare 1982, 91)

As the Zionist movement progressed, so too did perceptions of what the Promised Land was. The memory of Jewish ownership of Jerusalem clearly shaped Zionist preferences as immigration to Palestine increased. Striking a markedly different tone than Herzl a decade earlier, Wiezmann noted the movement's renewed focus on Palestine in a 1906 discussion with Arthur Balfour, a former British Prime Minister and future Foreign Minister. "Mr Balfour, supposing I were to offer you Paris instead of London, would you take it?" "But Dr. Weizmann," Balfour retorted, "we have London," to which Weizmann rejoined "That is true, but we had Jerusalem when London was a marsh". (Blumberg 1975, 32)

After visiting Palestine in the following year, Weizmann wrote to Moses Gaster, a fellow Zionist leader, that "The whole Zionist program can be put into two words: *Geulat ha-Aretz* (Redemption of the Soil)." But in saying this Wiezmann was not committed to supporting mass Jewish immigration to Palestine, rather preferring an intellectual foundation built on science and agriculture that he feared could be challenged by Eastern European immigration (Reinharz 1983, 208). Weizmann was above all pragmatic, looking to build capacity in Europe that could be transferred to Palestine through endeavors such as the establishment of a Jewish university in Europe. He noted this sentiment himself in his autobiography: "To me, Zionism was something organic, which had to grow like a plant, had to be watered and nursed, if it was to reach maturity. I did not believe things could be done in a hurry."(Weizmann 1949, 45)

Unlike Herzl, who is remembered primarily for as the philosopher of Zionism, Weizmann was a politician, adaptable and sensitive to changes in the Zionist movement

90

(Reinharz 1983, 219). Weizmann disagreed with Herzl's emphasis on the rabbis and synagogues and wrote in a personal letter "If there is anything in Judaism that has become intolerable and incomprehensible to the best of Jewish youth, it is the pressure to equate its essence with the religious formalism of the Orthodox." (Litvinoff 1980, 11) Weizmann's political savvy is no more evident than in his associations with Balfour whom he had met while working as a chemistry professor in Manchester (Blumberg 1975, 31–32). Weizmann's decade-long relationship with Balfour payed dividends as he successfully lobbied the Balfour Declaration, playing a unique role "as almost sole representative of the World Zionist Organization" in Britain (Reinharz 1992, 225).

The Balfour Declaration came to be a significant point of reference by which Zionists measured their political aspirations. Writing after the founding of Israel, Weizmann reflected: "A generation has passed since the Balfour Declaration became history. It is not easy to recapture, at this distance, the spirit of elation which attended its issuance…" (Weizmann 1949, 211). Yet the promise of the declaration raised expectations and brought with it near-immediate disappointment as the distance between Zionist aspirations and British policy soon became evident. Weizmann described his "painful duty to retrace to their beginnings the steps which have placed such a gap between the promise of the declaration and the performance…" (Weizmann 1949, 212)

The conclusion of World War I brought with it the realization to both Zionists and Palestinians that the promises they had received during the war were to be tempered by a new geopolitical reality. The Sykes-Picot Agreement frustrated both Zionists and Arabs (Schneer 2010, 370–71). Both felt that they had been misled by the British government and that they had a wider claim to the territory than the agreement delineated. The

Palestinian riots of 1920 and 1921 signaled widespread Palestinian discontent with the status quo, later magnified in the Great Revolt of 1936-1939. The rise of Zionist paramilitary organizations, such as Lehi (also known as the Stern Gang), that were committed to expelling the British presence in Palestine show a similar Zionist dissatisfaction with the status quo (Schneer 2010, 376). The Arab revolts of 1920 marked to Weizmann a familiar story. He wrote to the British Prime Minister: "Jerusalem where anti-Jewish excesses did not happen since the Crusades has been for three days the scene of wild pogroms, massacres, looting and violating of Jewish women." (Blumberg 1975, 73)

The interwar period brought with it the rise of a new voice in Zionism, that of David Ben-Gurion. As head of the Jewish Agency for Israel, the primary mechanism by which Jewish immigrants were brought to Palestine, and later as the executive leader of the World Zionist Organization and first Prime Minister of Israel, Ben-Gurion served as Zionism's most important voice for a quarter of a century. During 1930s, Ben-Gurion's chief goal was unrestricted Jewish immigration in hopes of the best possible standing when creating a Jewish state. For Ben-Gurion, Arabs could be a recognized minority, but one within in Zionist state (Aronson 2011, 164). The focus on population brought with it an emphasis on increasing Jewish birthrates, a subject Ben-Gurion first addressed in 1936. He noted that "Building up a Jewish majority in Palestine in anticipation of the establishment of a Jewish state was a Zionist goal of the highest order…" He decried the decline of the birthrate in the Yishuv because of incorporation of European culture and speaking on the topic in 1939 noted "Our future in this land may soon be decided mainly by the number of Jews who live here."(Rosenberg-Friedman 2015, 743–45).

Ben-Gurion's focus on population was further entrenched because of the horrors of the holocaust, a watershed in Israeli perspectives on territory in Palestine. The holocaust, according to one scholar, served as "ex post justification for the original Zionist arguments and warning" and "Zionized" the survivors (Aronson 2011, 99; 167). Of the holocaust, Ben-Gurion wrote, "So long as Israel lived, it would provide refuge from such atrocity. In the name of our persecuted dead we had to fight. If need be, we too would die." (Ben-Gurion 1970, 72)

The 1948 war and the 1967 war further embedded Israeli claim to Palestinian territory and served as additional points of reference against which to frame the territorial debate. Although Ben-Gurion was acceptant of the partition as presented by the UN, he renormalized his reference point following the war and Israel's taking of additional territory (Morris 2008). This process repeated in 1967 as Ben-Gurion, although retired from politics, saw a need to start settlement operations right away, even when the war was still going. The day after Israeli forces took Old Jerusalem, he urged, "We've got to reinforce the military conquest – Old Jerusalem should be settled at once, as quickly as possible, including the destroyed area of the Jewish Quarter, and Arabs' vacant homes, if any, should be housed with Jews…" He further proposed that "Old Jerusalem should be united with New [Jerusalem] as an Israeli city that was the country's capital 3,000 years ago." (Kabalo 2018, 1; 3) The process by which Israel purposefully acted to renormalize its reference point is best summarized by Moshe Dayan, Israel's Minister of Defense during the Six-Day War. Dayan advocated for the establishment of "facts on the ground," thereby creating a new status quo away from which Israel was unwilling to move.

The Palestinian perspective of this story offers a similar narrative in which the changing power dynamics between the Palestinians and the Zionists/Israelis drove changes in reference points that produced perceptions of loss. Initial Zionist immigration was met with little opposition at the hands of the Palestinians but the prospect of continued and increased immigration caused perceptions to change. The establishment of the World Zionist Organization in 1897 spurred the Ottoman Empire to consolidate and strengthen restrictions for Jewish immigration and land purchase. It was only the poor administrative capacity in Palestine and disinterest of local Palestinian authorities that undercut the Ottoman policies (Reinharz 1985, 45). As immigration increased, however, so did Palestinian resistance. By the outbreak of World War I Palestinian papers had begun to portray Zionism as a threat, a threat that was cast as existential after the Balfour Declaration (Pappé 2015).

The war and Britain's concomitant and contradicting promises for Palestine brought with it very real political changes. World War I shifted administration in Palestine from the defeated Ottomans to the British mandate. With that shift came a palpable administrative shift in favor of the Zionists. While Ottoman administrators had typically sided with the Palestinians in local disputes, Palestinians saw a significant decrease in cases adjudicated in their favor after the war (Mattar 1983, 104). These changes served as kindling around which new political tensions would spark.

At the center of these tensions for the next 20 years was the Mufti of Jerusalem. Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, also known as al-Hajj Amin, came from a landed aristocratic family. His father and grandfather had both been the Mufti of Jerusalem before him and other members of the family held various Ottoman and local political

positions. Although Husseini was born in 1895 and therefore not a factor in the interaction of Palestinians and early Jewish immigrants, his father had petitioned to the Ottoman government for greater restrictions on Jewish immigration following the Second Aliyah (Mattar 1988a, 8). After receiving an education in Cairo, Husseini returned to Jerusalem in 1913 and quickly became involved in politics. When war broke out, Husseini accepted British assurances that Arabs would be rewarded with a state of their own. He subsequently turned against the Turkish presence in the region and helped organize 2000 Palestinians to fight in Faisal's army (Muslih 1987).

Husseini's first political acts against Zionism came in early 1920 when the British government announced its intention to honor the Balfour Declaration and Husseini helped organize demonstrations in all major cities in Palestine (Mattar 1988a, 14–16). The Palin Commission, investigating riot deaths in 1920, concluded that tensions were a result of Arab disappointment in not gaining political autonomy as promised compounded with a fear that the Balfour Declaration undercut any possibility of their own self-determination. Such fears were not unfounded as policies under the new British mandate served as key signals to the Palestinians of a new political reality. By 1924, Christians who accounted for just 10% of the population of British mandate occupied 45% of government posts, which Jews, accounting for 11% of the total population, held another 30% (Moten 1980, 206). In 1928 Husseini cast Zionist efforts to purchase the Western Wall as a sign of things to come and that it was the first step to purchasing the Temple Mount and the Haram al-Sharif with it.

Despite Palestinian concerns that the British signaled a shift away from their favored status under the Ottomans, Husseini continued to work with the British until

1936. This cooperation is explained by a long history of the Husseini family working under imperial patronage in defense of the status quo. By 1936, however, Husseini pulled away from supporting the British and called for open Palestinian revolt.

By the conclusion of World War II, international support for a Jewish state ensured that the political landscape in Palestine would soon change. The resulting 1948 war, known among Palestinians as al-nakba or "the catastrophe" came to represent one of the most salient symbols of Palestinian loss and served as a catalyst for Palestinian nationalism (Baumgarten 2005). As one scholar has noted, "… the Palestinians' desire to go back to their original places of residence, now under Israel's rule, never disappeared… A large number of Palestinian refugee families have been keeping the keys to their homes, located in what was now sovereign Israel, as their most cherished family belonging." (Hermann 2013, 141)

Just as Palestinian nationalism had been spurred by key political events including the Balfour Declaration and the 1948 war, it was the Six-Day war that finally cemented Palestinian nationalism. As As'ad Ghanem notes "the war significantly undermined the status of the Arab regimes that had asserted their patronage over the liberation of Palestine in the eyes of their own citizens and especially the Palestinians. At the same time, confidence in and support for Fedayeen organizations, who engaged in the armed struggle and advocated all-out war of liberation against Israel grew, especially among the Palestinians who had fallen under Israeli occupation as a result of the war." (Ghanem 2013, 18)

Indivisible preferences

As relative power between the Zionists, later Israelis, and the Palestinians shifted, so too did their points of reference against which they evaluated the status quo. Although Jewish settlers arrived with the narrative of a historical claim to the territory, it took time for intransigent maximalist preferences to develop as their sense of aspiration grew (Gans 2008, 25). The Palestinians, similarly, developed preferences according to the changing power dynamics and their perceptions of loss.

Although the Zionist movement and Israel in particular point to Herzl as a founding father - Herzl's picture being prominently displayed behind Ben-Gurion when he declared Israel's independence in 1948 - Herzl was not wholly committed to Palestine as the site of the future Jewish state. Of key note is the fact that in *Der Judenstaat* the location of the home for the Jews' state is up for debate. Herzl's first mention of Palestine in his journal notes that it was a place of "mighty legend" but that it had a number of unfavorable factors with respect to settlement including a climate to which the Jews were largely unaccustomed, limited area for possible expansion, and its proximity to Russia and Europe. After visiting Palestine he wrote of his discussion with a local doctor who warned of prevalent disease and the need to spend billions in drainage operations to make the land suitable for immigration.

Herzl noted in his personal writings an affinity for Argentina as the home for the Jews' state. One reason that Argentina was appealing was that the Jewish migration would cause little tension with native Argentines owing to the state's large area and sparse population (Overberg 1997, 87–88; 92–93). In *Der Judenstaat* Herzl presented an argument for both locales: "Is Palestine or Argentina to be preferred? The Society will

accept what it is given and what has the support of public opinion among the Jews as a people."[27] (Herzl 1997, 148) Herzl wrote in *Der Judenstaat* that should the new homeland have "persons of other faiths or nationalities live among us, then we will accord them honorable protection and equality before the law." (Herzl 1997, 196–97)

Herzl further worked with Britain to attain land not in Palestine but in Egypt, either in the Sinai or El Arish, but this effort failed by 1903 (Reinharz 1985, 164). El Arish had been appealing because of its proximity to Palestine, but after that failed Herzl considered alternatives. Upon the recommendation of Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and father of Neville Chamberlain, Herzl began exploring the possibility of Jewish settlement in East Africa. Even Weizmann, who later focused solely on Palestine as the home for the Jewish state, initially backed Herzl's position on East Africa. It took the course of the next decade, a period which saw significant Jewish immigration to Palestine and promising discussions with Balfour, for Weizmann to focus solely on Palestine as the Zionist goal (Reinharz 1985, 184; 310).

Zionist perspectives on sharing the region likewise developed over time. Weizmann struck a conciliatory tone in a letter to Balfour after meeting with Faisal, to whom the British had promised support for an Arab state. "I foresee – and Feisal [sic] and his counsellors fully agree on this point – a possibility for sincere cooperation between the two nations… we shall come to his help, not as exploiters or concessionaries, but with a sincere desire to cooperate with a race which is destined to hold an important position in the Middle East." (Blumberg 1975, 69).

---

[27] "The Society" refers to an organizational element that Herzl presented earlier in the book. He called for the creation of a Society of Jews and a Jewish Company, the former charged with preparing the Jews' state intellectually and politically and the latter charged with applying such plans.

Weizmann reflected on the early days of Zionism:

> "Looking back from the vantage point of present-day Zionism, I can see that we had not the slightest idea of how the practical ends of the movement were to be realized. We knew that the doors of Palestine were closed to us… Perhaps if we had considered the matter too closely, or tried to be to systematic, we would have been frightened off. We merely went ahead in a small, blind, persistent way. Jews settled in Palestine and they were not expelled… They bought land… Houses were built… Things got done, somehow; not big things, but enough to whet the appetite and keep us going."(Weizmann 1949, 26–27)

It is clear that the development of Zionist preferences for Palestinian territory developed in conjunction with a changing status quo. As the Zionists gained a greater foothold in the territory, they renormalized their reference point and aspired for the ultimate realization of their dream, a state of their own.

Following World War I, Weizmann's preferences and those of the Zionist movement as a whole became more maximalist. In 1919 a group of American Zionists submitted a pamphlet to the British Foreign Office entitled "Memorandum of the Zionist Organization Relating to the Reconstruction of Palestine as the Jewish National Home." The central theme of the document was that Palestine should become a Jewish commonwealth. Weizmann did not agree with the tone and led a re-write .The new document removed a call for Jewish majority in governing bodies and delineated boundaries for the new Palestine (Reinharz 1993, 296). The boundaries depicted a Palestine larger than today's Israel and Palestinian Territories combined, including land east of the Dead Sea and Jordan River almost to Amman, and in the north extending into today's Lebanon, including Tyre and Sidon (Tessler 2009).

Violence in the early 1920s convinced Weizmann of the importance of strengthening the Jewish presence in Palestine. He wrote to a meeting of Zionists in Chicago "Jews have once more fallen victims to unprovoked assaults of Arab fanaticism… If Jewish blood has been shed, it is for the Jewish people to see that it shall not be shed in vain. For every Jew who has fallen, a thousand newcomers must be brought in." The pattern repeated with further violence in 1929 as Weizmann noted "The late events have proved that not a single Jew in Palestine has been shaken. The Jews in London and New York are more frightened than the Jews of Jerusalem… no amount of pogroms will frighten us… we are in Palestine and we shall stay." (Blumberg 1975, 86; 120)

Ben-Gurion's views became increasingly maximalist over time as well. Ben-Gurion had previously voiced support for a partition of Palestine between the Zionists and Palestinian Arabs, but he had done so at a time when Germany was expelling Jews rather than murdering them. Following the atrocities of the holocaust, Ben-Gurion saw the establishment of Israel with complete authority over British Palestine as the only acceptable political prospect (Aronson 2011, 167). The partition plan under UN Resolution 181, although disproportionately beneficial to the region's Jews, was unacceptable to Ben-Gurion who saw it as crippling for Israel (Shapira 2014, 161).

David Ben-Gurion declared Israeli independence on 14 May 1948. Ben-Gurion's speech cited Zionist foundations including Herzl and the First Zionist Congress, international legal endorsements of Israeli sovereignty including the Balfour Declaration and UN Resolution 181, and the recent atrocities committed against the Jewish people.

The chief rhetorical framing of his speech, however, focused on Israel's historical claim to the territory. Its opening lines orient readers to Ben-Gurion's reference point:

> "The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and national identity was formed. Here they achieved independence and created a culture of national and universal significance. Here they wrote and gave the Bible to the world. After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it through their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom."

The rationale for the establishment of Israel was clearly one of loss and reclamation.

Just as Zionist preferences became increasingly maximalist over time, so too did Palestinian preferences. Palestinian reaction to the First Aliyah was anything but maximalist or intransigent. Arabs often worked the land for Jewish settlers who required labor, prompting many Palestinians to invite Jewish immigrants into their vicinity. Consistent with the village-oriented political reality of the time, Palestinians were also known to help protect Jewish settlers against travelling marauders (Moten 1980, 200). It was only the increased immigration of the early 19th century that began to cause Palestinians to feel a sense of loss, a feeling cemented by the Balfour Declaration. Citing the need for distinctness from a third party in the development of nationalism, Ghada Talhami notes a direct correlation between the strengthening Zionist presence in Palestine and the development of a distinct Palestinian nationalism, a nationalism undeveloped prior to World War I (Talhami 1986). Rashid Moten makes a similar argument in stating "… there was nothing inherent in the nature of the inter-group relations between Arabs and Jews to predetermine the emergence of Palestinian nationalism. It was the Mandate

system and, more specifically, the establishment of a British civil administration charged with carrying out the Balfour Declaration which determined the political development of the national movement." (Moten 1980, 202)

Husseini's views likewise became increasingly maximalist. In 1921 the Supreme Muslim Council was created to oversee Muslim religious trusts and communal affairs. Under the leadership of Husseini, the council promoted a fatwa prohibiting Palestinians from selling land to non-Palestinians (Talhami 1986, 351). His support of the riots of 1929 and growing discontent prior to the violence of 1936 were consistently focused on Palestine's Jewish settlers. Following his exile from Palestine in 1936, Husseini began decrying not only the Zionists, but also British authorities. Despite the fact that the 1939 British White Paper was largely favorable to the Palestinian cause in that it limited Zionist immigration and land purchases, Husseini rejected the document outright (Mattar 1988b, 236). In exile Husseini attempted to develop international ties in support of defeating both the British and Zionists in Palestine. In 1941 he met with Adolf Hitler, laying the groundwork for a 1942 agreement between Germany and Italy to aid Arab countries in their fight against the British and to work for the "abolition of the Jewish National Homeland in Palestine."
(Carpi 1983, 108)

The conflicts of 1948 and 1967 cemented Israel's political authority over the Palestinians. Israel on both occasions immediately renormalized its reference point to the new status quo, viewing all occupied territory as a part of rightful Israel. Palestinians, at loss in both 1948 and 1967, failed to renormalize their reference points and continued to hold the status quo ante as their reference point. Through this perspective the nakba of

1948 and the lost territories of 1967 serve as potent symbols of loss. It was only after the extreme loss of the 1967 war had been fully cemented that Palestinian leaders began calling for a two-state solution, returning to pre-1967 borders citing a right of return (Ghanem 2013, 22).

Conclusion

This chapter began by asking how Zionist, later Israeli, and Palestinian preferences developed such that they came to view the disputed territory as indivisible. One possible explanation for enduring indivisibilities lies in Hassner's sacred space thesis which argues that religious territory is especially prone such disputes. The contention of this chapter has been that there is a broader story to tell and one that requires an understanding of shifting relative power and accompanying perceptions of loss. The indivisibility of Palestine was the product of a political process in which Zionists became increasingly aspirational and Palestinians felt increasingly at a loss relative to their past. Writing after leaving politics and retiring to a kibbutz, Ben-Gurion noted that the "rebirth of Israel was no overnight affair" but was the work of multiple generations and that Israel as a project was not yet complete (Ben-Gurion 1970, 18). The same may be said of Israel and Palestine's indivisibility.

CHAPTER 5

INDIVISIBLE TAIWAN

There is perhaps no case of territorial indivisibility with greater implications for great power politics and conflict than Taiwan. As scholars debate the implications of China's rise as a great power, even optimists who believe that China and the United States can avoid war note that "a crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved." (Glaser 2011a, 87) It is for this reason that Glaser recommends that the United States offer Taiwan on the altar of accommodation to China in exchange for Chinese recognition of lasting American security presence in the region (Glaser 2015). Crises across the Taiwan Strait, American security guarantees with Taiwan, and the proximity of the U.S. Seventh Fleet result in a degree of uncertainty unwelcome when considering great power war. But what is the source of China's unfailing focus on Taiwan?

Three central questions drive the narrative of this chapter: Why did Chinese nationalists and Communists show little interest in Taiwan prior to 1942 but viewed Taiwan and the mainland as an inseparable unit after 1942? Why did the People's Republic of China shift its approach to the dispute in late 1970s? And why after a decade of seemingly cooling tensions in the 1980s has the mainland resumed its maximalist approach to the island?

I argue that the answers to these questions best lie in an analysis of shifting power dynamics between first Chinese nationalists and Communists and later between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. The origins of Taiwan's indivisibility lie in the Chinese Civil War. Prior to the conflict between nationalists and Communists neither party viewed Taiwan as a fundamental part of China. The Taiwanese were regarded along with the Koreans as a separate people from the Chinese. It was only after the prospect of a Japanese defeat at the hands of the United States that both parties saw Taiwan as a territory lost to Japan and in need of reclaiming. Following a series of Communist victories, Chinese nationalists were forced to flee to Taiwan leaving both the Communists and the nationalists claiming legitimacy over all of China, including Taiwan. As the People's Republic of China gained international standing, Taiwan renormalized its reference point and abandoned its one-China policy, no longer claiming legitimacy over the mainland but rather beginning to hint toward independence. The mainland, especially as it has gained in power in the last 25 years, has returned to a more bellicose approach to Taiwan, asserting that the island is forever indivisible from the mainland.

An alternative argument for Taiwan's indivisibility is found in Olivier Henripin's theory of strategic propaganda (Henripin 2014). According to Henripin, leaders recognize that their position at the international bargaining table may be strengthened if their hands are tied by maximalist demands of their domestic population. Leaders, keen to gain the most leverage in territorial negotiations, strategically deploy propaganda of indivisibility among their domestic population knowing that if they can shape domestic attitudes they may appear stronger in their negotiations. Such is the case, according to Henripin, with

China's relationship with Taiwan. Although he shows evidence of China's leaders deploying indivisible rhetoric to a domestic audience, he fails to account for why Taiwan is important to China in the first place nor does he demonstrate that China's leaders do not themselves hold such maximalist preferences. As I show below, intransigent maximalist preferences in both the People's Republic of China and in Taiwan are the result of shifts in relative power and subsequent aversion to loss.

Shifting power

The territorial dispute between Taiwan and China has its most proximate origins in the Chinese Civil War, though the decades preceding the war were important in setting the stage for the events that would follow.

Foundations

Three major phases of Taiwanese history are evident prior to World War Two and the Chinese Civil War. The first phase includes the island's precolonial history. Taiwan's aboriginal inhabitants come from nine major tribes with cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences. Although some of these groups have origins in modern-day China and Japan, most share linguistic and biological ties with Malays of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Waves of Chinese settlers from the Chinese province Fujian settled for centuries in Tawain and especially in the late 17th century. Their decedents, the Fujianese, are considered an ethnic subgroup of the Han. Many clashed with those aborigines who had begun farming in the lowlands, leaving most aborigines as hunter-gatherers in the island's mountainous regions (Roy 2003, 3; Gordon 2007, xviii). By the end of the 17th

century China formally annexed the island and demanded its surrender, thereby incorporating Taiwan into the Qing Empire. Today Fujianese comprise roughly 70% of the island's inhabitants and aborigines account for 2-3%.

The second phase of Taiwan's history was its rule under Qing China until the end of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. This period saw significant foreign interest in Taiwan from western powers such as Great Britain, France, and the United States and also from neighboring Japan. Taiwan was tempting to outside powers because of its natural resources and strategic location. Swelling foreign interest in the island caused China to become increasingly protective of it (Gordon 2007). Another Han subgroup, the Hakkas, immigrated to Taiwan in these years, especially in the latter part of the 19th century. Because Fujianese had settled the most desirable lowland areas, Hakkas were concentrated in the foothills and had more contact with aborigines. Hakkas account for roughly 14% of today's population.

The Sino-Japanese War brought Taiwan under Japanese rule, the third phase of Taiwanese history prior to World War II. Japan's vision for Taiwan was to use the island to support its imperial project. As such, Taiwan became an important resource for the Japanese Navy and the economy shifted to the production of cash crops. Some benefits from this time include the building of the island's infrastructure, but Japan also ruled the island with a heavy hand. Japan's responses to anti-Japanese protests and rebellions resulted in the deaths of several thousand Taiwanese. Japanese rule had an important effect on Taiwanese identity, an effect not uniform among the island's ethnic groups. Unlike the Hakkas who had a strong cultural identity that had travelled with them through centuries of migration across China and eventually to Taiwan, the Fujianese lacked

107

homogeneity of identity prior to the Japanese colonial period. Foreign rule, however, developed among the Fujianese a strong Taiwanese identity that remains today.

Taiwan once again fell under Chinese authority following Japan's defeat in World War II but the transition was difficult. Chinese mainlanders began immigrating in large numbers, straining the economy and causing tension with Taiwan's previous residents. They also held a disproportionate amount of government positions. Mainlanders continue to be considered a separate Han ethnic subgroup, accounting for 14% of the population.

The Chinese Civil War

Mainland China's interest in Taiwan and resulting intransigent maximalist claims derive most directly from the Chinese Civil War. The Chinese Civil War between the Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and Mao Zedong's Communist Party of China (CCP) offered a resolution, albeit a bloody one, to the political uncertainty following the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. Competing factions (and self-proclaimed governments) wrangled for power for years, but one figure, Sun Yat-sen, rose to prominence. Sun founded the KMT and aimed to reunify China from disparate warlords. Sun was an influential leader but his early death in 1925 split the KMT into left-wing and right-wing elements. Although the Communist element within the KMT had been small in the KMT's early years, the Communist influence among the KMT's leftist branch grew significantly following Sun's death, aided by Soviet support and bolstering the nascent CCP. Chiang Kai-shek took up Sun's mantle as leader of the KMT and worked to purge the party of Communists and to purge the country of competing political claims to governance.

Chiang's efforts were successful early as he led a military campaign known as the Northern Expedition through eastern China, eventually founding an internationally-recognized government in Nanjing. Peace, however, was fleeting as Chiang soon faced opposition from Communist insurgents, the creation of the Chinese Red Army, and warlords previously committed to the KMT. The KMT attempted to defeat the Communists through a series of unsuccessful encirclement campaigns only to find some degree of victory on their fifth attempt in the latter half or 1933 and through most of 1934. They forced an extensive retreat of Communist forces, later known as the Long March, traveling nearly 6,000 miles over the course of a year.

Open conflict between the KMT and CCP was paused after the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Although Japan had occupied Manchuria since their invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Chiang viewed the Communists as the greater threat and sought to purge China of the CCP and then lead a unified China against Japanese occupiers. Following Japan's full-scale invasion of Japan in 1937 the KMT and CCP made an alliance with each other, but one that was in name only. Actual military coordination was negligible and several severe clashes between the nationalist and Communist forces occurred during the war. The war ended with Japan's defeat in World War II. The KMT and CCP found themselves in significantly different positions than they had been prior to the war. The nationalist army, as the official military arm of the state, had faced the brunt of casualties at the hands of the Japanese, exacerbated by the differing force structures of the nationalist and Communist armies. The nationalists fought a conventional war whereas the Communists largely fought a guerrilla campaign that not only limited casualties but actually aided in recruitment.

Mao Zedong cemented his role as the leader of the CCP following his appointment as Chairmen of the Military Commission of the Red Army at the conclusion of the Long March. At the end of World War II he met with Chiang and after a month and a half of negotiations the two recognized the legitimacy of the other's party: Zedong recognized the KMT as the legitimate government of China and Chiang recognized the CCP as a valid opposition party. Despite the apparent progress of the so-called Double Tenth Agreement, relations between the KMT and CCP quickly deteriorated as both wrangled for power in Manchuria. The Soviet Army, which had driven out Japanese occupiers at the end of the war, held Manchuria and refused the KMT's demand to let it enter the area to shore up defenses before the CCP could claim the region. The CCP not only benefitted from gaining the territory, but also acquired considerable military strength both in equipment and personnel. Bolstered by direct Soviet support and laying claim to abandoned Japanese equipment. the CCP began to have the resources to field a modern army. Additionally the CCP's ranks swelled through its promises to the rural poor that they would be given land to farm should they fight for the CCP. As a result the Communist army was able to increase its numbers, despite casualties, over the next four years of fighting while the nationalist army's strength depleted through casualties and defection to the CCP.

The conflict between Chinese nationalists and Communists over the next four years defined China's future and Taiwan's political indivisibility from the mainland. The first stage of the post-World War II civil war was concentrated in China's northeast as American-backed nationalists and Soviet-backed Communists wrestled for Manchuria. The Communists recognized that the balance of power was not yet in their favor and so

110

largely fought a defensive war, prioritizing the preservation of forces over holding territory. By 1948, however, the scales had tipped and Communist forces began gaining significant victories in the north. Through late 1948 and early 1949 they pushed the nationalists further south and eventually took the KMT capital of Nanjing in April 1949. The remainder of the year saw a series of retreats for the KMT through much of southern China. Mao declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1st while the KMT was in retreat through the south. The KMT, in turn, fled to Taiwan in December and Chiang immediately declared the KMT's legitimacy as the rightful government of mainland China – the Republic of China (ROC) – now with a temporary capital in Taipei. In so doing the ROC now faced the unique challenge of shifting from "stripping down Taiwan to building it up" (Roy 2003, 76).

Taiwan and a rising PRC

The United States was initially hesitant to support the ROC but that dynamic changed with the outbreak of the Korean War. Truman announced just a month after the KMT arrived in Taiwan that the "U.S. government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa" and there were discussions within the State Department of engineering a coup to replace Chiang (Roy 2003, 109–10). By the summer of 1950 things looked bleak for the ROC. Initially spared conquest at the hands of the PRC because of the difficulties of an amphibious invasion, Communist forces amassed throughout the first half of 1950. Taiwan, however, was spared by the geopolitics of great powers when North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. Two days later Truman announced that the Seventh Fleet would "prevent any attack upon Formosa." (Roy 2003, 112)

The ROC was likely saved because of the intervention of the United States, but Chiang soon discovered that the US was not interested in his goal of invading the mainland and destroying the PRC. The Korean War brought with it an official US embassy in Taipei and $300 million in military aid but the US supported a two-China outcome in hopes that the mutual recognition of the PRC and ROC would ease tensions in the growing Cold War (Sung 2005, 62).

The PRC had gained enough international traction by the end of the 1960s that it successfully lobbied the United Nations General Assembly to acknowledge that the PRC could supplant the ROC as China's representative to the UN and as a permanent member of the security council with a two-thirds vote of member states.[28] In 1971 this became a reality through General Assembly Resolution 2758 in which 76 states voted to recognize the PRC as China's official representative in the UN and to expel the ROC, with 35 states voting against (including the United States), and 17 abstaining.

As the PRC's position on the international stage increased, it changed its strategy for reunification of Taiwan. Moving away from the bellicose rhetoric of the previous three decades, the PRC emphasized a "peaceful unification" with Taiwan through the 1980s. Although limited economic and diplomatic exchanges showed progress between the PRC and ROC in the early 1990s, Taiwan's political liberalization empowered native Taiwanese against the mainland-born minority which had long held power and brought with it a concomitant swell in Taiwanese aspirations for international recognition. The ROC pulled away from its commitment to a one-China policy, acknowledging in 1991 that the mainland was not under its rule.

---

[28] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1668, 1968.

Tensions came to head following the visit of the ROC's president, Lee Teng-hui, to his alma mater in the United States in 1995. The PRC viewed the visit as setting a dangerous precedent for international recognition of Taiwanese leaders and as evidence of the ROC's abandonment of its one-China policy. The PRC responded over the course of the next year with a series of missile exercises around the Taiwan Strait. Increased tensions with the ROC through the 1990s accompanied a shift the PRC's military doctrine in which it began modernizing its military to increase its capacity beyond simply defending its territory. The PLA, armed with a growing annual budget, began expanding its arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) adding roughly 100 missiles a year in garrisons along the Taiwan Strait. By 2006 the PLA had stationed 400,000 troops near Taiwan (Wachman 2007, 13–17; Shiquan 2012).

The status quo between the PRC and the ROC today is much as it has been for the last 25 years. Mainland China continues to emphasize its claim to Taiwan and to the one-China policy and to do so in increasingly assertive tones (Chen 2016, 357). Taiwan, alternatively, is forced to walk a tightrope in its international affairs. Successive governments have raised the balloon of declaring independence, but without international support have been unable to do so.

Shifting reference points

The reference points by which important actors in the Taiwan-mainland dispute evaluated their positions shifted in accordance with the shifts in power noted in the previous section. The conflict between the KMT and the CCP and later between the PRC and the ROC with regard to the indivisibility of Taiwan and the mainland was oriented

around power changes and key events that symbolically oriented not only the rhetoric of the actors in dispute, but their preferences for the territory itself. Both the KMT and the CCP viewed Taiwan as a non-integral part of Chinese territory prior to World War II. The war, however, and specifically the Western-supported Cairo Declaration, cast Taiwan in new light. The island was now a part of a greater China lost to Japan and in need of reclamation. Following Japan's defeat in World War II, the retreat of the KMT to Taiwan served as the seminal point by which both the KMT and the CCP would measure the island's relationship with the mainland. For three decades the ROC and the CCP both claimed to be the legitimate government of the mainland and Taiwan. The ROC's decline in international prestige pushed it to abandon its one-China perspective while China's unequaled growth since the early 1990s has only reinforced its claim on Taiwan.

Chinese nationalism following the fall of the Qing Dynasty laid an important foundation for the reference point against which the mainland would measure Taiwan. This reference point, however, took time to develop. Sun Yat-sen's rhetoric on Taiwan did not include it as part of China proper. In 1923 he referred to Taiwan (then called Formosa) as a separate country along with Korea arguing that China was in a worse situation than these Japanese-occupied areas because they at least only had one "master" while China had many. Chiang Kai-shek was likewise dismissive of Taiwan in his early years. Despite speeches throughout 1937 condemning Japanese occupation of China, his focus was solely on Manchuria; he did not mention Taiwan once. While Japan's occupation of Manchuria represented an "unprecedented wrong," Chiang had no complimentary fiery rhetoric over Taiwan. Like Sun, Chiang categorized Taiwan in the same field as Korea and distinct from China in asking the Japanese:

"Have not the twenty million Koreans and the four million Formosans whom you have mistakenly thought of as being completely enslaved, been waiting for an opportunity to rise in rebellion? Now, if you add another four hundred and fifty million Chinese, who, if they were to be conquered, will hate Japan intensely, no matter how you try to oppress them… your difficulties will only be increased." (Wachman 2007, 76)

Taiwan, to Sun and Chiang, was of interest only for its implications in China's ongoing struggles with Japan, but it was not viewed as a part of China nor did nationalist leaders hold maximalist preferences for it.

Chinese Communists showed a similar apathy toward Taiwan prior to 1942. In a 1922 party manifesto the CCP stated among its goals the reunification of China with autonomous regions in Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang (China's northwest region occupied largely by Muslim Uighurs). Taiwan is not mentioned. Various CCP documents throughout the 1920s and early 1930s began referring to Taiwanese as a Chinese nationality, but the documents specify those Taiwanese living in the mainland while, like Sun and Chiang, casting Formosa in a similar light to Korea. For example, the CCP's 1935 "Message to Compatriots on Resistance to Japan to Save the Nation" calls on its members to "Unite with the people who are opposed to Japanese imperialism (the laboring masses in Japan, the Koreans, the Taiwanese, etc.) as our allies…" thereby explicitly separating Taiwan from China (Wachman 2007, 84).

As World War II developed, so did Chiang and Mao's views on Taiwan. The war brought a temporary cessation of open hostilities between the nationalists and Communists. It also signaled that the prize to be won in the nationalist-Communist dispute was a China with greater regional influence than either party had known in its

lifetime. Japan, China's long-serving regional antagonist, faced the prospect of complete defeat at the hands of the Americans. This signaled to both the nationalists and the Communists that the victor in the struggle for the rule of China would be leading a China more powerful than it had been in generations. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 served as the key reorientation for Chinese views on Taiwan. The declaration, made by Theodore Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, outlined expectations for the region following Japan's defeat. Included in the declaration was a statement that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese" including Manchuria and Formosa, "would be restored to the Republic of China." Taiwan now represented a necessary piece in order to achieve the goal of Chinese reunification (Roy 2003, 56). Rhetoric on Taiwan began to shift. In 1943 Chiang wrote that Taiwan was "originally opened up and developed by Han stock," thereby signaling the island's ties to mainland. Mao likewise began discussion Taiwan's historic links to China and Japan's unjustified claim on the island, language that was absent prior to the Cairo Declaration.

The greatest historical event that set reference points for both the ROC and the PRC was the KMT's retreat to Taiwan in 1949. For 15 years the nationalists and Communists had been struggling over the future of the country, each aiming for the destruction of the other. The ROC held their previous status as the legitimate mainland government as continued justification for its one-China policy. In 1978, ROC president Chiang Ching-kuo stated

> "The Republic of China is an independent sovereign state with a legitimately established government based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. It is an effective government, which has the wholehearted support of her people. The international status and

personality of the Republic of China cannot be changed merely because of the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by any country of the world." (Kan 2013, 478)

Mao's views on Taiwan were similarly anchored in the events of 1949. Mao was especially worried about the prospect of a mutual defense treaty between the United States and the ROC in 1954. Such a treaty, he feared, would permanently pull the island away from the mainland.

As the PRC entered the international stage, historical reference points clearly influenced Mao's thinking with respect to the mainland's Taiwan policy. During the two Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, Mao repeatedly cited China's "long century of humiliation." Taiwan, and China's reputation, were in need of reclamation. These feelings were only compounded by Mao's assessment of China's position against the United States. He constantly cited America's strength and China's relative weakness (Kan 2013). It was this power disparity and China's lag behind the United States that prompted his desire for China to make a 'great leap forward" (Yang and Mao 2016).

Mao came to frame the justification for the entire enterprise of the state as a "commune" for the Chinese people, a "people's republic led by the working class" (Yun 2014, p. 318). Despite this lofty rhetoric, his policies were disastrous for the country. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, membership in the CCP doubled, but the future of the party and the state were uncertain because of the effects of the Cultural Revolution. Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, understood that the relationship between the state and its working class under Mao had destabilized the country and actively worked to reorient the country's economic policies (Russo 2013, 270–74). Despite Mao's

domestic failures, during his tenure the PRC received international recognition, a fact that would have important implications for decades. In 2007, for example, Taiwan requested to join the United Nations but Ban Ki-moon rejected the request citing the 1971 resolution on China's representation in the UN as precedent because Resolution 2758 acknowledged Taiwan as a part of China. This interpretation is especially interesting in that Tawian is not specifically named in the resolution.

Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s served as an important point in shifting Taiwanese attitudes with respect to Taiwan's position vis-à-vis mainland China. Prior to democratization only a minority of Taiwan's citizens considered themselves Taiwanese; most identified as Chinese. Today between 60 and 70 percent of the population self-identify as Taiwanese while only 5 percent identify as Chinese (Cabestan 2017, 42–43). As Taiwan shifted away from its one-China stance, so too did it move away from the memory of Chiang Kai-shek. Since the mid-1990s the island has been subject to a process the Taiwanese media refers to as quJinghua, literally "de-Chiang-ification" (Taylor 2010). The government has renamed monuments, institutions, and public places. Today Taiwanese arguments for autonomy fall in two camps, each with historical reference points as foundations. For members of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party, the island's democratization serves as an important counter argument to reunification. The democratic government, they argue, provides the island with a functioning state. Members of the Nationalist Party point to the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911 and that although the KMT was driven from mainland China, it never renounced its validity as the legitimate Chinese government (Dittmer 2017, 285–86).

Indivisible preferences

Just as key power shifts between the actors in the Taiwan-mainland dispute drove changes in their points of reference in evaluating the dispute, so too did those shifting reference points drive changes in their preferences. Prior to World War II neither the KMT nor the CCP held maximalist preferences for Taiwan as they did with China's northeast territory or other regions under control of local warlords. American involvement in the war, however, signaled Japan's eventual defeat and opened Taiwan as a prospect for greater Chinese influence. As a result, both the CCP and the KMT shifted their earlier positions on Taiwan and began discussing the island as an integral part of Chinese territory. The civil war between 1945 and 1949 cemented Taiwan's indivisibility with the mainland as the mainland-Taiwan dispute came to embody the dispute for legitimacy of China as a whole between the PRC and the ROC. It was only after significant losses on the international stage that the ROC moved away from its one-China policy. The PRC, in contrast, has only increased its pressure on Taiwan and its emphasis on its one-China policy since gaining significant international footing since the early 1990s.

As noted above, Chinese leaders saw Taiwan not as lost Chinese territory but as a foreign country, like Korea, occupied by a common enemy prior to the Cairo Declaration. Even after the conclusion World War II Taiwan was clearly subordinate in Chiang's mind to other territories. Prior to the KMT's retreat to Taiwan, Chiang neglected to make the island a proper Chinese province, but rather treated it politically as he would conquered foreign territory through a military government (Roy 2003, 55–57; 60).

Mao Zedong had a similar view of Taiwan in his early years writing in 1934 about "comrades" from Korea and Taiwan living in China, rather than referring to them as Chinese (Hsiao and Sullivan 1979). Mao was explicit about his views on Taiwan in response to an interviewer's question in 1936 about whether it was the goal of the Chinese to regain all lost territory from Japan or to just drive Japan from northern China. Mao responded:

> "It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty south of the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan." (Wachman 2007, 85)

Preferences for Taiwan began to shift as the end of Imperial Japan became a possibility as signaled by the Cairo Declaration. Writing in 1943 of territories, including Taiwan, which had been claimed by foreign powers, Chiang noted "There is not a single piece of territory within these areas, therefore, which can be torn away or separated from China, and none of them can form an independent unit by itself." (Chiang 1947, 9) This rhetoric, citing Taiwan as something ripped from China and incapable of standing on its own stands in stark contrast to Chiang's thoughts in the 1930s.

The establishment of the ROC in Taiwan in 1949 carried with it immediate and palpable meaning with respect to the island's relationship with the mainland. Although driven from the mainland, Chiang's goal for years was a reunification of the two. His military planned invasions of the mainland for the next decade and his government

120

promoted the propaganda of indivisibility throughout the island in an attempt to bring the native Taiwanese into a similar point of view as the newly arrived mainlanders (Pang 2014). Likewise the PRC saw Taiwan, now under the control of a political enemy, as a final bastion of illegitimacy. The CCP began discussing "liberating" Taiwan immediately following the KMT's retreat to the island (Hao 2010, 103).

For the next 30 years there was little change in the expressed preferences of either party. For decades the title of a 1949 editorial from *Xinhua,* the official media arm of the CCP, became a rallying cry for mainland perceptions of Taiwan: "The Chinese People Will Certainly Liberate Taiwan" (Wachman 2007, 3). In a New Year's message to party members in 1979, the PRC argued that "Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times… Taiwan's separation from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial…" (Kan 2013, 478).

The 1980s and early 1990s brought more discussion of peaceful unification rather than the bellicose rhetoric that had accompanied the issue since 1949 (Hao 2010). Although the PRC's approach to Taiwan softened through the 1980s, it is clear the underlying preference remained unchanged. It was only a shift in strategy from a bellicose pressure on Taiwan to a position of "peaceful unification" in which Taiwan's isolation would drive it to unification with the mainland (Wachman 2007, 4). The 1992 Consensus, for example, was an agree-to-disagree accord. China and Taiwan both agreed that there was only one China but disagreed regarding whether Beijing or Taipei was the seat of its government. 25 years later this consensus remains the "foundation of cross-Strait relations" (Huang 2017, 239).

Since 2000 the PRC has pursued policy of reintegrating Taiwan by pulling it ever closer to its economic sphere while stating in clearest terms that Taiwanese independence is not an option. Hu Jintao set a precedent of enveloping Taiwan first in a de facto manner through economic dependence prior to establishing a de jure integration (Narayanan 2013). Xi Jinping has largely followed Hu Jintao's approach to Taiwan which has been to set aspirations for reunification on the backburner while prioritizing the blocking of any international legal recognition of Taiwan's independence. Xi has thus used the status quo to his advantage, continually pulling Taiwan further into China's economic orbit (Huang 2017, 240).

May of 2004 marked further evidence of Chinese maximalist preferences for Taiwan following the 1992 Consensus. For the first time China publicly stated that its top priority with respect to Taiwan was to prevent Taiwanese independence. The PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council made the preferences of the government clear in its statement on May 17th:

> "The Chinese People are not afraid of ghosts, nor will they be intimidated by brutal force. To the Chinese people, nothing is more important and more sacred than safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country. We will do our utmost with the maximum sincerity to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification of the motherland. However, if Taiwan leaders should move recklessly to provoke major incidents of "Taiwan independence", the Chinese people will crush their splittist schemes firmly and thoroughly at any cost [sic]." (Hao 2010, 105)

This position was quickly followed by the Anti-Secession Law (Huang 2017). The 2005 law stated "If the separatist forces of 'Taiwan Independence' use any name or any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's separation from China, or a major incident occurs that

would lead to Taiwan's separation from China, or the possibilities of peaceful unification are completely exhausted, the country may adopt non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity." (Kan 2013, 515)

Xi Jinping's continuing emphasis of China's stance against Taiwanese independence represents a careful strategy to achieve a maximalist preference for Taiwan rather than a weakening of the maximalist preference itself. In discussions with trusted compatriots, including the honorary chair of the KMT, Xi has expressed his confidence in the payoffs that strategic patience will pay in assimilating Taiwan into mainland China (Huang 2017, 242). He has further warned, as recently as March of 2018, that Taiwan will face "the punishment of history" and that "Any actions and tricks to split China are doomed to failure and will meet with the people's condemnation…" (Reuters 2018).

Conclusion

The road ahead for mainland China and Taiwan remains unclear. Although the PRC has focused on developing Taiwan's dependence it has also made clear that any talk of independence is unacceptable. What is more, Xi, some argue, demonstrates a greater need for achievement than his predecessors and may seek to make that achievement through a reunification of the mainland and Taiwan (Lee 2018).The ROC, alternatively, seems committed to a path for independence, with anti-Beijing sentiment is growing in Taiwan in recent years (Huang 2017, 239). While the road ahead remains uncertain, the path traveled to get here is clearer. Maximalist preferences, rather than simple ploys deployed domestically to gain a bargaining advantage, have developed through shifting

123

power dynamics and clear historic junctures serving as meaningful reference points against which the dispute on both sides of the strait is evaluated. These preferences have informed relations between the mainland and Taiwan for 70 years and appear likely to remain in force in the near future because "The PRC," as one observer has noted, "has operated from the premise that China's sovereignty is indivisible and that it resides in the government of the PRC, headed by the Chinese Communist Party" (Wachman 2007, 5)

CHAPTER 6

INDIVISIBLE IRELAND

Northern Ireland and the conflict around its indivisibility offers another - and for the purposes of this dissertation, a final - example of intransigent maximalist preferences in territorial disputes. While Northern Ireland lacks the great power geostrategic implications of Taiwan or the broader regional repercussions of Israel and Palestine, the case offers value in its lessons on counterinsurgency and implications for domestic violence in industrialized democratic nations. During the height of the Troubles, for example, British soldiers were stationed in Northern Ireland at a rate of 20 soldiers per 1,000 individuals in Northern Ireland. This represents the most concentrated per capita counterinsurgency in history. By comparison, during the height of the surge in Iraq the United States had 166,000 troops deployed in the country that had a population of 28 million, a rate of roughly 6 troops per 1,000 Iraqis. During America's heaviest involvement in Afghanistan the rate was almost half that, at approximately 3.3 troops per 1,000 Afghanis. Thus, although Northern Ireland was small, it faced an occupation with greater capacity for state coercion than any other like situation. Added to this is the fact that the tension following the civil war occurred among political units that were democratized and, after the 1960s, economically liberalized. Additionally, violence in the form of exported terrorism targeted civilians outside of Northern Ireland. The source of this tension is therefore worthy of attention.

This chapter is focused on three central questions: What are the origins of the Irish Civil War? Why did the conclusion of the war and the changed political realities it fostered not engender an accompanying cessation of political hostilities? And why did these political hostilities endure such that they prompted three decades of violence in the Troubles of Northern Ireland?

I argue the best answer to these questions lies in the shifting power dynamics between the island's nationalists who sought a politically independent Ireland governing the entirety of the island and loyalists who welcomed British influence and the inclusion of the island's six northernmost counties within the United Kingdom. Growing nationalist voices spurred political mobilization in World War I and the ensuing Anglo-Irish War and the treaty with Britain at its conclusion gave nationalists power they had not held in more than a century. The subsequent partition of the island, however, signaled to nationalists that their work was not yet complete while also providing northern loyalists comfort in the prospects of continued close relations with Britain. Power disparities in the north gave rise to significant Catholic and nationalist grievances that spurred 30 years of civil violence. Throughout these events the actors involved continually emphasized key historical events as their reference points for their arguments of Ireland's future.

An alternative argument in explanation of Ireland's indivisibility lies in Stacie Goddard's thesis of socially constructed legitimation effects (Goddard 2006, 2010). According to Goddard, indivisibilities occur dependent "on how actors legitimate their claims during negotiations." Some actors become locked "into bargaining positions where they are unable to recognize the legitimacy of their opponent's demands… [coming] to negotiations with incompatible claims" (Goddard 2010, 18–19). While

intuitive, Goddard's theory fails to account for the preferences that individuals may have prior to any negotiation and the role history played in shaping those preferences. Goddard's focus, for example, is on the civil war but by broadening our analytical lens to include the decades that followed including the violence of the Troubles, we find that power shifts and key historical events shaped individuals' points of reference by which they measured the territorial disputes. Their resultant preferences are thus best explained by that history rather than the particular bargaining dynamics of any specific negotiation.

Shifting power

While the two sides of the conflict largely fall along Catholic and Protestant lines, to characterize the dispute as religious or sectarian would be a mistake. It is the politics of the island that drove the conflict, politics that I argue below have their root in power shifts and the accompanying shifts in reference points that such shifts engender.

Ireland's settled history predates written records but the concept of anything approaching a polity with any connection to today's political geography did not begin to form until the medieval period. For several centuries the island hosted various invaders, first the Normans and then the English. By the beginning of the 19th century British influence was such that it was able to leverage the Irish parliament to join in the Acts of Union, thereby formally uniting the two countries on January 1st, 1801. The union was never popular in Ireland and there were several attempts to have it repealed, most notably in the 1830s and 1840s through Daniel O'Connell's Repeal Association. Ireland, however, remained in a position of weakness as its economy failed to industrialize and as it lost a third of its population to famine, disease, and emigration in the 1840s and 1850s.

127

By the 1880s Irish nationalists began making progress in their calls for self-government. The so-called Home Rule Movement aimed for authority over domestic affairs while retaining fealty to the crown. While previous Home Rule efforts had failed, by the 1880s the movement's leader, Charles Stewart Parnell, found success in convincing some British authorities that Irish Home Rule would actually benefit the crown by appeasing its Irish subjects. The debate over Home Rule became militaristic in 1912 as unionists, opposed to greater Irish autonomy, formed a militia, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Nationalists, in turn, formed their own militia, the Irish Volunteers. In 1914 the British Parliament passed the Third Home Rule Act, the previous two having failed to pass in 1886 and 1893, but it was suspended because of the start of World War I.

Although Westminster placed the Irish question on the back burner during the war, Irish nationalists were not interested in exhibiting the same degree of patience. In April 1916 nationalists including the Irish Republic Brotherhood and the Irish Volunteers seized key government locations in Dublin and declared Ireland's independence and the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic. For six days the rebels barricaded central Dublin and fought in the street with British soldiers. Although the Easter Rising failed to establish its political aims and landed many of its participants (and many non-participants) in prison or internment camps, the Rising inspired a shift in nationalist politics. Candidates from Sinn Féin dominated in the 1918 parliamentary elections, and rather than taking seat in London established the First Dáil, an Irish republican parliament, with their express purpose to establish an Ireland completely independent from Britain.

The establishment of the First Dáil sparked the Anglo-Irish War, also known as the Irish War of Independence. Britain immediately responded by denouncing the Dáil. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), which had its roots in the Irish Volunteers, began targeting the British police forces who in turn were forced to retreat and left large portions of the country in IRA hands. Britain reinforced its flagging police service by sending a paramilitary force, the Black and Tans, to support the Royal police in Ireland and violence continued to escalate through the first half of 1921. The war ended with a ceasefire on June 11th, 1921 followed by a formal treaty in December (Ó Ruairc 2016). The treaty recognized the creation of the Irish Free State as a dominion of the British Empire while at the same time giving Britain continued claim to the 6 counties of Northern Ireland, which had been so designated the year before in the Government of Ireland Act, should Northern Ireland opt out of the Irish Free State. Within hours of the treaty's formalization Northern Ireland did just that and chose to retain its proximity to the crown (Townshend 2013; Clark 2014).

The Anglo-Irish treaty, while providing the end to one conflict spurred another. The treaty's establishment of the Irish Free State as a commonwealth of Britain and its requirement that members of its new parliament declare in an oath that they will be faithful subjects of the crown was untenable to many nationalists. A split in the nationalist movement occurred and in April 1922 IRA militants occupied Ireland's judicial heart, the Four Courts building in Dublin. A stand-off ensued and by the end of June the Irish Free State responded by bombarding the anti-Treaty nationalists into submission with Michael Collins, a political hero of the Anglo-Irish War, serving as Commander-in-Chief. For the next 11 months IRA militants and the Irish Free State

fought a full-scale civil war, the IRA eventually losing because, although it had an advantage in manpower, it lacked the organization and arms of the Free State's National Army.

The conclusion of the Irish Civil War did not foster a reconciliation over the island's future. The main political parties of the Irish Free State held their origins in the pro-treaty and anti-treaty factions of the civil war. Moreover the end of the war did not foster the end of political dispute in the north. In 1929 the Northern Ireland Parliament, under control of the Unionist majority, abolished proportional representation in local and parliamentary elections, thereby bolstering Unionist electoral returns, especially at the local level. The Irish Free State continued to claim the whole of Ireland, including language to that effect in its 1937 constitution. The Unionist government in the north felt the constitution was a bold refutation of the principles that had brought peace 15 years before and moved ever closer to Britain, participating in World War II while the remainder of the island, which declared itself a republic in 1948, remained neutral.

Britain responded by passing the Ireland Act in 1949, noting that the north would remain a part of the United Kingdom unless the Northern Ireland Parliament voted to leave. While on its surface the law may represent a growing disinterest on the part of the crown' s government in Irish affairs, the law simply passed the buck to a body that held a permanent Unionist veto to any permanent changes Northern Ireland's status. Nationalists were outraged feeling that Britain had unilaterally partitioned Ireland and so should likewise be unilaterally responsible for its reunification (Hennessey 2005, xi).

The 1960s were a time of economic liberalization and industrialization for the Republic of Ireland. Despite being a decade of change that saw major economic and

130

political changes, including the rise of the country's first political generation distinctly removed from the civil war, the parties themselves remained remarkably stable. While "[m]any predicted that the party system would change to reflect a changing society," with the Labour Party making overtures to socialism, ideology proved to be less a guide in party direction than a history in which "the two main parties originated in the split over the Anglo-Irish Treaty" (Daly 2016, 372).

The 1960s brought a rise in Catholic mobilization through the Northern Ireland civil rights movement. The civil rights campaign pointed to abuses in power from which Catholics hoped for redress. Chief among these were the political discrimination of electoral politics and the gerrymandered Unionist districts and civic challenges in the form of housing discrimination. Letter-writing campaigns and general lobbying efforts transformed to public protests in the summer of 1968. The first march, between two small towns in central Northern Ireland, ended in counterdemonstrations and the police's refusal to allow protestors to conclude their march. Several months later, on the 5th of October, another group of protestors gathered in the northern coastal city of Derry (known as Londonderry to loyalists). This march ended in considerably more violence as police pushed Catholic demonstrators across the river.

The violence of these early civil rights marches proved to be the starting point of the Troubles, three decades of violence that resulted in nearly 4,000 killed and more than ten times that numbered injured. In January of 1969 a student group from the Queen's University Belfast marched from Belfast to Derry attracting both nationalist support and loyalist harassment and resulting in a brief standoff in Derry. Clashes continued through much of the year, but it was the August riots that shifted the tensions from the immediacy

of civil rights marches to broader civil violence. Loyalists marched on the edge of Bogside, a Catholic area of Derry that had been a focal point for conflict in the previous year. Tensions quickly rose resulting in two days of fighting. Nationalists responded in Belfast with counter-protests, eventually spurring the deployment of British troops to keep the peace.

The presence of British troops added to a new reality in Northern Ireland in which once-peaceful residential areas came to resemble a war zone. The presence of the British Army brought "routine vehicle checkpoints, huge surveillance watchtowers perched strategically along the 303-mile border with the Irish Republic, a massive buildup of regular infantry battalions in bases scattered across the province of Ulster, and daily patrols by air, sea, and land." (Edwards 2017, 78) By 1971 nationalists had established no-go areas, portions of Derry and Belfast that citizens had barricaded thereby barring access to British troops and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the British police. The largest of these came to be known as Free Derry, a section of Derry that included Bogside. Members of the IRA and common citizens alike patrolled these no-go areas. Clashes between British troops and the RUC on one side and members of the IRA and non-IRA nationalists on the other continued through 1971. Catalysts included attempted curfews and policies whereby loyalist officials could intern suspected republican activists without trial.

It was in this context that one of the most infamous events of the Troubles occurred. Despite a ban on parades and marches declared by the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, on Sunday, 30 January 1972, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association held an anti-internment march in Derry. As many as 15,000 protestors

marched through Derry but were barred by barricades under control of British troops from the city center where they intended to conclude the march with a rally. Minor skirmishes ensued as march organizers planned to move the rally to a prominent corner of Free Derry but the skirmishes turned violent as protestors and British paratroopers clashed. Although British soldiers had fired rubber bullets in previous encounters, soldiers from the 1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment used live ammunition. By the end of Bloody Sunday, paratroopers had shot 26 people and killed 13. Among the dead were several who had been shot in the back while attempting to flee and several others who had been shot while attempting to give aid to the wounded. The Saville Inquiry, an official British investigation of the events of Bloody Sunday that was completed in 2010, noted that the victims held no threat to the paratroopers and that the paratroopers had fired first.

The Troubles continued for nearly thirty years. The first years set a bloody start for the conflict. The IRA, now split between the Official IRA which focused its campaigns primarily against British troops and in the name of Marxist-oriented social reform and the Provisional IRA which adopted a guerrilla posture and included civilians in its targeting, took an activist role in the conflict. The combination of paramilitaries on both sides, the RUC, and British troops resulted in daily life that included "[a]ssassinations and assassination attempts, sniper attacks, bombings, bomb scares, street riots, civilian searches, and vehicle checkpoints" (Muldoon 2004, 459). Political changes in this time included a heavier British involvement in Northern Irish politics and some reforms that spoke to initial Catholic civil rights demands. In 1972 direct rule of the northern six counties was transferred back to London, thereby abolishing the office of the

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Stormont Parliament established 50 years earlier. Unionists and Protestant felt they had lost their best defense against and increasingly active nationalist population (McKittrick and McVea 2012, 94). The gerrymandering of earlier yeas was abolished and legislation was enacted in attempts to curtail religious discrimination in the allocation of public housing and in employment.

The Troubles came to an end through the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 which established a power-sharing system and formed an elected Northern Irish Assembly. By the conclusion of the Troubles, 3,636 lives were lost. Of those, 34% were Catholic civilians, 19% were Protestant civilians, 14% were Northern Ireland security forces, 14% were from the British Army, Republicans accounted for 11% and Loyalists accounting for 4%. Responsibility for those deaths lay primarily with he paramilitaries, Republican paramilitaries accounting for 59% of all deaths and loyalist paramilitaries accounting for 29% (McKittrick 2001, 1476).

Shifting reference points

As political realities in Ireland changed during the first half of the 20th century, so too did the manner in which actors evaluated their political aims. The self-declared and immediately-failed Irish Republic of 1916 set a benchmark against which republicans evaluated future political progress. While nationalist efforts had aimed for Home Rule through much of the 19th century, the idea of a self-governing Ireland that was still subject to the crown became anathema to Ireland's nationalists. Although some nationalists accepted the Anglo-Irish Treaty, they saw it as a stop along a continuing journey rather than a final destination (Bew 2007, 381).

The Government of Ireland Act created the partition that has stood as a key point of reference for nationalists and loyalists alike for nearly a century. For loyalists, the partition represents the enshrinement of political association with Britain and the establishment of a political entity in which Protestant and loyalist voices were, for the first time on the island, a majority. For nationalists the partition represents a tarnish on the otherwise sterling political gains of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and later the founding of the Republic. For them the project of Ireland's political independence is not complete until the British-imposed borders of the partition are removed. Nationalist response to the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which followed the Government of Ireland Act by just two years, is evidence of these views.

Those against the Anglo-Irish Treaty found grounds for its rejection in its failure to meet the expectations of the Republic that had been declared in 1916. Daniel Breen, a member of the IRA during the Anglo-Irish War, entreated his compatriots fighting for the Irish Free State in the civil war:

> "Are you aware that you are fighting against the Republic that you fought to establish in 1916, and that was maintained and is going to be maintained? Are you aware that England tried to disestablish the Republic through a reign of Black and Tan terror? Are you aware that she is now using the so-called Provisional Government to try where she failed? Are you aware that YOU are the Black and Tans of to-day [sic], the only difference is the uniform?… Will you again stand with me as my comrade in arms, or will you continue to fight with England against me?" (Breen 1922)

While anti-treaty nationalists, such as Breen, saw the treaty as a threat to the Irish republican project, even pro-treaty nationalists were not convinced that the Irish project

was complete. Although Michael Collins had been part of the Irish delegation that negotiated the Anglo-Irish Treaty, he was not satisfied that it represented a final political solution for Ireland. He saw the agreement as the means to an end, not the end itself. Collins argued that the treaty gave "not the ultimate freedom that all nations aspire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it."(Walsh 2002, 86) The conflict in the civil war, therefore, was not about Ireland's claim to the entirety of the island or its true independence from Britain, but rather whether the Anglo-Irish Treaty represented the best means to achieve those goals.

In 1937 the Irish Free State adopted a constitution and in 1949 the Irish Free State became the Republic of Ireland, no longer a member of the British Commonwealth. As the country moved away from Britain and entered the Europe's orbit, petitioning to join the European Economic Community in 1961. Under Sean Lemass, Ireland's Taoiseach for much of the 1960s, Ireland began industrializing and liberalizing its trade policies. Lemass's latter years in office coincided with a new outlook from the government in Northern Ireland. Terence O'Neill's tenure as Prime Minister of Northern Ireland proved monumental in "raising Catholic expectations that could not be fulfilled." (Hennessey 2005, 378) O'Neill was a member of the Ulster Unionist Party like every man that held the post during the office's life from 1921 to 1972, but unlike his predecessor O'Neill was a moderate.

While there was more cooperation between north and south in the 1960s than there had been in four decades, the political and economic changes only spurred further dissatisfaction among unionists and nationalists. Among unionists, O'Neill's softened stance from that of his predecessors seemed to signal an abandonment of unionist ideals.

136

The movement fractured between reformers and conservatives, the latter finding a leader in Protestant minister Ian Paisley, who grew "from a semi-comical and apparently insignificant pantomime demon into a formidable figure in Unionist politics." (McKittrick and McVea 2012, 76) One Unionist journalist said of O'Neill that "He was essentially an Englishman. He was desperately out of touch with everything." (McKittrick and McVea 2012, 58) Nationalists, alternatively, viewed a unionist prime minister making overtures to the south as a signal that they were soon to be further driven from the political arena by moderate unionists.

For those Catholics and nationalists living in the six counties of Northern Ireland, the feeling of loss resulting from the partition was especially palpable. Not only was the partition a powerful symbol, but the political realities in Northern Ireland served as consistent reminders. The police force, for example, was almost entirely Protestant while the Minister of Home Affairs under the 1922 Civil Authorities Act had authority to "take all such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace and maintaining order." This had the effect of enabling the RUC to curtail civil liberties that served as powerful symbols to those in a loss frame. Richard O'Rawe, a member of the IRA, later recalled:

> "The catalyst for me was the curfew… It wasn't just a matter of joining because of the curfew, that may have been the catalyst, but I had this form of 'Republic' thing, I wanted to free Ireland. I wasn't particularly aware of 'isms,' the only reason I knew was that Ireland was an island, the Irish were an indigenous people, who'd been gerrymandered, betrayed and denied a state and that the Irish people as a whole were being denied their sovereignty." (Sanders and Wood 2012, 37)

137

Arthur Galsworthy, the British ambassador to Ireland in the mid-1970s noted the symbolic effect that British occupation had on the minds of local inhabitants. "There is still a deep-seated feeling of instinctive opposition to the idea of British soldiers entering the Republic in order to snatch Irishmen, however misguided or miscreant the latter might be." (Patterson 2013, 57)

The violence of the Troubles became symbolic not only at the time, but also created symbols and reference points that have endured. The effect of the Bloody Sunday, for example, is captured in an opinion piece carried in an Irish weekly:

> "People who were apathetic up to last Sunday are not displaying a remarkable solidarity with the Irishmen and women who are being shot, wounded, harassed, interned, discriminated against, unemployed in part of Ireland that the British claim as their own against the facts of history and geography." (Daly 2016, 356)

Murals of the nationalist and loyalist martyrs mark street corners in Belfast, serving as constant reminders of the important reference points for both sides (McAuley 2017). Historical events came to serve as anchor points by which individuals evaluated the past and present. By the 1990s, for example, there were nearly 3,500 commemorative parades a year in Northern Ireland (McBride 2017, 9). This constant reinforcing and creation of historical memory has enshrined the benchmarks against which nationalists and loyalists evaluate their prospects and form their political preferences.

Indivisible preferences

The development and entrenchment of intransigent maximalist preferences maps on to the political changes and corresponding shifts in reference points discussed above.

Following the declaration of the Irish republic in 1916 and the subsequent hardening of nationalist positions on Home Rule, Sinn Féin's stance on Ireland's political legitimacy was clear. A party statement in 1921 noted

> "The nation which we represent enjoyed for over a thousand years the life of an independent sovereign State among the States of Europe. Then a neighbouring nation, England… burst in upon us as a conscienceless invader, and through the course of many generations strove to subvert our polity, annihilate our language and our culture, suppress our industry, ruin our agriculture, steal our trade and our commerce, deprive us of the advantages of our geographic position, cut us off form our ancient intercourse with other people, rob our revenues, and erase our name from the roll call of all nations." (Kissane 2005, 51)

Ireland's sovereignty was set against hundreds of years of English intervention, a framing that made Ireland's inclusion in the Commonwealth, although an advance in political autonomy, untenable. For Michael Collins, there was never any question that newly-elected Sinn Féin members of parliament should abstain from taking their seats in Westminster. "Abstention from attendance at the British Parliament," he noted, "was the indispensable factor in the Republican ideal - the repudiation of foreign government." (Costello 1997, 56)

War with England only hardened republican sentiments. Collins expressed his frustration that the true politics behind that nationalist movement might be sacrificed on

139

the altar of political expediency. Writing to Austin Stack, a fellow Sinn Féin member, Collins lamented:

> "It seems to me that official Sinn Féin is inclined to be ever less militant and ever more political, theoretical… There is I suppose the effect of the tendency of all revolutions moving to divide themselves into component parts. Now the moral force department have been probably affected by British propaganda… You can see it at work. In the minds of the moderates it climbs to the surface in all sorts of rumors, whispers, suggestions of differences between certain people" (Costello 1997, 17)

Collins was prescient in his discernment of growing factions within republicanism, factions that became manifest in discussions about the forthcoming Anglo-Irish Treaty and blocs that spurred the Irish Civil War. At the prospect of the Anglo-Irish treaty Collins noted a sense of excitement at the island's reunification. "Under the Treaty," he wrote in a published essay, "Ireland is about to become a fully constituted nation. The whole of Ireland, as one nation, is to comprise the Free State, whose Parliament will have power to make laws for peace, order and good government of Ireland, with an executive responsible to that government." (Costello 1997, 62)

The conclusion of the civil war did not bring with it a conclusion of the dispute over the island's future, just a transformation of that dispute from war to normal politics (Dolan 2003, 201). "The sharply antagonistic shape of party politics" that developed following the war was owed in large part to the fact that "the civil war was fought anew on the floor of the Dáil with a venom all the more concentrated for having been distilled for five years." (Fanning 1983, 10). Nevertheless, as noted above, the tension in Irish politics was about the process to independence for the entirety of the island rather than

about independence itself. That the goal for political autonomy over the entire island was embedded in the ethos of the Irish Free State is evident in its constitution. The Irish constitution, ratified in 1937, spoke not only for the Irish Free State, but also claimed Northern Ireland. Article 2 clearly states "The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas." Although it declared its right of jurisdiction over the entire island, Article 3 noted that it voluntarily chose not to pursue that right in the British occupied north. By including this language "the Irish state formally challenged the right of British sovereignty in Northern Ireland" because the state's position stood in contrast to the Acts of Union which declared Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom (Hennessey 2005, xi).

The prelude to the Troubles was evidence that maximalist preferences had not changed, they had simply been dormant. The IRA, returning to arms in 1956, proclaimed its goal as "an independent, united democratic Irish republic" intent on ending "the age-old struggle of the Irish people versus British aggression." (Prince 2011, 941) While Sean Lemass is remembered for modernizing the Irish economy and his overtures to business and government elites, his apparent softening on the Republic's position on Northern Ireland is less a symbol of a growing acceptance of the island's political bifurcation than it is indicative of a "new approach to securing a united Ireland" (Daly 2016, 10). In a party speech in 1961 Lemass noted "this economic effort is of special and immediate significance and importance in relation to our aim of reuniting the Irish people and ending partition" (Daly 2016, 326). Lemass's successor, Jack Lynch, likewise called for peace but emphasized the importance of Irish unity. In 1969 Lynch rejected the partition and called for a gradual reunification (Williamson 2017, 204).

141

The Troubles themselves were a battle for the island's identity. Early efforts to bring the sides together accomplished little more than laying a foundation for talks that would take another quarter century to solidify. The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 did not appease the IRA which remained focused on the complete reintegration of Northern Ireland into the south. Northern Ireland's loyalists, remained as committed as ever to retaining British ties. Ian Paisley, who grew to represent uncompromising unionism argued for decades against compromise with republicans, famously asserting "I am not going to sit down with bloodthirsty monsters who have been killing and terrifying my people" (Hennessey 2005, 181)

The political nature of the conflict need not be lost in discussion of its sectarian elements. Although the Troubles may be cast as a recent battle in a Protestant / Catholic war that dates back five centuries, the primary struggle was between nationalists and loyalists. Gerry Adams, the long-serving leader of Sinn Féin noted in 1988 that the nationalist effort should "de-sectarianize" and that the IRA's focus should be on British Army sites rather than on Protestants serving in the Northern Irish police force (Patterson 2013, 105). The Troubles, like the Anglo-Irish War that preceded it, was fundamentally a political conflict, one born in shifting power dynamics and the subsequent perceptions of loss created therein.

Conclusion

This chapter began by asking why the Anglo-Irish War occurred and why its conclusion failed to bring an accompanying conclusion to the political contentions over the six counties of Northern Ireland. Stacie Goddard has argued that legitimation

strategies within the bargaining dynamics of the war led to political actors developing incompatible claims. This chapter has contended that Goddard used a telephoto lens when a wide-angle lens was more appropriate. Moving beyond specific negotiations and their subsequent legitimations develops a picture that explains a broad and consistent swath of Irish history. While there may be a role for social construction in the development of indivisibilities, it is more likely a social construction rooted in memory, "presented through representations that determine our views of the past" that "are simultaneously framed and sustained by the present." (McAuley 2017, 97) The framing of the present is highly dependent on relative power dynamics.

As with the other cases discussed in this dissertation, prognostication is a dangerous affair. Suffice it to say that Irish memory remains strong. Just as "entrenched cultures of commemoration profoundly shaped the emergences of the Northern Ireland Conflict", so too do they "continue to shape the postconflict era, in which the Troubles are fought over again, this time symbolically, as the main protagonists seek to control public discussion of the past." (McBride 2017, 12; Brown and Grant 2016) The tenets of this theory's history would point to such commemorations as solidifying past reference points and the perceptions of loss that accompany them.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Indivisibility is an important factor in international politics. Shifting relative power dynamics influence actors' perceptions of compromise such that they consider anything less than the whole as a loss. The resultant intransigent and maximalist preferences drive actors into a world of zero-sum thinking and perpetuate disputes which may result in violent conflict. The most common examples of territorial indivisibility conform to this logic. The indivisibility of Israel and Palestine, China and Taiwan, and Ireland all result from shifting power dynamics and the resulting change in actor perceptions.

The logic of this theory of indivisibility either subsumes other indivisibility arguments or offers a competing theory grounded in power dynamics rather than social construction. With regard to the former, although I do not argue that religious space is not especially prone to the logics of indivisibility, I contend such processes cannot be understood absent a precipitating dispute and an accompanying aversion to loss. The intransigent maximalist preferences in Israel and Palestine took time to develop and were the product of political processes influencing perceptions of loss and gain. Concerning competing constructivist theories of indivisibility, their merits may best be weighed against this dissertation's theory according to each theory's utility in explaining multiple cases and in establishing a causal priority. In the case of Taiwan, I do not dispute that leaders may deploy propaganda laced with the rhetoric of indivisibility to their own

144

domestic populations, however a focus only on that propaganda ignores why the contested territory may be important to foreign policy elites in the first place. As was true in Israel/Palestine, Taiwan's indivisibility from the mainland developed through a process of shifting power dynamics setting palpable reference points by which each country evaluated the status quo. In the case of Ireland, I argue that the political process prior to the bargaining table matters in the development of indivisibilities and that such preferences are not a socially constructed phenomenon.

I conclude this dissertation with several thoughts on the theoretical implications and extensions of what has preceded.

Prospect theory has played an important role in this dissertation, but the dissertation's focus has differed from other international relations literature that incorporates prospect theory. The typical approach with prospect theory is to set an actor's risk propensity as the outcome of interest, coded as either risk-acceptant or risk-averse. McDermott set this standard in her influential work and others have followed in a similar vein. In so doing, the literature has been squarely focused on prospect theory's evaluation phase, the phase of theory where the actors' behavior – driven by their risk propensity – is determined by their loss or gain frame. Such an approach has value in explaining state behavior in times of risk. The focus in this dissertation, in contrast, lies in prospect theory's editing phase, the phase of the theory preceding the evaluation phase that determines why an actor ends up in a loss or gain frame. This focus is unique in international relations literature. As such, the variable of interest in my theory of indivisibility was a preference, coded as intransigent and maximalist or not, rather than an actor's risk propensity.

Although my theory has focused on preferences, an implication of my theory is that actors with intransigent and maximalist preferences, resulting from a loss frame, would also be more risk-acceptant. Because greater acceptance of risk is likely to raise the possibility for war, it follows that territorial disputes with actors who hold indivisible preferences are especially likely to turn violent. There is a link, therefore, between being averse to compromise and being acceptant of risk that is worthy of further exploration.

Another implication of my theory of indivisibility is that a common distinction within international relations, that of status quo versus revisionist states, creates a simple dichotomy that fails to account for an important dynamic in explaining why states may seek to revise the system. Simply labeling states that are discontented with the status quo as revisionist neglects the source of that dissatisfaction. Some states, as my theory argues, are dissatisfied with the status quo because it represents a loss from status the state previously held. These states continue to hold to the past as their reference point and measure their interactions with other states against the status quo ante. These loss frames are particularly sticky and it follows that they are particularly risk-acceptant. States that have risen in power, alternatively, may be discontent with the status quo not because of what they held in the past, but because of what believe they are entitled to in the future.

This dissertation has aimed to explain the development of intransigent maximalist preferences and has done so by incorporating the logic of prospect theory into the development of preferences. In doing so, it has focused on the dynamics of the theory working only in one direction: moving from divisible to indivisible. It has asked how political dynamics in Israel and Palestine, China and Taiwan, and Ireland resulted in intransigent maximalist preferences. In answer it has focused on the development of loss

146

frames. It has not asked, however, how the indivisible can become divisible. An important extension, therefore, is to explain the development of gain frames and their results on actors' preferences. The logic of the theory suggests that the key difference between maximalist and accommodating preferences lies in how actors frame the possibility of compromise. Empirical evidence from the survey in chapter 3 supports the notion that loss or gain frames are central in explaining bargaining preferences. Why, we might ask, were Irish Republicans willing to end their claim on a unified Ireland and sign the Good Friday Agreement? In other words, why did the indivisible become divisible? An exploration of the roots of gain frames will therefore add an important understanding to bargaining dynamics.

This dissertation has focused solely on territory, but it is possible that the logic of the theory may extend to other domains. Status, for example, is a likely area to explore and one with great power implications. Gilpin notes that one characteristic of hegemonic war is that the major fundamental issue at stake is the nature and governance of the international system, a status that could be explored through the lens of indivisibility. The Cold War offers a case that blends the logic of territory and international status. The United States' doctrine of containment is one avenue to explore the possible utility of this theory of indivisibility with dimensions of territoriality and regional hegemony.

In conclusion, this dissertation has emphasized what Waltz noted in *Theory of International Politics*, namely that the study of international relations is not only the concept of how states interact, but how they stand in relation to each other. But just as power is inherently relational, so too are preferences. As "comparative evaluations",

preferences delineate favored outcomes and are subject to change as the benchmark

against which they are pegged moves (Druckman and Lupia 2000; Simonson 2008).

The survey discussed in chapter three, administered to participants via Amazon's Mechanical Turk, is reproduced in full below.

The following background information was collected from survey respondents:

Age (18-25; 26-35; 36-45; 46-55; 56 or older; Prefer not to say)

Gender (Female; Male; Prefer not to say)

Highest degree or level of education completed (Did not complete high school; High

      school graduate or equivalent; Some college; Four-year degree; Graduate /

      professional degree [e.g. MA, JD, MD); Prefer not to say

Ethnicity (Asian / Pacific Islander; Black / African American; Hispanic / Latino; Native

      American; White; Other; Prefer not to say

Household income (Less than $25,000; $25,000 - $49,999; $50,000 - $74,999; $75,000 -

      $99,999; More than $100,000; Prefer not to say)

Survey Directions:

We interact with other people in many circumstances, including in work, home, and through other everyday activities. In the course of these interactions we often deal with those who have different views or opinions than we do. You will read about situations in

149

which people may have differences of opinion. You will be asked to imagine yourself in that situation and will be asked your opinion about how you would respond. You are NOT being asked which options are most fair or just, but rather how you would likely act if you were in that situation.

Question 1

You are a member of the local school board and the board is considering how to spend a sum of money. You would like the money to be spent on improving the district's music and arts programs while another member of the board would like to spend the money on school facilities. The amount of money is such that it will make a large improvement if applied in whole to either option but will only make minor improvements if split among the options. If the board does not come to an agreement the superintendent will decide to give all of the money to one of the two options. Which of the following do you prefer?

[Treatment A]

You compromise by keeping half of the money for music and arts programs

You pass the decision to the superintendent with 50% chance that all the funds go to music and arts and 50% chance that none of the funds go to music and arts

[Treatment B]

You compromise by losing half of the money to school facilities

You pass the decision to the superintendent with 50% chance that all the funds go to facilities and 50% chance that none of the funds go to facilities

Question 2

You and a neighbor both claim 100% of a disputed area between your two properties. You have the opportunity to settle or to go through legal arbitration. Which of the following do you prefer?

[Treatment A]

You settle and gain half of the contested land

You arbitrate with 50% probability you are awarded the whole of the territory and 50% probability you are awarded none of the property

[Treatment B]

You settle and lose half of the contested land

You arbitrate with 50% probability you lose all of the territory and 50% probability you lose none of it

Question 3

Your business is in a legal dispute with another company over the proceeds of an idea which both companies claim as their own. Which of the following do you prefer?

[Treatment A]

A settlement which takes half of the proceeds from you

A judge's ruling with 50% chance you lose all the proceeds and 50% chance you lose none of the proceeds

[Treatment B]

A settlement which gives you half of the proceeds

A judge's ruling with 50% chance you receive all the proceeds and 50% chance you receive none of the proceeds

Question 4

You are developing a product design for a client who will pay you a significant sum of money if your design is chosen. A colleague of yours is the only competing design developer and suggests you work together and split the profits. Which of the following do you prefer?

[Treatment A]

You receive half of the project payout by co-developing a design with your colleague

You develop your own design with 50% chance you receive all of the project payout yourself and 50% chance you receive none of the payout

[Treatment B]

You lose half of the project payout by co-developing a design with your colleague

You develop your own design with 50% chance you lose all of the project payout yourself and 50% chance you lose none of the payout

Question 5

[Treatment A]

Your house lies on a piece of land that has recently been discovered to have property lines different from the fence that separates your land from your neighbor's. The true property line is twenty feet further from your house than was previously thought, reducing your neighbor's land and extending yours. Your neighbor suggests you split the difference and each pay 50% to move the fence ten feet further from your house, rather than twenty. How willing are you to accept this compromise?

[Treatment B]

Your house lies on a piece of land that has recently been discovered to have property lines different from the fence that separates your land from your neighbor's. The true property line is twenty feet closer to your house than was previously thought, extending your neighbor's land and reducing yours. Your neighbor suggests you split the difference and each pay 50% to move the fence ten feet closer to your house, rather than twenty. How willing are you to accept this compromise?

Question 6

[Treatment A]

You and a sibling both claim a family heirloom. You have had the heirloom for a number of years. Recent family events have reminded you both of the heirloom and you both desire possession of it. Another member of your family whom you know to

be impartial has suggested you both compromise by alternating possession of it annually, however the physical distance between you and your sibling introduces some risk that the heirloom may be damaged or lost if shipped again and again. How willing are you to accept this compromise rather than keeping things as they currently are?

[Treatment B]

You and a sibling both claim a family heirloom. Your sibling has had the heirloom for a number of years. Recent family events have reminded you both of the heirloom and you both desire possession of it. Another member of your family whom you know to be impartial has suggested you both compromise by alternating possession of it annually, however the physical distance between you and your sibling introduces some risk that the heirloom may be damaged or lost if shipped again and again. How willing are you to accept this compromise rather than keeping things as they currently are?

Question 7

[Treatment A]

Suppose you enter a retail store and while completing your purchase you are informed that you were the store's millionth customer and as such were to be awarded a prize of $1,000. After giving you the check, the manager realizes there was a mistake and that the customer behind you was the actual winner. The manager informs you that you are not required to return your winnings but suggests that they

split the prize and you and the customer behind you each take half. How willing are you to accept this compromise?

[Treatment B]

Suppose you enter a retail store and while completing your purchase you see that the customer ahead of you is informed they are the store's millionth customer and as such are to be awarded a prize of $1,000. After a short discussion the manager realizes there was a mistake and that you are the actual winner. The manager informs you that you are not required to share your winnings but suggests that they split the prize and you and the customer ahead of you each take half. How willing are you to accept this compromise?

Question 8

[Treatment A]

You and a partner established a business some years ago in which you each handle separate halves of the company and each take equal salary. In recent years your half of the company brings in considerably more revenue. How willing are you to suggest that revenue sharing between you and your partner should reflect this shift, giving you a higher salary than your partner?

In a sentence, please explain why you feel this way

[Treatment B]

You and a partner established a business some years ago in which you each handle separate halves of the company and each take equal salary. In recent years your partner's half of the company brings in considerably more revenue. Your partner has suggested that revenue sharing between you and your partner should reflect this shift, giving your partner a higher salary than you. How willing are you to accept such a change from your original agreement in which you had equal salary?

In a sentence, please explain why you feel this way.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramson, Scott F., and David B. Carter. 2016. "The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 110 (4): 675–98.

Allison, Graham T. 1999. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2nd ed.. New York: Longman.

Alt, James E., Jeffrey Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. "The Political Economy of International Trade - Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry." *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (6): 689–717.

Ariely, Dan. 2008. *Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions*. 1st ed.. New York, NY: Harper.

Aronson, Shlomo. 2011. *David Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Renaissance*. 1st English ed.. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ashenfelter, Orley, and David E. Bloom. 1984. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence." *American Economic Review* 74 (1): 111.

Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade." *World Politics* 49 (3): 309–38.

Baldwin, David A. 2016. *Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach*. Princeton University Press.

Bardsley, Nicholas, Robin Cubitt, Graham Loomes, Peter Moffatt, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden. 2010. *Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules*. Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Baron, Jonathan. 2014. "Heuristics and Biases." In *The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law*, edited by Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichmann. New York: Oxford University Press.

Baumgarten, Helga. 2005. "The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948–2005." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 34 (4): 25–48.

Ben-Gurion, David. 1970. *Recollections [of] David Ben-Gurion*. London: Macdonald & Co.

Berejekian, Jeffrey. 1997. "The Gains Debate: Framing State Choice." *The American Political Science Review* 91 (4): 789–805.

Berejikian, Jeffrey D., and Bryan R. Early. 2013. "Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve." *Political Psychology* 34 (5): 649–71.

Bew, Paul. 2007. *Ireland the Politics of Enmity, 1789-2006*. Oxford History of Modern Europe. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Biddle, Stephen. 1996. "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict." *International Security* 21 (2): 139.

Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press.

Blumberg, Harold M. 1975. *Weizmann, His Life and Times*. Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein.

Boettcher, William A. 2004. "The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion." *Political Psychology* 25 (3): 331–62.

Bolton, Gary E., and Rami Zwick. 1995. "Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining." *Games and Economic Behavior* 10 (1): 95–121.

Bossert, and Kotaro Suzumura. 2010. *Consistency, Choice, and Rationality*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Bradnock, Robert W. 2010. *Kashmir: Paths to Peace*. London: Chatham House.

Brady, Henry E., David Collier, and EBSCO Publishing. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. 2nd ed.. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Brooks, Stephen G., G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. 2012. "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment." *International Security* 37 (3): 7–51.

Brown, Kris, and Adrian Grant. 2016. "A Lens Over Conflicted Memory: Surveying 'Troubles' Commemoration in Northern Ireland." *Irish Political Studies* 31 (1): 139–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2015.1126925.

Butler, Christopher K. 2007. "Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (2): 227–50.

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. 2017. "Changing Identities in Taiwan under Ma Ying-Jeou." In *Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace*, edited by Lowell Dittmer, 42–60. Oakland, California: University of California Press.

Carpi, Daniel. 1983. "The Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin El-Husseini, and His Diplomatic Activity during World War II (October 1941 - July 1943)." *Studies in Zionism* 4 (1): 101–31.

Chen, Lung-chu. 2016. *The U.S.-Taiwan-China Relationship in International Law and Policy*. Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Chiang, Kai-shek. 1947. *China's Destiny,*. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Clare, George. 1982. *Last Waltz in Vienna: The Rise and Destruction of a Family : 1842-1942*. 1st American ed.. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Clark, Gemma M. 2014. *Everyday Violence in the Irish Civil War*. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 44 (4): 823–30.

Conway, Lucian Gideon, Shannon C. Houck, Laura Janelle Gornick, and Meredith A. Repke. 2017. "Finding the Loch Ness Monster: Left-Wing Authoritarianism in the United States." *Political Psychology*, December. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12470.

Copeland, Dale C. 2000. *The Origins of Major War*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Costello, Francis J. 1997. *Michael Collins: In His Own Words*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

Crawford, Vincent P. 1990. "Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes." *American Economic Review* 80 (2): 213.

Dahl, Robert A. 1957. "The Concept of Power." *Behavioral Science* 2 (3): 201–15.

Daly, Mary E. 2016. *Sixties Ireland: Reshaping the Economy, State and Society, 1957-1973*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Diehl, Paul F. 1992. "What Are They Fighting for? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 29 (3): 333–44.

Dietrich, Franz, and Christian List. 2011. "A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 23 (2): 145–64.

———. 2013. "Where Do Preferences Come From?" *International Journal of Game Theory* 42 (3): 613–37.

———. 2016a. "Mentalism versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective." *Economics & Philosophy* 32 (2): 249–81.

———. 2016b. "Reason-Based Choice and Context-Dependence: An Explanatory Framework." *Economics & Philosophy* 32 (2): 175–229.

Dittmer, Lowell. 2017. *Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace*. Oakland, California: University of California Press.

Dolan, Anne. 2003. *Commemorating the Irish Civil War: History and Memory, 1923-2000*. Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Driesen, Bram, Andrés Perea, and Hans Peters. 2010. "On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games." *Theory and Decision* 68 (4): 367–91.

Druckman, James N. 2001. "Evaluating Framing Effects." *Journal of Economic Psychology* 22 (1): 91–101.

———. 2004. "Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)Relevance of Framing Effects." *The American Political Science Review* 98 (4): 671–86.

Druckman, James N., Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. 2006. "The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science." *The American Political Science Review* 100 (4): 627–35.

———. 2011. "Experiments: An Introduction to Core Concepts." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 15–26. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Druckman, James N., and Arthur Lupia. 2000. "Preference Formation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (1): 1.

———. 2012. "Experimenting with Politics." *Science* 335 (6073): 1177–79.

Dunning, Thad. 2016. "Transparency, Replication, and Cumulative Learning: What Experiments Alone Cannot Achieve." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19: S1–S23.

Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman. 1998. "Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence from Dictator Experiments." *The Economic Journal* 108 (448): 726–35.

Edwards, Aaron. 2017. "Beating the Retreat on a Contested Past? The British Army and the Politics of Commemoration in Northern Ireland." In *Remembering the Troubles: Contesting Recent Past in Northern Ireland*, edited by Jim Smyth, 77–95. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Elms, Deborah Kay. 2004. "Large Costs, Small Benefits: Explaining Trade Dispute Outcomes." *Political Psychology* 25 (2): 241–70.

Fairfield, Tasha. 2013. "Going Where the Money Is: Strategies for Taxing Economic Elites in Unequal Democracies." *World Development* 47 (July): 42–57.

Fanning, Ronan. 1983. *The Four-Leaved Shamrock: Electoral Politics and the National Imagination in Independent Ireland*. O'Donnell Lectures ; 25. Dublin: National University of Ireland.

Farnham, Barbara. 1997. *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49 (3): 379–414.

Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Frederick, Bryan A, Paul R Hensel, and Christopher Macaulay. 2017. "The Issue Correlates of War Territorial Claims Data, 1816–20011." *Journal of Peace Research* 54 (1): 99–108. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316676311.

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1999. "Actors and Preferences in International Relations." In *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, edited by David A. Lake and Robert Powell, 39–76. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Friedman, Jeffrey A., and Richard Zeckhauser. 2017. "Analytic Confidence and Political Decision-Making: Theoretical Principles and Experimental Evidence From National Security Professionals." *Political Psychology* 0 (0). https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.library.nd.edu/doi/10.1111/pops.12465.

Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Bryan R. Early. 2008. "Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4 (1): 21–43.

Gamson, William A. 1995. "Constructing Social Protest." In *Social Movement and Culture*, edited by Hank Johnston and Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Gans, Chaim. 2008. *A Just Zionism on the Morality of the Jewish State*. New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gartzke, Erik. 1999. "War Is in the Error Term." *International Organization* 53 (3): 567–87.

Gelvin, James L. 2008. *The Modern Middle East: A History*. Second edition.. New York: Oxford University Press.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Gerber, Elisabeth R., and John E. Jackson. 1993. "Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions." *The American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 639–56.

Ghanem, As'ad. 2013. "Palestinian Nationalism: An Overview." *Israel Studies* 18 (2): 11–29.

Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. 1997. "Come Home, America." *International Security* 21 (4): 5.

Gibbon, Edward. 1897. *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. New ed.. London: Methuen.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gimpel, Henner. 2007. "Loss Aversion and Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Attribute Negotiations." *Group Decision & Negotiation* 16 (4): 303–19.

Glaser, Charles. 2010. *Rational Theory of International Politics the Logic of Competition and Cooperation*. Princeton, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 2011a. "Will China's Rise Lead to War?" *Foreign Affairs* 90 (2): 80–91.

———. 2011b. "Defending RTIP , Without Offending Unnecessarily." *Security Studies* 20 (3): 469–89.

———. 2015. "A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?: The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation." *International Security* 39 (4): 49–90.

Glaser, Charles, and Chaim Kaufmann. 1998. "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *International Security* 22 (4): 44.

Goddard, Stacie E. 2006. "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy." *International Organization* 60 (1): 35–68.

———. 2010. *Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy: Jerusalem and Northern Ireland*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goertz, Gary. 2017. *Case Studies and Multimethod Research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Goertz, Gary, Paul F. Diehl, and Alexandru Balas. 2016. *The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International System*. Oxford University Press.

Goertz, Gary, and James Mahoney. 2006. "Concepts in Theories: Two-Level Theories." In *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*, by Gary Goertz, 237–68. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2012. *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. New York, Cambridge, Mass.: Harper & Row, Harvard University Press.

Gordon, Leonard H. D. 2007. *Confrontation over Taiwan: Nineteenth-Century China and the Powers*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization* 32 (4): 881–912.

Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. 2002. "Reclaiming the Experimental Tradition in Political Science." In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, edited by Helen V. Milner and Katznelson, 3rd ed., 805–32. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2008. "The Case for Mindless Economics." In *The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook*, edited by Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter, 3–39. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, N.J.: Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University by Princeton University Press.

Güth, Werner, and Reinhard Tietz. 1990. "Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results." *Journal of Economic Psychology* 11 (3): 417–49.

Haas, Mark L. 2001. "Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2).

Hall, Peter A. 2003. "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research." In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 373–404. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Halpern, Ben., and Jehuda Reinharz. 1998. *Zionism and the Creation of a New Society*. Studies in Jewish History. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hao, Zhidong. 2010. *Whither Taiwan and Mainland China National Identity, the State and Intellectuals*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Hassner, Ron E. 2003. "'To Halve and to Hold': Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility." *Security Studies* 12 (4): 1–33.

———. 2009. *War on Sacred Grounds*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Heinrich, Tobias, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and Timothy M. Peterson. 2017. "Sanction Consequences and Citizen Support: A Survey Experiment." *International Studies Quarterly* 61 (1): 98–106.

Hennessey, Thomas. 2005. *Northern Ireland: The Origins of the Troubles*. Dublin, Ireland: Gill & Macmillan.

Henripin, Olivier. 2014. "Intractable Territorial Conflicts and the Strategic Social Construction of Indivisible National Homelands." Ph.D., United States -- Illinois: Northwestern University.

Hensel, Paul R. 1996. "Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15 (1): 43–73.

———. 2001. "Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (1): 81–109.

———. 2012. "Territory: Geography, Contentious Issues, and World Politics." In *What Do We Know About War?*, edited by John Vasquez, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hensel, Paul R., and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2005. "Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims." *GeoJournal* 64 (4): 275–85.

Hermann, Tamar S. 2013. "Zionism and Palestinian Nationalism: Possibilities of Recognition." *Israel Studies* 18 (2): 133–47.

Herzl, Theodor. 1997. "The Jews' State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution to the Issue of the Jews." In *The Jews' State: A Critical English Translation*, by Theodor Herzl, 121–206. Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc.

Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. "Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation." *The American Political Science Review* 96 (3): 593–608.

Holcombe, Randall G. 2000. "Public Goods Theory and Public Policy." *Journal of Value Inquiry* 34 (2–3): 273–86.

Hsiao, Frank S. T., and Lawrence R. Sullivan. 1979. "The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943." *Pacific Affairs* 52 (3): 446–67.

Huang, Jing. 2017. "Xi Jinping's Taiwan Policy: Boxing Taiwan In with the One-China Framework." In *Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace*, edited by Lowell Dittmer, 239–48. Oakland, California: University of California Press.

Huff, Connor, and Robert Schub. 2018. "The Intertemporal Tradeoff in Mobilizing Support for War." *International Studies Quarterly*.

Hurst, Reuben, Taylor Tidwell, and Darren Hawkins. 2017. "Down the Rathole? Public Support for US Foreign Aid." *International Studies Quarterly* 61 (2): 442–54.

Jacobs, Martin. 2016. "Accounting for Changing Tastes: Approaches to Explaining Unstable Individual Preferences." *Review of Economics* 67 (2): 121–183.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1992. "Political Implications of Loss Aversion." *Political Psychology* 13 (2): 187–204.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2003. "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security* 27 (4): 5–56.

———. 2008. *Social States China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Kabalo, Paula. 2018. "City with No Walls: David Ben-Gurion's Jerusalem Vision Post-June 1967." *Modern Judaism - A Journal of Jewish Ideas and Experience*.

Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics." *The Journal of Business* 59 (4): S285–300.

———. 1990. "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem." *Journal of Political Economy* 98 (6): 1325–48.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." *Econometrica* 47 (2): 263–91.

Kan, Shirley A. 2013. "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy - Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei." Congressional Research Service.

Kanner, Michael D. 2004. "Framing and the Role of the Second Actor: An Application of Prospect Theory to Bargaining." *Political Psychology* 25 (2): 213–39.

Kaufman, Stuart J. 2001. *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. New York: Cornell University Press.

Kennan, John, and Robert Wilson. 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information." *Journal of Economic Literature* 31 (1): 45–104.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Khong, Yuen Foong. 1992. *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Kissane, Bill. 2005. *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency." *The American Political Science Review* 100 (3): 369–84.

Kuklinski, James H., Michael D. Cobb, and Martin Gilens. 1997. "Racial Attitudes and the 'New South.'" *The Journal of Politics* 59 (2): 323–49.

Lasswell, Harold D. 1936. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How*. New York, London: Whittlesey house, McGraw-Hill book company, inc.

Ledgerwood, Alison, and Amber E. Boydstun. 2014. "Sticky Prospects: Loss Frames Are Cognitively Stickier than Gain Frames." *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 143 (1): 376–85.

Lee, Tony C. 2018. "Can Xi Jinping Be the next Mao Zedong? Using the Big Five Model to Study Political Leadership." *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, February, 1–25.

Levay, Kevin E., Jeremy Freese, and James N. Druckman. 2016. "The Demographic and Political Composition of Mechanical Turk Samples." *SAGE Open* 6 (1): 1–17.

Levy, Jack S. 1992. "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems." *Political Psychology* 13 (2): 283–310.

———. 1997. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1): 87–112.

Litvinoff, Barnet. 1980. "Chaim Weizmann's Trials and Errors." *Jewish Quarterly* 28 (4): 9–15.

Lustick, Ian S. 1996. "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias." *The American Political Science Review* 90 (3): 605–18.

Lyall, Jason, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai. 2013. "Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan." American Political Science Review. November 2013.

MacDonald, Paul K. 2003. "Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory." *The American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 551–65.

Mahoney, James, and Tulia G. Falleti. 2015. "The Comparative Sequential Method." In *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*, edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Ann Thelen, 211–39. Strategies for Social Inquiry. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Maoz, Zeev, and Ben D. Mor. 2002. *Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Mastanduno, Michael. 1992. "Framing the Japan Problem: The Bush Administration and the Structural Impediments Initiative." *International Journal* 47 (2): 235–64.

Mattar, Philip. 1983. "The Role of the Mufti of Jerusalem in the Political Struggle over the Western Wall, 1928-29." *Middle Eastern Studies* 19 (1): 104–18.

———. 1988a. *The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin Al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement*. New York: Columbia University Press.

———. 1988b. "The Mufti of Jerusalem and the Politics of Palestine." *Middle East Journal* 42 (2): 227–40.

McAuley, James W. 2017. "'Climbing over Dead Brambles'? Politics and Memory within Ulster Loyalism." In *Remembering the Troubles: Contesting Recent Past in Northern Ireland*, edited by Jim Smyth, 96–114. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

McBride, Ian. 2017. "The Truth about the Troubles." In *Remembering the Troubles: Contesting the Recent Past in Northern Ireland*, edited by Jim Smyth, 9–43. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

McCarthy, John D., Jackie Smith, and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. "Accessing Public, Media, Electoral, and Governmental Agendas." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 291–311. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

167

McDermott, Rose. 1998. *Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

———. 2004. "Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First Decade." *Political Psychology* 25 (2): 289–312.

———. 2011. "Internal and External Validity." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 27–40. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

McDermott, Rose, James H. Fowler, and Oleg Smirnov. 2008. "On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory Preferences." *The Journal of Politics* 70 (2): 335–50.

McKittrick, David. 2001. *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles*. Edinburgh: Mainstream.

McKittrick, David, and David McVea. 2012. *Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict*. Rev. ed.. London: Viking.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. 1 edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. "Prospect Theory and Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science* 8 (1): 1–21.

Miller, Aaron David. 2008. *The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace*. New York: Bantam Books.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics: Erratum." *International Organization* 51 (1): 513–53.

Morris, Benny. 2008. *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Moten, A. Rashid. 1980. "Palestinian Nationalism: Its Growth and Development." *International Studies* 19 (2): 197–219.

Muldoon, Orla T. 2004. "Children of the Troubles: The Impact of Political Violence in Northern Ireland." *Journal of Social Sciences* 60 (3): 453–68.

Mullinix, Kevin J., Thomas J. Leeper, James N. Druckman, and Jeremy Freese. 2015. "The Generalizability of Survey Experiments." Journal of Experimental Political Science. January 2015.

Murnighan, J. Keith, Alvin E. Roth, and Francoise Schoumaker. 1988. "Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study." *Journal of Risk & Uncertainty* 1 (1): 101–24.

Muslih, Muhammad. 1987. "Arab Politics and the Rise of Palestinian Nationalism." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16 (4): 77–94. https://doi.org/10.2307/2536721.

Narayanan, Raviprasad. 2013. "Stability with Chinese Characteristics: Hu Jintao's Taiwan Policy." *China Report* 49 (4): 413–24.

Neale, Margaret A., and Max H. Bazerman. 1985. "The Effects of Framing and Negotiator Overconfidence on Bargaining Behaviors and Outcomes." *The Academy of Management Journal* 28 (1): 34–49.

Nye, Joseph S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. 1st ed.. New York: Public Affairs.

Ó Ruairc, Pádraig Óg. 2016. *Truce: Murder, Myth and the Last Days of the Irish War of Independence*. Cork, Ireland]: The Mercier Press.

Overberg, Henk. 1997. "Theodor Herzl: The Jews' State - An Introduction." In *The Jews' State: A Critical Translation*, by Theodor Herzl, 1–120. Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc.

Pang, Yang Huei. 2014. "Taiwan and Chiang Kai-Shek's Fangong Dalu." *Asian Affairs* 45 (1): 79–107.

Pappé, Ilan. 2006. *A History of Modern Palestine One Land, Two Peoples*. 2nd ed.. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2015. "The Framing of the Question of Palestine by the Early Palestinian Press: Zionist Settler-Colonialism and the Newspaper Filastin, 1912–1922." *Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies* 14 (1): 59–81.

Patterson, Henry. 2013. *Ireland's Violent Frontier: The Border and Anglo-Irish Relations during the Troubles*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Posen, Barry R., and Andrew L. Ross. 1996. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy." *International Security* 21 (3): 5.

Posner, Daniel N. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review* 98 (4): 529–45.

Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60 (1): 169–203.

Press, Daryl G. 2001. "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare." *International Security* 26 (2): 5–44.

Press, Daryl Grayson. 2005. *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Prince, Simon. 2011. "Narrative and the Start of the Northern Irish Troubles: Ireland's Revolutionary Tradition in Comparative Perspective." *Journal of British Studies* 50 (4): 941–64.

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42 (3): 427–60.

Rabin, Matthew. 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics." *The American Economic Review; Nashville* 83 (5): 1281.

Redd, Steven B., and Alex Mintz. 2013. "Policy Perspectives on National Security and Foreign Policy Decision Making." *Policy Studies Journal* 41 (April): S11–37.

Reinharz, Jehuda. 1983. "Chaim Weizmann: The Shaping of a Zionist Leader before the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 18 (2): 205–31.

———. 1985. *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader*. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1992. "Chaim Weizmann: Statesman without a State." *Modern Judaism* 12 (3): 225–42.

———. 1993. *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman*. Studies in Jewish History. New York: Oxford University Press.

Reiter, Dan. 2003. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (1): 27–43.

Ripsman, Norrin M., Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell. 2016. *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*. 1 edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Rosato, Sebastian. 2011. *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

———. 2015. "The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers." *International Security* 39 (3): 48–88.

Rosenberg-Friedman, Lilach. 2015. "David Ben-Gurion and the 'Demographic Threat': His Dualistic Approach to Natalism, 1936–63." *Middle Eastern Studies* 51 (5): 742–66.

Roth, Avin E. 1995. "Bargaining Experiments." In *The Handbook of Experimental Economics*, by John H. Kagel and Avin E. Roth, 253–348. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Roy, Denny. 2003. *Taiwan: A Political History*. Cornell Paperbacks. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Russo, Alessandro. 2013. "How Did the Cultural Revolution End? The Last Dispute between Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, 1975." *Modern China* 39 (3): 239–79.

Ryan, Timothy J. 2014. "Reconsidering Moral Issues in Politics." *Journal of Politics* 76 (2): 380–97.

Salovey, Peter, and Pamela Williams-Piehota. 2004. "Field Experiments in Social Psychology: Message Framing and the Promotion of Health Protective Behaviors." *The American Behavioral Scientist; Thousand Oaks* 47 (5): 488–505.

Sammy, Rashid. 2015. "The Emergence and Evolution of Palestinian Nationalism." *International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding* 2 (2): 1–7.

Samuelson, Paul A. 1954. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 36 (4): 387–89.

———. 1958. "Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 40 (4): 332–38.

Sanders, Andrew., and Ian S. Wood. 2012. *Times of Troubles: Britain's War in Northern Ireland*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1991. "Comparing and Miscomparing." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3 (3): 243–57.

Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2011. *Leaders at War How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*. Academic Complete (Ebrary). Ithaca, N.Y., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Schaub, Gary. 2004. "Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory." *Political Psychology* 25 (3): 389–411.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. Law Books Recommended for Libraries. Atomic Energy ; 49. New Haven, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

———. 1984. *Choice and Consequence*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Schneer, Jonathan. 2010. *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. 1st ed.. New York: Random House.

171

Schweller, Randall L. 2011. "Rational Theory for a Bygone Era." *Security Studies* 20 (3): 460–68.

Shafir, Eldar, Itamar Simonson, and Amos Tversky. 1993. "Reason-Based Choice." *Cognition* 49 (1–2): 11–36.

Shapira, Anita. 2014. *Ben-Gurion: Father of Modern Israel*. Jewish Lives (New Haven, Conn.). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Shiquan, Xu. 2012. "DPP Transformation and Constitutional One China." *American Foreign Policy Interests* 34 (4): 216–19.

Simonson, Itamar. 2008. "Will I like a 'Medium' Pillow? Another Look at Constructed and Inherent Preferences." *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 18 (3): 155–69.

Sniderman, Paul M. 2011. "The Logic and Design of the Survey Experiment: An Autobiography of a Methodological Innovation." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, edited by Donald P. Green, James N. Druckman, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 102–14. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51 (4): 464–81.

Steinberg, James, and Michael O'Hanlon. 2014. "Keep Hope Alive." *Foreign Affairs* 93 (4): 107–17.

Sung, Yun-Wing. 2005. *The Emergence of Greater China: The Economic Integration of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong*. Studies on the Chinese Economy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Talhami, Ghada. 1986. "From Palestinian Nationhood to Palestinian Nationalism." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 8 (4): 346–57.

Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2004. *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Taylor, Jeremy E. 2010. "Qujianghua: Disposing of and Re-Appraising the Remnants of Chiang Kai-Shek's Reign on Taiwan." *Journal of Contemporary History* 45 (1): 181–96.

Tessler, Mark A. 2009. *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. 2nd ed.. Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Thaler, Richard H. 1980. "Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 1 (1): 39–60.

Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2008. *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Thelen, Kathleen, and James Mahoney. 2015. "Comparative-Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science." In *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*, edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, 3–36. Strategies for Social Inquiry. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Toft, Monica Duffy. 2002. "Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War." *Security Studies* 12 (2): 82–119.

———. 2003. *The Geography of Ethnic Violence Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 2006. "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War." *Security Studies* 15 (1): 34–69.

Tomz, Michael R., and Jessical L. P. Weeks. 2013. "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace." *The American Political Science Review* 107 (4): 849–65.

Townshend, Charles. 2013. *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918-1923*. London: Allen Lane.

Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1974. "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." *Science* 185 (4157): 1124–31.

———. 1981. "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice." *Science* 211 (4481): 453–58.

Tversky, Amos, and Itamar Simonson. 1993. "Context-Dependent Preferences." *Management Science* 39 (10): 1179–89.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

———. 1999. *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y., Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Wachman, Alan. 2007. *Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity*. Studies in Asian Security. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Waldner, David. 2015. "Process Tracing and Qualitative Causal Inference." *Security Studies* 24 (2): 239–50.

Wallander, Celeste A. 1999. *Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Walsh, Oonagh. 2002. *Ireland's Independence, 1880-1923*. Introductions to History (New York, N.Y.). London ; New York: Routledge.

Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Academic Complete (Ebrary). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

———. 1999. "Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security* 23 (4): 5–48.

Walter, Barbara F. 2009. *Reputation and Civil War Why Separatist Conflicts Are so Violent*. Academic Complete (Ebrary). Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reprinted with corrections.. Addison-Wesley Series in Political Science. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Weeks, Jessica L. P. 2014. *Dictators at War and Peace*. Academic Complete (Ebrary). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Weizmann, Chaim. 1949. *Trial and Error; the Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann.* Philadelphia, New York: Jewish Publication Society of America, Harper.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 67. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2004. "The State as Person in International Theory." *Review of International Studies* 30 (2): 289–316.

Weyland, Kurt. 1996. "Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory." *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (2): 185–207.

Williamson, Daniel C. 2017. *Anglo-Irish Relations in the Early Troubles: 1969-1972*. London ; New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2007. "Field Research." In *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, 123–46. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wood, Michael J. 2015. "Some Dare Call It Conspiracy: Labeling Something a Conspiracy Theory Does Not Reduce Belief in It." *Political Psychology* 37 (5): 695–705. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12285.

Yang, Kuisong, and Sheng Mao. 2016. "Unafraid of the Ghost: The Victim Mentality of Mao Zedong and the Two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s." *China Review* 16 (1): 1–34.

Zakaria, Fareed. 1999. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Zald, Mayer N. 1996. "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.